- *Fax:* (202) 459–9673, Attn: Ji Lee.
- *Mail:* Attn: Ji Lee, NCO, 2415 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314, USA.

Instructions: Response to this RFI is voluntary. Each individual or institution is requested to submit only one response. Submissions must not exceed 10 pages in 12 point or larger font, with a page number provided on each page. Responses should include the name of the person(s) or organization(s) filing the comment. Responses to this RFI may be posted online at *http://www.nitrd.gov.* Therefore, no business proprietary information, copyrighted information, or personally identifiable information should be submitted in response to this RFI.

In accordance with FAR 15.202(3), responses to this notice are not offers and cannot be accepted by the Government to form a binding contract. Responders are solely responsible for all expenses associated with responding to this RFI.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ji Lee at *nscr-rfi@nitrd.gov,* 202–459–9674, or by post mailing to 2415 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314, USA. Individuals who use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877–8339 between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern time, Monday through Friday.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The prompt, successful, and nimble deployment of computational resources (including expertise) via the COVID–19 High-Performance Computing (HPC) Consortium has demonstrated its essential role in the Nation's response to emergencies. This backdrop has led to the conceptualization of a National Strategic Computing Reserve (NSCR), comprising a coalition of experts and resource providers that could be mobilized quickly to provide critical computational resources (including compute, software, data, and technical expertise) in times of urgent need.

Background Information: The COVID–19 HPC Consortium (*https://covid19-hpc-consortium.org*) was formed in March 2020 and offers an example of how the consortium rapidly delivered scientific insights. The Consortium brought together the Federal Government, industry, and academic leaders to provide access to the world's most powerful computational resources in support of COVID–19 research. Within its first week of existence, the Consortium instantiated an operational framework for providing computational resources for rapid crisis response. The Consortium effectively:

- Worked together across institutional and organizational boundaries within government, industry, and academia to create a common portal to access computational resources and to coalesce ad hoc efforts in smaller ''consortia'' around the country;
- Ramped up quickly to meet urgent computational resource requirements not easily available through other means; this ramp-up included the development and adaptation of review, matching and on-boarding processes for accessing these resources;
- Set up a communications and user engagement framework for a worldwide community; and
- Accelerated explorations in basic understanding of the SARS–CoV2 virus, its host interactions, strategies to mitigate its spread, and early-stage drug development.

With this RFI, we seek to aggregate the lessons learned from the COVID–19 HPC Consortium with other broader community input towards the potential design of a NSCR effort.

Information Requested: Responders are asked to answer one or more of the following questions in the responses to the RFI:

1. *Deployment Scenarios:* What are envisioned scenarios under which it would be beneficial to make NSCR computational resources available for use? What are relevant characteristics to consider regarding the design of triggers for activating and deactivating the NSCR? What approaches might the NSCR utilize to test readiness for such scenarios? Are there other barriers to activating NSCR that would need to be addressed?

2. *Computational Resources:* By what means will the NSCR computational resources be recruited, vetted, and sustained for use when needed? What are appropriate incentives and mechanisms for compensation? What principles might be employed in assessing the suitability of resources for inclusion in the NSCR? What types of research (*e.g.,* fundamental research, Controlled Unclassified Information research, proprietary research) should the NSCR be provisioned to support?

3. *NSCR Providers:* How should the resource providers' contributions to NSCR be determined? What approaches should guide the selection and allocation of the NSCR computational resources to users, and what roles do resource providers have in determining these approaches? By what means can the NSCR computational resource providers opt in or opt out on computational resource allocations?

4. *NSCR Users:* By what means and with what principles should allocations for NSCR computational resources be considered? What should constitute eligibility to apply for computational resources? What kind of eligibility restrictions/selection criteria would be appropriate for users and the use cases of applications of NSCR?

5. *Community Formation:* What types of community outreach and communications will help enhance the likelihood of connecting the NSCR computational resources to the relevant computational, scientific, and emergency-response communities? With what organizations and services should the NSCR coordinate to enhance its effectiveness?

6. *Partnership Agreements:* What are key aspects of partnership agreements (*e.g.,* access to results, intellectual property rights) that can help sustain the NSCR over time?

7. *Relationship to Other Strategic Reserves:* Are there other strategic reserves that are relevant to NSCR? How can NSCR connect or interface with those reserves? What lessons can be learned from other strategic reserves that might inform the process of standing up a NSCR?

Submitted by the National Science Foundation in support of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development National Coordination Office on December 16, 2020.

(Authority: 42 U.S.C. 1861.)

Suzanne H. Plimpton,

Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation.

[FR Doc. 2020–28142 Filed 12–21–20; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Sunshine Act Meeting

TIME AND DATE: 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, January 12, 2021.

PLACE: Virtual.

STATUS: The one item may be viewed by the public through webcast only.

MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED:

64964—Pipeline Investigation Report—Atmos Energy Corporation Natural Gas-Fueled Explosion, Dallas, Texas, February 23, 2018

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Candi Bing at (202) 590–8384 or by email at *bingc@ntsb.gov.*

Media Information Contact: Keith Holloway by email at *keith.holloway@ntsb.gov* or at (202) 314–6100.

This meeting will take place virtually. The public may view it through a live

or archived webcast by accessing a link under ''Webcast of Events'' on the NTSB home page at *www.ntsb.gov.*

There may be changes to this event due to the evolving situation concerning the novel coronavirus (COVID–19). Schedule updates, including weather-related cancellations, are also available at *www.ntsb.gov.*

The National Transportation Safety Board is holding this meeting under the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(b).

Dated: Friday, December 18, 2020.

Candi R. Bing,

Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 2020–28405 Filed 12–18–20; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 7533–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC–2020–0271]

Order to ConverDyn Suspending Exports of Certain Source Material

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Order; issuance.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an order to ConverDyn suspending its authority to export certain source material to the United Kingdom (U.K.). This suspension is required due to the U.K.'s exit from the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Exports of EURATOM-obligated and Canadian-obligated source material to the U.K. are currently not authorized.

DATES: This Order is effective on January 1, 2021.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2020–0271 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly available information related to this document using any of the following methods:

- *Federal Rulemaking Website:* Go to *https://www.regulations.gov* and search for Docket ID NRC–2020–0271. Address questions about Docket IDs in *Regulations.gov* to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301–287–9127; email: *Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov.* For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** section of this document.
- *NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):* You may obtain publicly available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at *https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.* To begin the search, select ''Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to *pdr.resource@nrc.gov.* The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this document.
- *Attention:* The PDR, where you may examine, and order copies of public documents is currently closed. You may submit your request to the PDR via email at *pdr.resource@nrc.gov* or call 1–800–397–4209 between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lauren Mayros, Office of International Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–287–9088, email: *Lauren.Mayros@nrc.gov.*

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The United States engages in significant nuclear cooperation with other nations, including the authorized distribution of source material, pursuant to the terms of an Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement). ConverDyn currently holds two specific licenses, XSOU8846/01 and XSOU8789/07, authorizing the export of source material to several countries including the U.K. ConverDyn's export licenses were issued under the legal framework of the 123 Agreement between the U.S. and EURATOM.

On December 31, 2020, the U.K. will exit from EURATOM, and on January 1, 2021, a 123 Agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. will enter into force. The U.S. Government has already made arrangements with the Government of the U.K. for this transition to occur on January 1, 2021 for all NRC-licensed exports to the U.K. However, beginning on January 1, 2021, the NRC is currently unable to authorize the export of EURATOM-obligated and Canadian-obligated material from the U.S. to the U.K., until pre-approval to retransfer such material to the U.K. is received from EURATOM or the Canadian government, respectively.

This suspension is required as an operation of law and only applies to exports of EURATOM-obligated or Canadian-obligated source material to the U.K. The NRC is reproducing the text of the order as an attachment to this **Federal Register** notice.

Dated: December 17, 2020.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Nader L. Mamish,

Director, Office of Internal Programs.

Attachment—Order Suspending Export Licenses

Order Modifying Licenses To Suspend Certain Exports to the United Kingdom

(Effective January 1, 2021)

I

ConverDyn (or ''the licensee'') holds specific licenses XSOU8846/01 and XSOU8789/07 issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to Sections 62 and 127 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA) and 10 CFR part 110. These specific licenses authorize the export of source material to France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (U.K.) under the terms of an Agreement for Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement) between the United States (U.S.) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

II

On December 31, 2020, the formal transition period marking the United Kingdom's (U.K.) exit from the European Union (EU) will end. On this date, the U.K. will also exit from EURATOM. On January 1, 2021, the U.S./U.K.123 Agreement will enter into force. At that time, ConverDyn's export licenses, XSOU8846/01 and XSOU8789/07 will authorize exports to France, Germany, and the Netherlands under the legal framework of the U.S./EURATOM 123 agreement and will authorize exports to the U.K. under the legal framework of the U.S./U.K. 123 Agreement. After the U.K. exits EURATOM, the NRC is prohibited from authorizing any exports of EURATOM-obligated material from the U.S. to the U.K. until EURATOM, pursuant to the U.S./EURATOM 123 agreement, provides its pre-approval to retransfer EURATOM-obligated material from the U.S. to the U.K. The NRC is likewise prohibited from authorizing any exports of Canadian-obligated material from the U.S. to the U.K. until the Government of Canada, pursuant to the U.S./Canada 123 Agreement, provides its pre-approval to retransfer Canadian-obligated material to the U.K.

The U.S. Government has already made arrangements with the Government of the U.K. for the transition from the U.S./EURATOM 123 Agreement to the U.S./U.K. 123 Agreement to automatically occur on January 1, 2021, for all NRC-approved export licenses to the U.K. However, the