

an environment that led to external corrosion; and

- The pipeline's CP system was not effective in preventing corrosion from occurring beneath the pipeline's coating/insulation system.

(2) Failure to detect and mitigate the corrosion:

- The ILI and subsequent analysis of ILI data did not characterize the extent and depth of the external corrosion accurately.

Corrosion under insulation (CUI) is recognized as an integrity threat difficult to address through conventional cathodic protection systems and can lead to accelerated wall-loss corrosion and stress corrosion cracking of the pipe steel. A NACE International (NACE) technical committee report titled "Effectiveness of Cathodic Protection on Thermally Insulated Underground Metallic Structures" dated September 2006 (NACE International Publication 10A392, 2006 Edition), was prepared as a guide for external corrosion control of thermally-insulated underground metallic surfaces and considerations of the effectiveness of CP. A summary of the NACE report's conclusions are as follows:

(1) "Generally, the application of external CP to thermally insulated metallic surfaces has been ineffective.

(2) The principal or primary means of corrosion control of thermally-insulated metallic surfaces is the application of an effective coating on the metallic surface.

(3) Care is typically taken in the application of the external jacket and during pipe installation to minimize water ingress, which causes corrosion at imperfections in the primary coating.

(4) When practical, the thermally insulated metallic surfaces need to be inspected at routine time intervals for metal loss (e.g., an internal pipeline inspection tool could be used)."

II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2016-04)

To: Owners and Operators of Hazardous Liquid, Carbon Dioxide and Gas Pipelines.

Subject: Ineffective Protection, Detection, and Mitigation of Corrosion Resulting from Insulated Coatings on Buried Pipelines.

Advisory: Operators of hazardous liquid, carbon dioxide and gas pipelines, as defined in 49 CFR parts 192 and 195, should review their operating, maintenance, and integrity management activities to ensure that their insulated and buried pipelines have effective cathodic protection systems, including coating systems to protect against cathodic protection shielding and moisture under the

coatings with higher operating temperatures, and in-line inspection tool findings are accurate, verified, and the in-line tools are appropriate for the pipeline threat. This bulletin is intended to inform operators about PHMSA's failure investigation of the Plains Pipeline May 19, 2015, accident in Santa Barbara, California and to urge operators to take all necessary actions, including, but not limited to, those set forth in this bulletin, to prevent and mitigate the breach of integrity, leaks, and/or failures of their pipeline facilities and to ensure the safety of the public and operating personnel and to protect the environment.

Operators must have and implement procedures to operate, maintain, assess, and repair their pipelines. These procedures for insulated and buried pipelines should take into consideration:

(1) The need for coatings and cathodic protection systems to be designed, installed, and maintained so as not to foster an environment of shielding and moisture that can lead to excessive external corrosion growth rates and pipe steel cracking such as stress corrosion cracking.

(2) Coatings for buried, insulated pipelines that may result in cathodic protection "shielding" yet still comply with 49 CFR part 192, subpart I or 49 CFR part 195, subpart H. Inadequate corrosion prevention may be addressed through any one or more methods, or a combination of methods, including, but not limited to, the following:

- Replacing insulated and buried pipelines with compromised coating systems or inadequate cathodic protection systems;

- Repairing or re-coating compromised portions of the coating on insulated and buried pipelines to ensure adequate corrosion control; or

- Taking other special precautions if an operator suspects that adequate cathodic protection cannot be provided due to shielding resulting from insulated coatings that have become disbanded. Such precautions may include:

- More frequent reassessments;
- Usage of the appropriate assessment tools for all threats including stress corrosion cracking;
- Coordination of data from the appropriate ILI technologies;
- More stringent repair criteria targeted at CUI or corrosion under disbanded coatings for insulated and buried pipelines;

- Usage of a leak detection system with instrumentation and associated calculations to monitor line pack (the total volume of liquid present in a

pipeline section) along all portions of the pipeline when it is operating or shut down; and

- Valve spacing to limit any possible spill volumes with remotely operated valves and pressure monitoring at the valves.

