

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on helicopters identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

2020–19–11 Leonardo S.p.a.: Amendment 39–21254; Docket No. FAA–2020–0411; Product Identifier 2018–SW–061–AD.

(a) Applicability

This AD applies to Leonardo S.p.a. Model A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters, certificated in any category, with 90-degree tail rotor gearbox (TGB) part number (P/N) 109–0440–06–101 or 109–0440–06–105 having serial number 167, 169 through 172 inclusive, 215 through 225 inclusive, 227, 230, 232, 233, AW268, K3, K16, M47, or L29, installed.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This AD defines the unsafe condition as corrosion on the internal surface of the 90-degree TGB output shaft. This condition could result in failure of the 90-degree TGB output shaft and reduced control of the helicopter.

(c) Effective Date

This AD becomes effective October 27, 2020.

(d) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(e) Required Actions

(1) Within 25 hours time-in-service (TIS) or 3 months, whichever occurs first, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours TIS or 6 months, whichever occurs first, borescope inspect the entire internal surface of the 90-degree TGB output shaft for corrosion. Refer to Figure 3 of Leonardo Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin No. 119–090, dated July 23, 2018, for a depiction of the entry point for the borescope. If there is corrosion, before further flight, remove from service the TGB.

(2) After the effective date of this AD, do not install on any helicopter any 90-degree TGB P/N 109–0440–06–101 or 109–0440–06–105 that has serial number 167, 169 through 172 inclusive, 215 through 225 inclusive, 227, 230, 232, 233, AW268, K3, K16, M47, or L29, unless the actions required by paragraph (e)(1) of this AD have been done.

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Rao Edupuganti, Aviation Safety Engineer, Regulations and Policy Section, Rotorcraft Standards Branch, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone 817–222–5110; email 9-ASW-FTW-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, the FAA suggests that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office, before operating any aircraft complying with this AD through an AMOC.

(g) Additional Information

The subject of this AD is addressed in European Aviation Safety Agency (now

European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD No. 2018–0156, dated July 24, 2018. You may view the EASA AD on the internet at <https://www.regulations.gov> in Docket No. FAA–2020–0411.

(h) Subject

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 62 Tail Rotor Gearbox.

(i) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Leonardo Helicopters Alert Service Bulletin No. 119–090, dated July 23, 2018.

(ii) [Reserved]

(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact Leonardo S.p.a. Helicopters, Emanuele Bufano, Head of Airworthiness, Viale G. Agusta 520, 21017 C. Costa di Samarate (Va) Italy; telephone +39–0331–225074; fax +39–0331–229046; or at <https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/home>.

(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 817–222–5110.

(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, email fedreg.legal@nara.gov, or go to: <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued on September 9, 2020.

Lance T. Gant,

Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2020–20750 Filed 9–21–20; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. FAA–2020–0328; Product Identifier 2020–NM–030–AD; Amendment 39–21244; AD 2020–19–03]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319–111, –112, –113,

–114, –115, –131, –132, and –133 airplanes; Model A320–211, –212, –214, –216, –231, –232, and –233 airplanes; and Model A321–111, –112, –131, –211, –212, –213, –231, and –232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of crack findings in and around the fastener holes of the central and lateral window frame upper junction; those cracks were found on fastener holes outside of the inspection area specified in a certain airworthiness limitation item (ALI) task. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the upper junction fastener holes at the lateral window frame for cracking; and for certain airplanes, repetitive inspections of the spotface around the fastener holes for cracking; and corrective actions if necessary; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective October 27, 2020.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of October 27, 2020.

ADDRESSES: For the material incorporated by reference (IBR) in this AD, contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email ADs@easa.europa.eu; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this IBR material on the EASA website at <https://ad.easa.europa.eu>. You may view this IBR material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. It is also available in the AD docket on the internet at <https://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2020–0328.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the internet at <https://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2020–0328; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sanjay Ralhan, Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206–231–3223; email sanjay.ralhan@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

The EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD 2020–0019, dated February 5, 2020 (“EASA AD 2020–0019”) (also referred to as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for certain Airbus SAS Model A318–111, –112, –121, and –122 airplanes; Model A319–111, –112, –113, –114, –115, –131, –132, and –133 airplanes; Model A320–211, –212, –214, –215, –216, –231, –232, and –233 airplanes; and Model A321–111, –112, –131, –211, –212, –213, –231, and –232 airplanes. Model A320–215 airplanes are not certificated by the FAA and are not included on the U.S. type certificate data sheet; therefore, this AD does not include those airplanes in the applicability.

