

in the laws discussed above may nonetheless constitute a UDAAP.<sup>24</sup>

CFPB expects all servicers under its jurisdiction, including those with significant transfer volume, to maintain a robust Compliance Management System (CMS). A robust CMS must, among other things, both ensure that violations of Federal consumer financial law do not occur during a transfer and must contain mechanisms for promptly identifying and remediating any violations of Federal consumer financial law that do occur. Entities with a robust CMS have strong policies and procedures, effective board oversight, regular and properly directed training, internal monitoring, external audits and complaint review.

CFPB expects servicers that identify any potential violations during a transfer to undertake all necessary corrective measures. Such corrective measures should include both steps to prevent the violation from occurring for subsequently transferred loans and to remediate any actual harm the violation may have caused the consumer whose loan was transferred. If the CFPB determines that a servicer has engaged in any acts or practices that violate the new servicing rule, that are unfair, deceptive, or abusive, or that otherwise violate Federal consumer financial law, it will take appropriate supervisory and enforcement actions to address violations and seek all appropriate corrective measures, including remediation of any harm to consumers. In determining the appropriate action, the CFPB will consider a variety of factors, including the timeliness of identification and the timeliness and scope of remediation of the violation by the servicer.

#### *D. Plans for Handling Servicing Transfers*

As part of its efforts to focus supervisory attention on the topics described above, the CFPB will, in appropriate cases, require servicers engaged in significant servicing transfers to prepare and submit written plans to the CFPB detailing how they will manage the associated consumer risks. The CFPB will use these plans to assess consumer risk and inform further examination planning. Servicers do not need approval from the CFPB before moving forward with servicing transfers unless specifically required to do so (e.g., by a consent order).

<sup>24</sup> The CFPB Supervision and Examination Manual provides further guidance on how the UDAAP prohibition applies to supervised entities. That examination manual is available at <http://www.consumerfinance.gov/guidance/supervision/manual>.

The information included in a plan would depend on the circumstances of the particular transfer. In general, however, the CFPB will request information regarding:

1. The number of loans involved in the transfer;
2. The total servicing volume being transferred (measured by unpaid principal balance);
3. The name(s) of the servicing platform(s) on which the transferor stored all relevant account-level information for transferred loans prior to transfer and information about compatibility with the transferee's systems;
4. A detailed description of how the servicer will ensure that it is complying with the applicable new servicing rule provisions on transfers;
5. A detailed description of the transaction and system testing to be conducted to ensure accurate transfer of electronic information and a description of the summary report resulting from the transferee or transferor's testing;
6. A description of how the transferee will identify and correct errors identified in connection with the transfer, including a specified time period for reviewing files and resolving errors;
7. A description of the training plan and actual training materials for staff involved in reviewing, assessing, utilizing, or communicating information regarding the transferred loans; and
8. A customer-service plan, specific to the transferred loans, that provides for responding to loss mitigation requests or inquiries and for identifying whether a loan is subject to a pending loss mitigation resolution or application.

#### **IV. Regulatory Requirements**

This Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance is a non-binding compliance bulletin and policy guidance articulating considerations relevant to the CFPB's exercise of its supervisory authority under Regulation X and RESPA and reciting certain requirements of Regulation X and other Federal consumer financial laws applicable to servicing transfers. It is therefore exempt from the notice and comment rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b).

Because no notice of proposed rulemaking is required, the Regulatory Flexibility Act does not require an initial or final regulatory flexibility analysis. 5 U.S.C. 603(a), 604(a).

The CFPB has determined that this Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance does not impose any new or revise any existing recordkeeping,

reporting, or disclosure requirements on covered entities or members of the public that would be collections of information requiring OMB approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.

Dated: October 7, 2014.

**Richard Cordray**,  
Director, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.

[FR Doc. 2014-24194 Filed 10-22-14; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4810-AM-P**

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## **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

### **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### **14 CFR Part 25**

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0698; Special Conditions No. 25-567-SC]

#### **Special Conditions: Bombardier Aerospace, Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 Series Airplanes; Airplane Electronic System Security Protection From Unauthorized External Access**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final special conditions; corrections.

**SUMMARY:** This document corrects two errors that appeared in Docket No. FAA-2014-0698, Special Conditions No. 25-567-SC, which was published in the **Federal Register** on September 12, 2014 (79 FR 54574). There is an error in the header information and in one instance of one of the airplane model numbers in the publication.

