

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new Airworthiness Directive (AD):

Eurocopter France Helicopters: Docket No. FAA-2013-0353; Directorate Identifier 2008-SW-029-AD.

(a) Applicability

This AD applies to Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) models AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and EC225LP helicopters, serial numbers (S/N) up to and including 2680 and S/N 9000 through 9009, certificated in any category.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This AD defines the unsafe condition as interference between the tail gearbox (TGB) attachment bolt and the structure fitting. This condition could result in insufficient tightening of the TGB casing, damage to the TGB attachment, cracking under the attachment bolt, loss of the TGB and consequently, loss of helicopter control.

(c) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(d) Required Actions

Within 50 hours time-in-service (TIS):

(1) Inspect the TGB aft attachment fitting to measure the dimension for a blind hole as follows:

(i) Remove the TGB attachment bolt (c) but retain washer (d) as depicted in Detail A, Figure 1, of Eurocopter Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (EASB) No. 53.01.58 and EASB No. 53A012, both Revision 1, and both dated January 4, 2008.

(ii) Use a depth gauge to measure dimension “x” between the top face of the washer (d) and the bottom of aft fitting (a) as depicted in Detail A, Figure 1, of the EASB.

(2) If the measurement is equal to or greater than 81 mm, then the blind hole is present. Install the TGB attachment bolt (c) with its washer (d) as depicted in Detail A, Figure 1, of the EASB. Lock with lockwire.

(3) If the measurement is less than 81 mm, then the blind hole is missing. Inspect the end of the threaded section of bolt (c) for chafing or a contact mark, as depicted in Area 1, Figure 1, of the EASB.

(i) If there is no chafing and no contact marks, install bolt (c) with washer (d) and additional washer (2) as depicted in Detail B, Figure 1, of the EASB.

(ii) If there is chafing or a contact mark, replace the TGB attachment bolt (c) with an airworthy bolt and install with washer (d) and additional washer (2) as depicted in

Detail B, Figure 1, of the EASB. Lock with lockwire.

(iii) Within the next 825 hours TIS, replace the TGB aft attachment fitting with an airworthy attachment fitting.

(4) Inspect the right and left attachment points of the TGB forward attachment to measure the dimension for a blind hole, as follows:

(i) Remove both TGB attachment bolts (c) but retain washers (d), as depicted in Detail A, Figure 2, of the EASB.

(ii) Use a depth gauge to measure dimension “x” between the top face of washer (d) and the bottom of forward fitting (b) at the right and left attachment points, as depicted in Detail A, Figure 2, of the EASB.

(5) If both measurements are equal to or greater than 81 mm, then the blind hole is present. Install TGB attachment bolt (c) with its washer (d), as depicted in Detail A, Figure 2, of the EASB. Lock with lockwire.

(6) If one or both measurements are less than 81 mm, then the blind hole is missing. Inspect the end of the threaded section of each bolt (c) for chafing or a contact mark, as depicted in Area 1, Figure 2 of the EASB.

(i) If there is no chafing and no contact marks, for each attachment point, install bolt (c) with washer (d) and additional washer (2), as depicted in Detail B, Figure 2, of the EASB.

(ii) If there is chafing or a contact mark, replace each the TGB attachment bolt (c) with an airworthy bolt and install bolt (1) with washer (d) and additional washer (2), as depicted in Detail B, Figure 2, of the EASB. Lock with lockwire.

(iii) Within the next 825 hours TIS, replace the TGB forward attachment fitting with an airworthy attachment fitting.

(e) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOC)

(1) The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Gary Roach, Aviation Safety Engineer, Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, TX 76137; telephone (817) 222-5110; email gary.b.roach@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office before operating any aircraft complying with this AD through an AMOC.

(f) Additional Information

The subject of this AD is addressed in the Direction Générale de L'Aviation Civile France AD No F-2007-027, dated January 2, 2008.

(g) Subject

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6520, Tail Rotor Gearbox.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on April 11, 2013.

Lance T. Gant,

Acting Directorate Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2013-09414 Filed 4-19-13; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2013-0349; Directorate Identifier 2012-SW-058-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Inc. Helicopters

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Inc. (BHT) Model 206A, 206B, and 206L helicopters. This proposed AD would require replacing certain part-numbered engine auto-relight kit control boxes. This proposed AD is prompted by a design review that revealed the control box chipset did not meet the required temperature range requirements, which could cause the control box to malfunction, disabling the engine auto-relight system. This condition could result in increased pilot workload during a power loss emergency and subsequent loss of control of the aircraft.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by June 21, 2013.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Docket:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the online instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Fax:* 202-493-2251.

- *Mail:* Send comments to the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.

- *Hand Delivery:* Deliver to the “Mail” address between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov> or in person at the

Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited, 12,800 Rue de l'Avenir, Mirabel, Quebec J7J1R4; telephone (450) 437-2862 or (800) 363-8023; fax (450) 433-0272; or at <http://www.bellcustomer.com/files/>. You may review the referenced service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rao Edupuganti, Aviation Safety Engineer, Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222-5110; email rao.edupuganti@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should submit only one time.

We will file in the docket all comments that we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider comments filed after the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments we receive.