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus SAS Model A318–111, –112, –121, and –122 airplanes; Model A319–111, –112, –113, –114, –115, –131, –132, and –133 airplanes; Model A320–211, –212, –214, –215, –216, –231, –232, and –233 airplanes; and Model A321–111, –112, –131, –211, –212, –213, –231, and –232 airplanes. The NPRM published in the **Federal Register** on April 10, 2020 (85 FR 20213). The NPRM was prompted by reports of crack findings in and around the fastener holes of the central and lateral window frame upper junction; those cracks were found on fastener holes outside of the inspection area specified in a certain ALI task. The NPRM proposed to require repetitive inspections of the upper junction fastener holes at the lateral window frame for cracking; and for certain airplanes, repetitive inspections of the spotface around the fastener holes for cracking; and corrective actions if necessary; as specified in an EASA AD. The FAA is issuing this AD to address such cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane. See the MCAI for additional background information.

Comments

The FAA gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing

this final rule. The following presents the comment received on the NPRM and the FAA’s response to each comment.

Request To Clarify Impact on Operator’s Maintenance Program

Delta Air Lines, Inc. (DAL) asked that the FAA include a statement that the proposed AD affects and is related to AD 2019–23–01, Amendment 39–19794 (84 FR 66579, December 5, 2019) (“AD 2019–23–01”), and could impact an operator’s maintenance program. DAL stated that the procedures specified in Airbus Service Bulletins A320–53–1448 and A320–53–1449, both dated August 5, 2019 (referred to in EASA AD 2020–0019), cancel and replace Airworthiness Limitation Item (ALI) Task 531125, dated October 11, 2019, which is required in Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) part 2, revision 7. DAL added that FAA Global Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) AIR–676–20–138, dated April 4, 2020, approved ALS part 2, revision 8, which removes ALI Task 531125. DAL noted that, for operators that have incorporated revision 8 prior to issuance of the proposed AD, there would be a potential gap in tracking, and that adding the requested statement would bring awareness to the relationship between the specified service information, MCAI, affected ADs and ALI task.

The FAA acknowledges the commenter’s concern, and provides the following clarification: AD 2019–23–01 does not mandate incorporation of ALS part 2, revision 08, in the operator’s maintenance or inspection program. In addition, ALI Task 531125 was removed from ALS part 2, revision 8, for specific model airplanes with specific configurations. The FAA has no way to ascertain the impact on an individual operator’s maintenance program and customize the AD requirements in accordance with DAL’s maintenance or inspection program. However, under the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD, the FAA will consider requests for approval of an AMOC if an operator’s maintenance program is adversely affected by the requirements of this AD, if sufficient data are submitted to substantiate that fact and that show the method used adequately addresses the unsafe condition identified in this AD. The FAA has not changed this AD regarding this issue.

Conclusion

The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the comment received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule as proposed, except for minor

editorial changes. The FAA has determined that these minor changes:

- Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and
- Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM.

Related IBR Material Under 1 CFR Part 51

EASA AD 2020–0019 describes procedures for repetitive inspections of the upper junction fastener holes at the lateral window frame for cracking, repetitive inspections of the spotface around the fastener holes for cracking, and corrective actions. Corrective actions include repair. This material is

reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the **ADDRESSES** section.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 938 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

ESTIMATED COSTS FOR REQUIRED ACTIONS

Labor cost	Parts cost	Cost per product	Cost on U.S. operators
4 work-hours × \$85 per hour = \$340	\$0	\$340	\$318,920

The FAA has received no definitive data that will enable the FAA to provide cost estimates for the on-condition actions specified in this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

- (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
- (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
- (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

- 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

- 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

2020–19–03 Airbus SAS: Amendment 39–21244; Docket No. FAA–2020–0328; Product Identifier 2020–NM–030–AD.

(a) Effective Date

This AD is effective October 27, 2020.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to the Airbus SAS airplanes specified in paragraphs (c)(1) through (4) of this AD, certificated in any category, as identified in European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020–0019, dated February 5, 2020 (“EASA AD 2020–0019”).

- (1) Model A318–111, –112, –121, and –122 airplanes.
- (2) Model A319–111, –112, –113, –114, –115, –131, –132, and –133 airplanes.
- (3) Model A320–211, –212, –214, –216, –231, –232, and –233 airplanes.
- (4) Model A321–111, –112, –131, –211, –212, –213, –231, and –232 airplanes.

(d) Subject

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 53, Fuselage.

