

exemption from section (c)(3) of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) as is necessary and appropriate to protect this information.

(b) Additionally, this system contains law enforcement and other derogatory records or information recompiled from or created from information contained in other systems of records that are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. For these records or information only, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d)(1)–(4); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), and (e)(8); (f); and (g). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d)(1)–(4); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f). Exemptions from these particular subsections cited above under (a) and (b) are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:

(i) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the entire investigative process.

(ii) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to homeland security.

(iii) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of investigations into potential violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is

appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity.

(iv) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with that investigation and related law enforcement activities.

(v) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.

(vi) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this system are exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential informants.

(vii) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5) would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on investigations.

(viii) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.

(ix) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

Jonathan R. Cantor,

Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.

[FR Doc. 2020–04987 Filed 3–13–20; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111–14–P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of the Secretary

6 CFR Part 5

[Docket No. USCBP–2019–0041]

Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Customs and Border Protection–022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System of Records

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is issuing a final rule to amend its regulations to exempt portions of a newly updated system of records titled, “Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Customs and Border Protection–022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System of Records” from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. Specifically, the Department exempts portions of this system of records from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act because of criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement requirements.

DATES: This final rule is effective March 16, 2020.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions please contact: Debra L. Danisek (202) 344–1610, CBP Privacy Officer, Privacy and Diversity Office, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20229. For privacy issues please contact: Jonathan R. Cantor (202) 343–1717, Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NRPM) in the **Federal Register** (8 FR 30632 June 27, 2019) proposing to exempt portions of DHS/CBP–022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System of Records from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act because of criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement requirements. DHS issued the “DHS/CBP–022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System of Records” in the **Federal Register** at 8 FR 30751 on June 27, 2019, to provide notice to the public to (1) clarify that the EVUS enrollment information includes questions

necessary to evaluate whether a covered alien's travel to the United States poses a law enforcement or security risk, and to make administrative changes to remove references to the specific EVUS application questions and data elements; (2) provide additional transparency that vetting results are retained in ATS; (3) expand the previously issued exemptions to clarify that DHS/CBP is exempting certain portions of records in this system from provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 because of criminal, civil and administrative enforcement requirements; and (4) to add new Routine Uses and clarify previously issued ones.

DHS/CBP invited comments on both the (NPRM) and System of Records Notice (SORN).

II. Public Comments

DHS received no comments on the NPRM and no comments on the SORN. DHS will implement the rulemaking as proposed.

List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5

Freedom of information, Privacy.

For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS amends Chapter I of Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION

■ 1. The authority citation for Part 5 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 6 U.S.C. 101 *et seq.*; Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135; 5 U.S.C. 301.

Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.

Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.

■ 2. In Appendix C to Part 5, revise paragraph 74 to read as follows:

Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy Act

* * * * *

74. The DHS/CBP–022 Electronic Visa Update System (EVUS) System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS and its components. The DHS/CBP–022 EVUS System of Records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its several and varied missions and functions, including the enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; national security and intelligence activities. This system of records covers information collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable information collected by other federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government agencies. As part of the process of determining EVUS eligibility or admissibility to the United States, CBP

collects two types of data for which it claims different exemptions.

(a) CBP will not assert any exemption to limit an individual from accessing or amending his or her record under subsection 552a(d) with respect to information maintained in the system as it relates to data submitted by or on behalf of a person who travels to visit the United States and crosses the border, nor shall an exemption be asserted with respect to the resulting determination (approval or denial). However, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), CBP will not disclose the fact that a law enforcement or intelligence agency has sought particular records because it may affect ongoing law enforcement activities, and thus, the Secretary of Homeland Security has exempted such records covered by this system from sections (c)(3), (e)(8), and (g) of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, as is necessary and appropriate to protect this information. Further, DHS will claim exemption from section (c)(3) of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) as is necessary and appropriate to protect this information.

(b) Additionally, this system contains law enforcement and other derogatory records or information recompiled from or created from information contained in other systems of records that are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act, and possibly relied upon as the basis for denial of an EVUS application. For these records or information only, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d)(1)–(4); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), and (e)(8); (f); and (g). Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), has exempted this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d)(1)–(4); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f).