Discussion

Transport Canada (TC), which is the aviation authority for Canada, has

issued TC AD No. CF-2012-19, dated June 12, 2012 (CF-2012-19), to correct an unsafe condition for certain serial numbered BHT Model 206A, 206B, and 206L helicopters with an engine auto-relight kit control box assembly (control box assembly) part number 206-375-017-101 or 206-375-017-103 installed. TC advises that these control box assemblies have a manufacturing defect which could disable the auto-relight system in the event of an engine flameout, subsequently requiring the pilot to re-start the engine manually. This condition could result in increased pilot workload during a power loss emergency in-flight and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. CF-2012-19 specifies replacing the affected control boxes within 4 months to correct the unsafe condition.

FAA's Determination

These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of Canada and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with Canada, TC, its technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in its AD. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all known relevant information and determined that an unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

Related Service Information

BHT has issued Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 206-11-127 for Model 206A and 206B helicopters and ASB No. 206L-11-167 for Model 206L helicopters, both dated May 2, 2011. Both ASBs specify replacing the affected control box assembly with an upgraded control box assembly.

Proposed AD Requirements

This proposed AD would require replacing the control box assembly within 4 months.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 1,357 helicopters of U.S. Registry. We estimate that operators may incur the following costs in order to comply with this AD. If installed, replacing the control box assembly would require about 2 work-hours at an average labor rate of \$85 per hour and required parts would cost about \$18,974, for a cost per helicopter of \$19,144.

According to BHT's service information, some of the costs of this proposed AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected individuals. We do

not control warranty coverage by BHT. Accordingly, we have included all costs in our cost estimate.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Inc (BHT):
Docket No. FAA-2013-0349; Directorate Identifier 2012-SW-058-AD.

(a) Applicability

This AD applies to the following helicopters, certificated in any category:

(1) BHT Model 206A and 206B helicopters, all serial numbers (S/N) except S/Ns 1, 2, and 3, with an engine auto-relight kit control box assembly (control box assembly) part number (P/N) 206-375-017-101 installed; and

(2) BHT Model 206L helicopters, S/N 45001 through 45153 and 46601 through 46617, with a control box assembly P/N 206-375-017-103 installed.

(b) Unsafe Condition

This AD defines the unsafe condition as an inoperative control box assembly. This condition could result in a disabled auto-relight system, failure of the engine to relight after a flame-out, increased pilot workload during a power loss emergency, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

(c) Reserved

(d) Compliance

You are responsible for performing each action required by this AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been accomplished prior to that time.

(e) Required Actions

Within 4 months, replace the control box assembly:

(1) For Model 206A and 206B helicopters, replace control box assembly P/N 206-375-017-101 with a control box assembly P/N 206-375-017-105.

(2) For Model 206L helicopters, replace control box assembly P/N 206-375-017-103 with a control box assembly P/N 206-375-017-107.

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, Safety Management Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Rao Edupuganti, Aviation Safety Engineer, Regulations and Policy Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone (817) 222-5110; email rao.edupuganti@faa.gov.

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office or certificate holding district office before operating any aircraft complying with this AD through an AMOC.

(g) Additional Information

(1) BHT Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 206-11-127 for Model 206A and 206B helicopters and ASB No. 206L-11-167 for Model 206L helicopters, both dated May 2, 2011, which are not incorporated by reference, contain additional information about the subject of this AD. For service information identified in this AD, contact Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited, 12,800 Rue de l'Avenir, Mirabel, Quebec J7J1R4; telephone (450) 437-2862 or (800) 363-8023; fax (450) 433-0272; or at <http://www.bellcustomer.com/files/>. You may review a copy of the service information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.

(2) The subject of this AD is addressed in Transport Canada AD CF-2012-19, dated June 12, 2012.

(h) Subject

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 7410: Ignition Power Supply.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on April 11, 2013.

Lance T. Gant,

Acting Directorate Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2013-09415 Filed 4-19-13; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2011-0034; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-021-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Proposed rule; withdrawal.

SUMMARY: The FAA withdraws a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that proposed a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200 series airplanes. The proposed AD would have required installing a new circuit breaker, relays, and wiring to allow the flightcrew to turn off electrical power to the in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems and other non-essential electrical systems through a switch in the flight compartment, and doing other specified actions. This proposed AD would also have required installing a new cabin system control panel (CSCP); installing a new cabin management system (CMS) configuration database; and installing new operational program software (OPS)

for the CSCP, zone management unit (ZMU), passenger address controller, cabin interphone controller, cabin area control panel (CACP), speaker drive module, overhead electronics units, and seat electronics unit. Since the proposed AD was issued, we have received new data that indicates the unsafe condition would not be adequately addressed by the proposed action. Subsequently, we are considering issuing new rulemaking that positively addresses the unsafe condition identified in the NPRM and eliminates the need for the actions proposed in the NPRM. Accordingly, the proposed AD is withdrawn.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD action, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is the Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ray Mei, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6467; fax: 425-917-6590; email: raymont.mei@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We proposed to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) with a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for a new AD for certain Model 777-200 series airplanes. That NPRM published in the **Federal Register** on February 1, 2011 (76 FR 5505). The NPRM would have required installing a new circuit breaker, relays, and wiring to allow the flightcrew to turn off electrical power to the IFE systems and other non-essential electrical systems through a switch in the flight compartment, and doing other specified actions. The actions included removing the CSCP core partition software, the CACP OPS, the ZMU OPS, and the cabin system management unit (CSMU) OPS; installing OPS for the CSCP, CACP, ZMU, and CSMU; and installing the new configuration database (CDB). That NPRM would also have required installing a new CSCP; installing a new CMS CDB, installing passenger address controller, cabin