(e) Reason

This AD was prompted by reports of crack findings in and around the fastener holes of the central and lateral window frame upper junction; those cracks were found on fastener holes outside of the inspection area specified in a certain airworthiness limitation item (ALI) task. The FAA is issuing this AD to address such cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

(g) Requirements

Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with, EASA AD 2020–0019.

(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2020–0019

- (1) Where EASA AD 2020–0019 refers to its effective date, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
- (2) The “Remarks” section of EASA AD 2020–0019 does not apply to this AD.

(i) Other FAA AD Provisions

The following provisions also apply to this AD:

- (1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs):* The Manager, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-AVS-AIR-730-AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight

standards district office/certificate holding district office.

(2) *Contacting the Manufacturer:* For any requirement in this AD to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus SAS's EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature.

(3) *Required for Compliance (RC):* For any service information referenced in EASA AD 2020-0019 that contains RC procedures and tests: Except as required by paragraph (i)(2) of this AD, RC procedures and tests must be done to comply with this AD; any procedures or tests that are not identified as RC are recommended. Those procedures and tests that are not identified as RC may be deviated from using accepted methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or inspection program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided the procedures and tests identified as RC can be done and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy condition. Any substitutions or changes to procedures or tests identified as RC require approval of an AMOC.

(j) Related Information

For more information about this AD, contact Sanjay Ralhan, Aerospace Engineer, Large Aircraft Section, International Validation Branch, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone and fax 206-231-3223; email sanjay.ralhan@faa.gov.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.

(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2020-0019, dated February 5, 2020.

(ii) [Reserved]

(3) For information about EASA AD 2020-0019, contact the EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email ADS@easa.europa.eu; internet www.easa.europa.eu. You may find this EASA AD on the EASA website at <https://ad.easa.europa.eu>.

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. This material may be found in the AD docket on the internet at <https://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0328.

(5) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, email fedreg.legal@nara.gov, or go to: <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued on September 1, 2020.

Gaetano A. Sciortino,

Deputy Director for Strategic Initiatives, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2020-20826 Filed 9-21-20; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2020-0460; Product Identifier 2018-SW-078-AD; Amendment 39-21252; AD 2020-19-09]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Leonardo S.p.A. Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Leonardo S.p.A. Model AW169 helicopters and certain Leonardo S.p.A. Model AW189 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of a broken extrusion rubber window seal. This AD requires installation of a reinforcement around the rubber filler wedge where the extrusion rubber window seal meets the door's emergency exit handle. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective October 27, 2020.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of October 27, 2020.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this final rule, contact Leonardo S.p.A. Helicopters, Emanuele Bufano, Head of Airworthiness, Viale G. Agusta 520, 21017 C. Costa di Samarate (Va) Italy; telephone +39-0331-225074; fax +39-0331-229046; or at <https://www.leonardocompany.com/en/home>. You may view this service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 817-222-5110.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the internet at <https://www.regulations.gov> by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2020-0460; or in person at Docket Operations

between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The street address for Docket Operations is listed above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kristi Bradley, Aviation Safety Engineer, International Validation Branch, General Aviation & Rotorcraft Unit, FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone 817-222-5110; email kristin.bradley@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all Leonardo S.p.A. Model AW169 helicopters and certain Leonardo S.p.A. Model AW189 helicopters. The NPRM published in the **Federal Register** on June 3, 2020 (85 FR 34139). The NPRM was prompted by a report of a broken extrusion rubber window seal, part number (P/N) A417AF001WB. The NPRM proposed to require installation of a reinforcement around the rubber filler wedge where the extrusion rubber window seal meets the door's emergency exit handle. The FAA is issuing this AD to address broken extrusion rubber window seals, which could result in an excessive load required to release the emergency exit window, possibly resulting in delayed evacuation of helicopter occupants during an emergency.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, issued EASA AD 2018-0197, dated September 5, 2018 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for all Leonardo S.p.A. Model AW169 helicopters and certain Leonardo S.p.A. Model AW189 helicopters. EASA advises of a broken extrusion rubber window seal, P/N A417AF001WB. According to EASA, an investigation determined that the damage to the rubber filler wedge of the rubber window seal could have been caused by the excessive tension of the string applied during the installation of an affected emergency exit handle. EASA advises that this condition, if not corrected, could result in an excessive load to release the emergency exit window, possibly resulting in delayed evacuation of helicopter occupants during an emergency. EASA states that, due to design similarities, the same unsafe condition could exist or develop