

prescribe includes physicians ‘licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices’ to dispense controlled substances. § 802(21).’). The Agency has applied these principles consistently. *See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D.*, 76 FR 71,371, 71,372 (2011), *pet. for rev. denied*, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th Cir. 2012); *Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D.*, 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).<sup>3</sup>

According to California statute, “dispense” means “to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the prescribing, furnishing, packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for that delivery.” Cal. Health & Safety Code section 11010 (West 2024). Further, a “practitioner” means a person “licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, or administer, a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in [the] state.” *Id.* section 11026(c).

Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant currently lacks authority to practice as a dentist in California. As discussed above, an individual must be a licensed practitioner to dispense a controlled substance in California. Thus, because Registrant currently lacks authority to practice as a dentist in California and, therefore, is not currently authorized to handle controlled substances in California, Registrant is not eligible to maintain a DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant’s DEA registration be revoked.

<sup>3</sup> This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the CSA. First, Congress defined the term “practitioner” to mean “a physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of professional practice.” 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner’s registration, Congress directed that “[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.” 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner’s registration is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. *See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D.*, 76 FR 71371–72; *Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D.*, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); *Dominick A. Ricci, M.D.*, 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); *Bobby Watts, M.D.*, 53 FR 11919, 11920 (1988); *Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D.*, 43 FR 27617.

## Order

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No. FR4257792 issued to Samreen Riaz, D.D.S. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending applications of Samreen Riaz, D.D.S., to renew or modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of Samreen Riaz, D.D.S., for additional registration in California. This Order is effective January 29, 2025.

## Signing Authority

This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on December 20, 2024, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA **Federal Register Liaison Officer** has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the **Federal Register**.

### Heather Achbach,

*Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.*

[FR Doc. 2024–31319 Filed 12–27–24; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4410–09–P**

## DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

### Drug Enforcement Administration

#### Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P.; Decision and Order

On June 8, 2021, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P., of Jackson, Tennessee (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 4. The OSC proposed the revocation of Registrant’s Certificate of Registration No. MY1093424, alleging that Registrant’s registration should be revoked because Registrant is “currently without authority to handle controlled substances in Tennessee, the state in which [he is] registered with DEA.” *Id.* at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).

The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in

default. *Id.* at 2–3 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing. RFAA, at 2.<sup>1</sup> “A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the registrant’s/applicant’s right to a hearing and an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].” 21 CFR 1301.43(e).

Further, “[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order pursuant to [21 CFR] § 1316.67.” *Id.* § 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant’s default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(e). RFAA, at 1.

## Findings of Fact

The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant’s default, the factual allegations in the OSC are admitted. According to the OSC, on September 30, 2019, Registrant’s Tennessee registered nurse license and Tennessee advanced practice registered nurse certificate both expired. RFAAX 2, 2. According to Tennessee online records, of which the Agency takes official notice, both Registrant’s Tennessee registered nurse license and Tennessee advanced practice registered nurse certificate are revoked.<sup>2</sup> NURSYS License Verification Search, <https://www.nursys.com/LQC/LQCSearch.aspx> (last visited date of signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant is not licensed to practice as a nurse

<sup>1</sup> Based on the Government’s submissions in its RFAA dated June 11, 2024, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was adequate. Specifically, the included Declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on June 14, 2021, a DEA Task Force Officer (TFO) personally served a copy of the OSC to Registrant at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee, where Registrant remained incarcerated. RFAAX 3, at 2–3, Attachment C.

<sup>2</sup> Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency “may take official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding—even in the final decision.” United States Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), “[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.” Accordingly, Registrant may dispute the Agency’s finding by filing a properly supported motion for reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed and served by email to the other party and to the DEA Office of the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration at [dea.addo.attorneys@dea.gov](mailto:dea.addo.attorneys@dea.gov).

practitioner in Tennessee, the state in which he is registered with DEA.

### Discussion

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 “upon a finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.”

With respect to a practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner’s registration. *Gonzales v. Oregon*, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (“The Attorney General can register a physician to dispense controlled substances ‘if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.’ . . . The very definition of a ‘practitioner’ eligible to prescribe includes physicians ‘licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices’ to dispense controlled substances. § 802(21).”). The Agency has applied these principles consistently. *See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D.*, 76 FR 71371, 71372 (2011), *pet. for rev. denied*, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th Cir. 2012); *Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D.*, 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).<sup>3</sup>

According to Tennessee statute, “dispense” means “to deliver a controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including

<sup>3</sup> This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the CSA. First, Congress defined the term “practitioner” to mean “a physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of professional practice.” 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner’s registration, Congress directed that “[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.” 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner’s registration is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. *See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D.*, 76 FR at 71371–72; *Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D.*, 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); *Dominick A. Ricci, M.D.*, 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); *Bobby Watts, M.D.*, 53 FR 11919, 11,920 (1988); *Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D.*, 43 FR at 27617.

the prescribing, administering, packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for that delivery.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–17–402(7) (2024). Further, a “practitioner” means “a physician . . . or other person licensed, registered or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or administer a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in [the] state.” *Id.* § 39–17–402(23)(A).

Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant lacks authority to practice as a nurse practitioner in Tennessee. As discussed above, an individual must be a licensed practitioner to dispense a controlled substance in Tennessee. Thus, because Registrant lacks authority to practice as a nurse practitioner in Tennessee and, therefore, is not authorized to handle controlled substances in Tennessee, Registrant is not eligible to maintain a DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant’s DEA registration be revoked.

### Order

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No. MY1093424, issued to Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending applications of Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P., to renew or modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P., for additional registration in Tennessee. This Order is effective January 29, 2025.

### Signing Authority

This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on December 20, 2024, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this

document upon publication in the **Federal Register**.

**Heather Achbach,**

*Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.*

[FR Doc. 2024–31329 Filed 12–27–24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P

## DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

### Notice of Lodging of Proposed Consent Decree Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act

On December 19, 2024, the Department of Justice lodged a proposed Consent Decree with the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia in the lawsuit entitled *United States and Commonwealth of Virginia, Secretary of Natural and Historic Resources v. FMC Corporation*, Civil Action No. 5:24–CR–108.

The lawsuit was initiated by a complaint filed by the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia (the “Trustees”) in their capacity as the legally designated trustees for natural resources in Virginia. The complaint alleged, *inter alia*, that the Defendant was liable for damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources resulting from the release of hazardous substances at and from the Avtex Fibers, Inc. Site (the “Site”) in Front Royal, Virginia, pursuant to three statutes: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, the Virginia State Water Control Law, and the Virginia Waste Management Act.

The Consent Decree resolves the claims of the Trustees against the Defendant for a total payment of \$1,674,361. Of this amount, \$1,393,219 will be paid into the United States’ Natural Resource Damages Assessment and Restoration (“NRDAR”) Fund managed by the U.S. Department of the Interior, which will reimburse the Department’s natural resource damages assessment activities and fund projects aimed at restoring the injured natural resources at the Site. The remaining \$281,142 will be paid to the Commonwealth of Virginia for restoration of injured natural resources arising from groundwater contamination at the Site, and to reimburse the Commonwealth’s natural resource damages assessment costs. In addition, as part of the settlement the United States will pay \$2,496,305 into the NRDAR Fund to support restoration projects. This latter amount will resolve the alleged liability of four settling