

# Rules and Regulations

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This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

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## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2021-0696; Project Identifier MCAI-2021-00032-T; Amendment 39-21923; AD 2022-03-06]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of loose or disconnected powerplant FIREX interconnection hoses. This AD requires replacing certain existing FIREX hose assemblies with a newly designed FIREX hose assembly, as specified in a Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

**DATES:** This AD is effective March 17, 2022.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publications listed in this AD as of March 17, 2022.

**ADDRESSES:** For TCCA material incorporated by reference (IBR) in this AD, contact TCCA, Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada; telephone 888-663-3639; email [AD-CN@tc.gc.ca](mailto:AD-CN@tc.gc.ca); internet <https://tc.canada.ca/en/aviation>. You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des

Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available in the AD docket at <https://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2021-0696.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket at <https://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2021-0696; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Elizabeth Dowling, Aerospace Engineer, Mechanical Systems and Administrative Services Section, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516-228-7300; fax 516-794-5531; email [9-avs-nyaco-cos@faa.gov](mailto:9-avs-nyaco-cos@faa.gov).

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Background

TCCA, which is the aviation authority for Canada, has issued TCCA AD CF-2021-01, dated January 8, 2021 (TCCA AD CF-2021-01) (also referred to as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or the MCAI), to correct an unsafe condition for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes.

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. The NPRM published in the **Federal Register** on August 25, 2021 (86 FR 47424). The NPRM was prompted by reports of loose powerplant FIREX interconnection hoses, and in one instance a hose was found disconnected. An investigation by the manufacturer determined that if the instructions for connecting the FIREX hose are not followed properly, hoses can become loose or disconnected. The NPRM proposed to require replacing

certain existing FIREX hose assemblies with a newly designed FIREX hose assembly, as specified in TCCA AD CF-2021-01.

The FAA is issuing this AD to address the possibility that fire extinguishing agent may not be effectively applied should a fire occur within a powerplant assembly that has a partially or completely disconnected FIREX hose, which could result in the inability to put out a fire in the engine. See the MCAI for additional background information.

#### Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive

##### Comments

The FAA received a comment from Air Line Pilots Association, International, who supported the NPRM without change.

The FAA received an additional comment from Delta Air Lines. The following presents the comment received on the NPRM and the FAA's response.

#### Request To Withdraw the Proposed AD

Delta Air Lines (DAL) requested that the FAA withdraw the proposed AD. DAL stated that it had already accomplished the required actions of paragraph (g) of the proposed AD by accomplishing the actions specified in Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletin (SB) BD500-262003 Issue 002, dated January 7, 2020.

The FAA does not agree with the request to withdraw this AD. Even though DAL is the only current U.S. operator of the applicable airplanes, the AD must still be issued in case of any future imports of the airplanes.

#### Conclusion

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as proposed. Except for minor editorial changes, this AD is adopted as proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any operator. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

#### Related Service Information Under 14 CFR Part 51

TCCA AD CF-2021-01 describes procedures for replacing certain existing

FIREX hose assemblies on each powerplant with a newly designed FIREX hose assembly with provisions for the installation of safety cables at each end, in order to prevent the hose from becoming loose or disconnected.

This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the **ADDRESSES** section.

**Costs of Compliance**

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 36 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

**ESTIMATED COSTS FOR REQUIRED ACTIONS**

Labor cost	Parts cost	Cost per product	Cost on U.S. operators
5 work-hours × \$85 per hour = \$425 .....	\$13,012	\$13,437	\$483,732

According to the manufacturer, some or all of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected operators. The FAA does not control warranty coverage for affected operators. As a result, the FAA has included all known costs in the cost estimate.

**Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

**Regulatory Findings**

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

- (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
- (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
- (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

**The Amendment**

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

- 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

**§ 39.13 [Amended]**

- 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

**2022-03-06 Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.):** Amendment 39-21923; Docket No. FAA-2021-0696; Project Identifier MCAI-2021-00032-T.

**(a) Effective Date**

This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective March 17, 2022.

**(b) Affected ADs**

None.

**(c) Applicability**

This AD applies to Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (type certificate previously held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) AD CF-2021-01, dated January 8, 2021 (TCCA AD CF-2021-01).

**(d) Subject**

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 26, Fire protection.

**(e) Reason**

This AD was prompted by reports of loose or disconnected powerplant FIREX

interconnection hoses. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the possibility that fire extinguishing agent may not be effectively applied should a fire occur within a powerplant assembly that has a partially or completely disconnected FIREX hose, which could result in the inability to put out a fire in the engine.

**(f) Compliance**

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

**(g) Requirements**

Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with, TCCA AD CF-2021-01.

