(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

# Adoption of the Amendment

Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

## §39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

# 2014–08–09 The Boeing Company:

Amendment 39–17833; Docket No. FAA–2008–0616; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–353–AD.

#### (a) Effective Date

This AD is effective June 5, 2014.

#### (b) Affected ADs

None.

# (c) Applicability

This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 767–200, –300, –300F, and –400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, that have received an original airworthiness certificate or original export certificate of airworthiness issued before November 2, 2012.

Note 1 to paragraph (c) of this AD: November 2, 2012, is the original publication date of Revision October 2012 of Section 9, Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) and Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs), D622T001–9, including AWL No. 28–AWL–101, Engine Fuel Suction Feed Operational Test, of the Boeing 767 Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) Document.

# (d) Subject

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 2800, Aircraft Fuel System.

#### (e) Unsafe Condition

This AD results from reports of two inservice occurrences on Model 737–400 airplanes of total loss of boost pump pressure of the fuel feed system, followed by loss of fuel system suction feed capability on one engine, and in-flight shutdown of the engine. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct failure of the engine fuel suction feed capability of the fuel system, which could result in dual engine flameout, inability to restart the engines, and consequent forced landing of the airplane.

## (f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

#### (g) Maintenance Program Revision

Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD: Revise the maintenance program to incorporate AWL No. 28-AWL-101, Engine Fuel Suction Feed Operational Test, of Section D., Airworthiness Limitations-Systems, of Section 9, Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) and Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs), D622T001-9, Revision October 2012, January 2013, April 2013, August 2013, September 2013, or November 2013 of the Boeing 767 MPD Document. The initial compliance time for the test is within 7,500 flight hours or 3 years, whichever occurs first after incorporation of the AWL into the maintenance program.

#### (h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals

After accomplishing the revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative actions (e.g., tests) or intervals may be used unless the actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i) of this AD.

# (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office.

## (j) Related Information

For more information about this AD, contact Sue Lucier, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3352; phone: 425–917–6438; fax: 425–917–6590; email: *suzanne.lucier@faa.gov*.

#### (k) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Section 9, Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) and Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs), D622T001–9, Revision October 2012, of the Boeing 767 Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) Document. (ii) Section 9, Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) and Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs), D622T001–9, Revision January 2013, of the Boeing 767 MPD Document.

(iii) Section 9, Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) and Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs), D622T001–9, Revision April 2013, of the Boeing 767 MPD Document.

(iv) Section 9, Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) and Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs), D622T001–9, Revision August 2013, of the Boeing 767 MPD Document.

(v) Section 9, Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) and Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs), D622T001–9, Revision September 2013, of the Boeing 767 MPD Document.

(vi) Section 9, Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) and Certification Maintenance Requirements (CMRs), D622T001–9, Revision November 2013, of the Boeing 767 MPD Document.

(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone 206– 544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766–5280; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.

(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221.

(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 14, 2014.

#### Jeffrey E. Duven,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2014–09239 Filed 4–30–14; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

# DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

## **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0864; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-108-AD; Amendment 39-17841; AD 2014-09-06]

#### RIN 2120-AA64

# Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain

The Boeing Company Model 777F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a fire that originated near the first officer's seat and caused extensive damage to the flight deck. This AD requires replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with non-conductive lowpressure oxygen hoses in the stowage box and supernumerary ceiling area. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the lowpressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn and lead to an oxygen-fed fire near the flight deck.

DATES: This AD is effective June 5, 2014.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of June 5, 2014.

**ADDRESSES:** For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone 206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766–5680; Internet *https:// www.myboeingfleet.com*. You may view this referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221.

# **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http://* www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2013-0864; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Susan L. Monroe, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM–150S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6457; fax: 425–917–6590; email: susan.l.monroe@faa.gov.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing Company Model 777F series airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on October 23, 2013 (78 FR 63130). The NPRM proposed to require replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with nonconductive low-pressure oxygen hoses in the stowage box and supernumerary ceiling area in order to prevent electrical current from passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the lowpressure oxygen hose, which can cause the low-pressure oxygen hose to melt or burn and lead to an oxygen-fed fire near the flight deck.

# Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal (78 FR 63130, October 23, 2013) and the FAA's response to each comment.

# Support for the NPRM (78 FR 63130, October 23, 2013)

The National Transportation Safety Board, The Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA), and Alex Naife expressed support for the NPRM (78 FR 63130, October 23, 2013).