Exemptions from these particular subsections cited above under (a) and (b) are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:

(i) From subsection (c)(3) and (c)(4) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the entire investigative process.

(ii) From subsection (d) (Access and Amendment to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the

existence of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension.

Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to homeland security.

(iii) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of investigations into potential violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity.

(iv) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with that investigation and related law enforcement activities.

(v) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.

(vi) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this system are exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential informants.

(vii) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5) would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on investigations.

(viii) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms that may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of

investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.

(ix) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

Jonathan R. Cantor,

Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.

[FR Doc. 2020-04991 Filed 3-13-20; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-14-P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[NRC-2017-0024]

RIN 3150-AJ93

Approval of American Society of Mechanical Engineers' Code Cases

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its regulations to incorporate by reference the latest revisions of three regulatory guides approving new, revised, and reaffirmed Code Cases published by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. This action allows licensees and applicants to use the Code Cases listed in these regulatory guides as voluntary alternatives to engineering standards for the construction, inservice inspection, and inservice testing of nuclear power plant components. These engineering standards are set forth in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers' Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes and American Society of Mechanical Engineers' Operation and Maintenance Codes, which are currently incorporated by reference into the NRC's regulations. Further, this final rule announces the availability of a related regulatory guide, not incorporated by reference into the NRC's regulations, that lists Code Cases that the NRC has not approved for use.

DATES: This final rule is effective on April 15, 2020. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulation is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 15, 2020.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2017-0024 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of the following methods:

- **Federal Rulemaking Website:** Go to <https://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0024. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions contact the individuals listed in the **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** section of this document.

- **NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):** You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To begin the search, select "ADAMS Public Documents" and then select "Begin Web-based ADAMS Search." For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. For the convenience of the reader, instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are provided in the "Availability of Documents" section.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Yanely Malave, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, telephone: 301-415-1519, email: Yanely.Malave@nrc.gov; and Bruce Lin, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, telephone: 301-415-2446; email: Bruce.Lin@nrc.gov. Both are staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Executive Summary

A. Need for the Regulatory Action

The purpose of this regulatory action is to incorporate by reference into the NRC's regulations the latest revisions of three regulatory guides (RGs). The three RGs identify new, revised, and reaffirmed Code Cases published by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), which the NRC has determined are acceptable for use as voluntary alternatives to compliance with certain provisions of the ASME

Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code and ASME Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code currently incorporated by reference into the NRC's regulations.

B. Major Provisions

The three RGs that the NRC is incorporating by reference are RG 1.84, "Design, Fabrication, and Materials Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section III," Revision 38; RG 1.147, "Inservice Inspection Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section XI, Division 1," Revision 19; and RG 1.192, "Operation and Maintenance Code Case Acceptability, ASME OM Code," Revision 3. This final rule allows nuclear power plant licensees and applicants for construction permits, operating licenses, combined licenses, standard design certifications, standard design approvals, and manufacturing licenses to voluntarily use the Code Cases, newly listed in these revised RGs, as alternatives to engineering standards for the design, construction, inservice inspection (ISI) and inservice testing (IST), and repair/replacement of nuclear power plant components. In this document, the NRC also notifies the public of the availability of RG 1.193, "ASME Code Cases Not Approved for Use," Revision 6, which lists Code Cases that the NRC has not approved for generic use and will not be incorporated by reference into the NRC's regulations.

The NRC prepared a regulatory analysis (ADAMS Accession No. ML19156A178) to identify the benefits and costs associated with this final rule. The regulatory analysis prepared for this final rule was used to determine if the rule is cost-effective, overall, and to help the NRC evaluate potentially costly conditions placed on specific provisions of the ASME Code Cases, which are the subject of this final rule. In addition, qualitative factors to be considered in the NRC's rulemaking decision are considered in the regulatory analysis. The analysis concluded that this rule would result in net savings to the industry and the NRC. Table 1 shows the estimated total net benefit relative to the regulatory baseline, the quantitative benefits outweigh the costs by a range from approximately \$6.34 million (7 percent net present value (NPV)) to \$7.20 million (3 percent NPV).