(3) Advanced ILI data analysis techniques to account for the potential growth of CUI, including interaction criteria for anomaly assessment.

(4) ILI data, subsequent analysis of the data, and pipeline excavations that:

- Confirm the accuracy of the ILI data to characterize the extent and depth of the external corrosion and ILI tolerances and unity charts;

- Follow the ILI guidelines of API Standard 1163, "In-Line Inspection Systems Qualification Standard" 2nd edition, April 2013, (API Std. 1163) for ILI assessments;

- Use additional or more frequent reassessment intervals and confirmations when the insulated and buried pipeline external coating, shields the pipeline from CP, retains moisture on insulated coating systems, and operates at higher operating temperatures; and

- Assess and mitigate operational and environmental conditions in shielded and insulated coatings that lead to excessive corrosion growth rates, pipe steel cracking, and all other threats.

In addition to the above, an operator's operating and maintenance processes and procedures should be reviewed and updated at least annually, unless operational inspections for integrity warrant shorter review periods.

Issued in Washington, DC, on June 15, 2016, under authority delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.

Alan K. Mayberry,

Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.

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DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

Health Services Research and Development Service, Scientific Merit Review Board; Notice of Meetings

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) gives notice under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2, that the Health Services Research and Development Service Scientific Merit Review Board will conduct in-person and teleconference meetings of its seven Health Services Research (HSR) subcommittees on the dates below from 8:00 a.m. to approximately 5:00 p.m. (unless otherwise listed) at the Hilton

Crystal City, 2399 Jefferson Davis Highway, Crystal City, VA 22202 (unless otherwise listed):

- HSR 1—Health Care and Clinical Management on August 23–24, 2016;
- HSR 2—Behavioral, Social, and Cultural Determinants of Health and Care on August 23–24, 2016;
- HSR 4—Mental and Behavioral Health on August 23–24, 2016;
- HSR 5—Health Care System Organization and Delivery on August 23–24, 2016;
- CDA—Career Development Award Meeting on August 25–26, 2016;
- HSR 3—Healthcare Informatics on August 24–25, 2016;
- NRI—Nursing Research Initiative from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on August 26, 2016;
- HSR 6—Post-acute and Long-term Care on August 25, 2016;
- HSR 8—Randomized Program Evaluations from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on August 25, 2016; and
- HSR 0—Precision Mental Health from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on August 25, 2016.

The purpose of the Board is to review health services research and development applications involving: The measurement and evaluation of

health care services; the testing of new methods of health care delivery and management; and nursing research. Applications are reviewed for scientific and technical merit, mission relevance, and the protection of human and animal subjects. Recommendations regarding funding are submitted to the Chief Research and Development Officer.

Each subcommittee meeting of the Board will be open to the public the first day for approximately one half-hour at the start of the meeting on August 23–24 (HSR 1, 2, 4, 5), August 24–25 (HSR 3), August 25 (HSR 0, 6, 8), August 25–26 (CDA), and August 26 (NRI) to cover administrative matters and to discuss the general status of the program. Members of the public who wish to attend the open portion of the subcommittee meetings may dial 1–800–767–1750, participant code 10443#.

The remaining portion of each subcommittee meeting will be closed for the discussion, examination, reference to, and oral review of the intramural research proposals and critiques. During the closed portion of each subcommittee meeting, discussion and recommendations will include qualifications of the personnel conducting the studies (the disclosure of

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy), as well as research information (the premature disclosure of which would likely compromise significantly the implementation of proposed agency action regarding such research projects). As provided by subsection 10(d) of Public Law 92–463, as amended by Public Law 94–409, closing the meeting is in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(6) and (9)(B).

No oral or written comments will be accepted from the public for either portion of the meetings. Those who plan to participate during the open portion of a subcommittee meeting should contact Ms. Liza Catucci, Administrative Officer, Department of Veterans Affairs, Health Services Research and Development Service (10P9H), 810 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20420, or by email at Liza.Catucci@va.gov. For further information, please call Ms. Catucci at (202) 443–5797.

Dated: June 16, 2016.

Jelessa Burney,

Federal Advisory Committee Management Officer.

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