## **Request To Shorten Compliance Time**

ALPA recommended that we reduce the 36-month compliance time to replace the low-pressure oxygen hoses to 12 months because of the impact that an oxygen-fed fire on the flight deck would have on flight safety.

We do not agree with the commenter's request to reduce the compliance time. In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for timely accomplishment of replacing the low-pressure oxygen hoses with nonconductive low-pressure oxygen hoses. In consideration of all of these factors, we determined that the compliance time, as proposed, represents an appropriate interval in which the lowpressure oxygen hoses can be replaced in a timely manner within the fleet, while still maintaining an adequate level of safety.

Also, reducing the compliance time of the NPRM (78 FR 63130, October 23, 2013) would necessitate (under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act) reissuing the notice, reopening the period for public comment, considering additional comments subsequently received, and eventually issuing a final rule. In light of this, and in consideration of the amount of time that has already elapsed since issuance of the original notice, we have determined that further delay of this final rule is not appropriate.

Operators are permitted to accomplish the requirements of an AD at a time earlier than the specified compliance time; therefore, an operator may choose to replace the low-pressure oxygen hoses before 36 months after the effective date of this final rule. If additional data are presented that would justify a shorter compliance time, we may consider further rulemaking on this issue. We have not changed this final rule in this regard.

#### **Request for Credit for Previous Actions**

FedEx requested that accomplishment of the actions described in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–35A0029, dated June 6, 2012, be considered as an acceptable means of compliance with the final rule. (The NPRM (78 FR 63130, October 23, 2013) specifies using Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777-35A0029, Revision 1, dated April 29, 2013.) FedEx commented that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–35A0029, Revision 1, dated April 29, 2013, on page 12, indicates that no more work is required for airplanes on which the defective hoses were removed, as described in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777-35A0029, dated June 6, 2012. FedEx stated that it has already accomplished the modification on 5 of its 18 applicable airplanes, as described in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777-35A0029, dated June 6, 2012.

We partially agree with the commenter. We agree because the commenter indicated that the unsafe condition has already been removed on several of its airplanes. However, paragraph (i) of the NPRM (78 FR 63130, October 23, 2013), and this final rule specifies credit for replacing the defective hoses before the effective date of this final rule using Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–35A0029, dated June 6, 2012. Therefore, no changes are necessary to this final rule in this regard.

#### **Change Made to This Final Rule**

We have revised the unsafe condition statement in the SUMMARY, the Discussion, and paragraph (e) of this final rule to clarify that the unsafe condition is near the flight deck, rather than on the flight deck.

# Conclusion

We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD 24550

with the change described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes:

• Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM (78 FR

63130, October 23, 2013) for correcting the unsafe condition; and

• Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM (78 FR 63130, October 23, 2013).

# ESTIMATED COSTS

# **Costs of Compliance**

We estimate that this AD affects 18 airplanes of U.S. registry.

We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

Action	Labor cost	Parts cost	Cost per product	Cost on U.S. operators
Replace oxygen hoses	7 work-hours $\times$ \$85 per hour = \$595	\$1,450	\$2,045	\$36,810

According to the manufacturer, some of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected individuals. We do not control warranty coverage for affected individuals. As a result, we have included all costs in our cost estimate.

# Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: "General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

## **Regulatory Findings**

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

# List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

# Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### §39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

2014–09–06 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39–17841; Docket No. FAA–2013–0864; Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–108–AD.

## (a) Effective Date

This AD is effective June 5, 2014.

#### (b) Affected ADs

None.

#### (c) Applicability

This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 777F series airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–35A0029, Revision 1, dated April 29, 2013.

# (d) Subject

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 35, Oxygen.

#### (e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by a report of a fire that originated near the first officer's seat and caused extensive damage to the flight deck. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from passing through an internal, anti-collapse spring of the low-pressure oxygen hose, which can cause the lowpressure oxygen hose to melt or burn and lead to an oxygen-fed fire near the flight deck.

# (f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

## (g) Oxygen Hose Replacement

Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD: Replace the low-pressure oxygen hoses in the stowage box and supernumerary ceiling area with new, non-conductive, lowpressure oxygen hoses, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–35A0029, Revision 1, dated April 29, 2013.