**DATES:** The effective date of this correction is October 23, 2014.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1298; facsimile (425) 227-1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On September 12, 2014, the **Federal Register** published document designated as "Docket No. FAA-2014-0698, Notice No. 25-567-SC," (79 FR 54574). The document issued special conditions pertaining to network security in the digital systems architecture, access from external sources, on the BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 series airplanes.

As published, the document contained two errors:

1. In the header of the document, "Notice No." should have been "Special Conditions No."

2. In one instance, one of the airplane model numbers was published as "BD-500-1A1" instead of "BD-500-1A11."

#### Correction

In Final special conditions document (FR Doc. 2014-21789) published on September 12, 2014 (79 FR 54574), make the following corrections:

1. On page 54574, second column in the header information, correct "Notice No." to read "Special Conditions No."

2. On page 54575, third column, last line in the introductory text in the section titled, "The Special Conditions," correct "BD-500-1A1" to read "BD-500-1A11."

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 16, 2014.

**Michael Kaszycki,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 2014-25241 Filed 10-22-14; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0666; Special Conditions No. 25-566-SC]

#### Special Conditions: Bombardier Aerospace, Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 Series Airplanes; Isolation or Airplane Electronic System Security Protection From Unauthorized Internal Access

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final special conditions; corrections.

**SUMMARY:** This document corrects two errors that appeared in Docket No. FAA-2014-0666, Special Conditions No. 25-566-SC, which was published in the *Federal Register* on September 12, 2014 (79 FR 54572). There is an error in the header information and in one instance of one of the airplane model numbers in the publication.

**DATES:** The effective date of this correction is October 23, 2014.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1298; facsimile (425) 227-1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On September 12, 2014, the *Federal Register* published document designated as "Docket No. FAA-2014-0666, Notice No. 25-566-SC," (79 FR 54572). The document issued special conditions pertaining to network security in the digital systems architecture, access from internal sources, on the BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 series airplanes.

As published, the document contained two errors:

1. In the header of the document, "Notice No." should have been "Special Conditions No."

2. In one instance, the airplane model number was published as "BD-500-1A1" instead of "BD-500-1A11."

#### Correction

In Final special conditions document (FR Doc. 2014-21788), published on September 12, 2014 (79 FR 54572), make the following corrections:

1. On page 54572, third column in the header information, correct "Notice No." to read "Special Conditions No."

2. On page 54574, first column, last line in the introductory text of the section titled, "The Special Conditions," correct "BD-500-1A1" to read "BD-500-1A11."

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 16, 2014.

**Michael Kaszycki,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 2014-25240 Filed 10-22-14; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 25

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0434; Special Conditions No. 25-544-SC]

#### Special Conditions: Bombardier Aerospace, Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11; Composite Wing and Fuel Tank Structure Post-Crash Fire Survivability

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Final special conditions.

**SUMMARY:** These special conditions are issued for the Bombardier Aerospace, Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 series airplanes. These airplanes will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. These design

features are composite materials used in the construction of the fuel tank skin and structure, which may behave differently in a post-crash fire than traditional aluminum construction. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

**DATES:** *Effective Date:* This action is effective on November 24, 2014.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Alan Sinclair, FAA, Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-115 Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-2195; facsimile 425-227-1232.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Background

On December 10, 2009, Bombardier Aerospace applied for a type certificate for their new Models BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 series airplanes (hereafter collectively referred to as "CSeries"). The CSeries airplanes are swept-wing monoplanes with an aluminum alloy fuselage sized for 5-abreast seating. Passenger capacity is designated as 110 for the Model BD-500-1A10 and 125 for the Model BD-500-1A11. Maximum takeoff weight is 131,000 pounds for the Model BD-500-1A10 and 144,000 pounds for the Model BD-500-1A11.

Conventional airplanes with aluminum skin and structure provide a well-understood level of safety during post-crash fire scenarios with respect to fuel tanks. This is based on service history and extensive full-scale fire testing. The CSeries airplanes will not be fabricated primarily with aluminum for the fuel tank structure. Instead, they will be fabricated using predominantly composite structure and skin for the wings and fuel tanks. Composites may or may not have the equivalent capability of aluminum, and current regulations do not provide objective performance requirements for wing and fuel tank structure with respect to post-crash fire safety. Because the use of composite structure is novel and unusual with respect to the designs envisioned when the applicable regulations were promulgated, additional tests and analyses substantiation will be required to show that the CSeries airplanes will provide an acceptable level of safety with respect to the performance of the wings and fuel tanks during an external fuel-fed fire.