**(h) Exceptions to TCCA AD CF-2021-01**

- (1) Where TCCA AD CF-2021-01 refers to its effective date, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
- (2) Where TCCA AD CF-2021-01 refers to “hours air time,” this AD requires using “flight hours.”

**(i) No Reporting Requirement**

Although the service information referenced in TCCA AD CF-2021-01 specifies to submit certain information to the manufacturer, this AD does not include that requirement.

**(j) Additional AD Provisions**

The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs):* The Manager, New York ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the certification office, send it to ATTN: Program Manager, Continuing Operational Safety, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516-228-7300; fax 516-794-5531. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.

(2) *Contacting the Manufacturer:* For any requirement in this AD to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, New York ACO Branch,

FAA; or TCCA; or Airbus Canada Limited Partnership's TCCA Design Approval Organization (DAO). If approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-authorized signature.

**(k) Related Information**

For more information about this AD, contact Elizabeth Dowling, Aerospace Engineer, Mechanical Systems and Administrative Services Section, FAA, New York ACO Branch, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516-228-7300; fax 516-794-5531; email [9-avs-nyaco-cos@faa.gov](mailto:9-avs-nyaco-cos@faa.gov).

**(l) Material Incorporated by Reference**

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Transport Canada Civil Aviation AD CF-2021-01, dated January 8, 2021.

(ii) [Reserved]

(3) For TCCA AD CF-2021-01, contact Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada; telephone 888-663-3639; email [AD-CN@tc.gc.ca](mailto:AD-CN@tc.gc.ca); internet <https://tc.canada.ca/en/aviation>.

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.

(5) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, email [fr.inspection@nara.gov](mailto:fr.inspection@nara.gov), or go to: <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued on January 20, 2022.

**Lance T. Gant,**

*Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 2022-02753 Filed 2-9-22; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

**Federal Aviation Administration**

**14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. FAA-2021-0944; Project Identifier MCAI-2020-00800-G; Amendment 39-21925; AD 2022-03-08]

**RIN 2120-AA64**

**Airworthiness Directives; Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG (Type Certificate Previously Held by GROB Aircraft AG, Grob Aerospace GmbH i.l., Grob Aerospace GmbH, Burkhart Grob Luft—und Raumfahrt GmbH & Co. KG) Gliders**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG (type certificate previously held by GROB Aircraft AG, Grob Aerospace GmbH i.l., Grob Aerospace GmbH, Burkhart Grob Luft—und Raumfahrt GmbH & Co. KG) Model G102 ASTIR CS, G103 TWIN ASTIR, G103 TWIN II, G103A TWIN II ACRO, G103C TWIN III ACRO, and G 103 C TWIN III SL gliders. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as corrosion on the elevator control pushrod. This AD requires inspecting the elevator control pushrod for water and corrosion and replacing the pushrod if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

**DATES:** This AD is effective March 17, 2022.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of March 17, 2022.

**ADDRESSES:** For service information identified in this final rule, contact Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG, Steige 3, D-88487 Walpertshofen, Germany; phone: +49 (0) 7353 22 43; email: [info@LTB-Lindner.com](mailto:info@LTB-Lindner.com); website: <https://www.ltb-lindner.com>. You may view this service information at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust, Kansas City, MO 64106. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110. It is also available at <https://www.regulations.gov> by

searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2021-0944.

**Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket at <https://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2021-0944; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, the MCAI, any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Jim Rutherford, Aviation Safety Engineer, General Aviation & Rotorcraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, MO 64106; phone: (816) 329-4165; email: [jim.rutherford@faa.gov](mailto:jim.rutherford@faa.gov).

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**Background**

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG Model G102 ASTIR CS, G103 TWIN ASTIR, G103 TWIN II, G103A TWIN II ACRO, G103C TWIN III ACRO, and G 103 C TWIN III SL gliders. The NPRM published in the **Federal Register** on October 29, 2021 (86 FR 59903). The NPRM was prompted by MCAI originated by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union. EASA issued EASA AD 2020-0138, dated June 19, 2020 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to address an unsafe condition on Fiberglas-Technik Rudolf Lindner GmbH & Co. KG Model G102 ASTIR CS, G103 TWIN ASTIR, G103 TWIN II, G103A TWIN II ACRO, G103C TWIN III ACRO, and G 103 C TWIN III SL gliders. The MCAI states:

During a routine inspection, a severely corroded elevator control pushrod was found in the vertical fin on a Grob TWIN ASTIR sailplane. The technical investigation results revealed that water had soaked into the elevator control pushrod, causing the corrosion damage and subsequent considerable weakening of the steel tube pushrod.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to failure of the elevator control pushrod, possibly resulting in loss of control of the sailplane.

To address this unsafe condition, Fiberglas-Technik R. Lindner GmbH & Co. KG published the [technische mitteilung/service bulletin] TM/SB and [anweisung/