## (h) Parts Installation Prohibition

As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install a low-pressure oxygen hose, part number (P/N) 57034–08A050140, P/N 57034–08A050215, or P/N 57034– 09A050270, on any airplane.

# (i) Credit for Previous Actions

This paragraph provides credit for the actions specified in paragraph (g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD using Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–35A0029, dated June 6, 2012, provided that the low-pressure oxygen hoses described in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–35A0029, Revision 1, dated April 29, 2013, were replaced with new, non-conductive, low-pressure oxygen hoses. Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–35A0029, dated June 6, 2012, is not incorporated by reference in this AD.

# (j) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (k) of this AD. Information may be emailed to 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. (3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair required by this AD if it is approved by the Boeing Commercial Airplanes ODA that has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.

# (k) Related Information

(1) For more information about this AD, contact Susan L. Monroe, Aerospace Engineer, Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems Branch, ANM–150S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6457; fax: 425–917–6590; email: susan.l.monroe@faa.gov.

(2) Service information identified in this AD that is not incorporated by reference may be obtained at the addresses specified in paragraphs (l)(3) and (l)(4) of this AD.

#### (l) Material Incorporated by Reference

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777– 35A0029, Revision 1, dated April 29, 2013.

(ii) Reserved.

(3) For Boeing service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone 206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766– 5680; Internet *https://* 

www.myboeingfleet.com.

(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221.

(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 17, 2014.

#### Jeffrey E. Duven,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2014–09413 Filed 4–30–14; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

# **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

# **Federal Aviation Administration**

# 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0943; Directorate Identifier 2013-SW-001-AD; Amendment 39-17836; AD 2014-09-01]

RIN 2120-AA64

# Airworthiness Directives; AgustaWestland S.p.A. (Type Certificate Previously Held by Agusta S.p.A.) (Agusta) Helicopters

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta Model A109C, A109E, A109K2, and A119 helicopters. This AD requires a recurring visual inspection of the tail rotor (T/R) blade retaining bolts (bolts) for a crack, corrosion, damage, or missing cadmium plating in the central part of the bolt and, depending on findings, a liquid penetrant inspection. This AD also requires replacing a cracked or damaged bolt. This AD was prompted by two reported incidents of cracked bolts. The actions of this AD are intended to detect an unairworthy bolt and prevent failure of a bolt, release of a T/R blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

DATES: This AD is effective June 5, 2014.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain documents listed in this AD as of June 5, 2014.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact AgustaWestland, Product Support Engineering, Via del Gregge, 100, 21015 Lonate Pozzolo (VA) Italy, ATTN: Maurizio D'Angelo; telephone 39–0331– 664757; fax 39–0331–664680; or at *http://www.agustawestland.com/ technical-bulletins.* You may review the referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

# **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http:// www.regulations.gov* or in person at the Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, any incorporated-by-reference service information, the economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations Office (phone: 800– 647–5527) is U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations Office, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Robert Grant, Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management Group, FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222–5110; email *robert.grant@faa.gov.* 

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Discussion

On November 20, 2013, at 78 FR 69595, the Federal Register published our notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Agusta Model A109C, A109E, A109K2, and A119 helicopters. The NPRM proposed to require a recurring visual inspection of each bolt, part number (P/N) 109-8131-09-1, for a crack, corrosion, a nick, other damage, or missing cadmium plating in the central part of the bolt. If a crack is not detected by the visual inspection, the NPRM proposed to require a liquid penetrant inspection. If there is a crack, corrosion, damage, or missing cadmium plating in the central part of the bolt, the NPRM proposed to require replacing the bolt before further flight. The NPRM also proposed to prohibit installing certain bolts on any helicopter unless it has passed the proposed inspections. The proposed requirements were intended to detect an unairworthy bolt and prevent failure of a bolt, release of a T/R blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

The NPRM was prompted by AD No. 2013-0009, dated January 11, 2013, issued by EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, to correct an unsafe condition for Agusta Model A109C, A109K2, A109E, and A119 helicopters, all serial numbers. EASA advises that cracks were reported in bolts, P/N 109-8131–09–1, installed on a Model A109K2 and a Model A109E helicopter. EASA further states that investigations conducted by Agusta revealed the cracks were in the same area of the bolts and corresponded with corrosion pits. EASA specified that this condition, if not detected and corrected, could cause damage to, or loss of, a T/R blade, possibly resulting in loss of control of the helicopter.