

response costs incurred by the United States in connection with the release of radiological waste at the Shpack Landfill Superfund Site located in the Town of Norton, Massachusetts and the City of Attleboro, Massachusetts. Pursuant to the Consent Decree resolving the lawsuit, Texas Instruments, Inc. agrees to pay \$15 million of the United States' response costs.

The publication of this notice opens a period for public comment on the Consent Decree. Comments should be addressed to the Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division, and should refer to *United States v. Texas Instruments Incorporated*, D.J. Ref. No. 90-11-2-08360/1. All comments must be submitted no later than thirty (30) days after the publication date of this notice. Comments may be submitted either by email or by mail:

<i>To submit comments:</i>	<i>Send them to:</i>
By email	<i>pubcomment-ees.enrd@usdoj.gov.</i>
By mail	Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DOJ-ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, Washington, DC 20044-7611.

During the public comment period, the Consent Decree may be examined and downloaded at this Justice Department Web site: http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/Consent_Decrees.html. We will provide a paper copy of the Consent Decree upon written request and payment of reproduction costs. Please mail your request and payment to: Consent Decree Library, U.S. DOJ-ENRD, P.O. Box 7611, Washington, DC 20044-7611.

Please enclose a check or money order for \$6.00 (25 cents per page reproduction cost) payable to the United States Treasury.

Ronald Gluck,

Assistant Section Chief, Environmental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division.

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division

United States v. Star Atlantic Waste Holdings, L.P., Veolia Environnement S.A. and Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc.

Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement

Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, Stipulation and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in *United States of America v. Star Atlantic Waste Holdings, L.P., Veolia Environnement S.A. and Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc.*, Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-01847-RWR. On November 15, 2012, the United States filed a Complaint alleging that the proposed acquisition by Star Atlantic Waste Holdings, L.P. of Veolia Environnement S.A.'s U.S. subsidiary, Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc., would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The proposed Final Judgment, filed at the same time as the Complaint, requires the defendants to divest three specified transfer stations in northern New Jersey; a landfill and two transfer stations in central Georgia; and three commercial waste collection routes in the Macon, Georgia metropolitan area.

Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-2481), on the Department of Justice's Web site at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr>, and at the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the copying fee set by Department of Justice regulations.

Public comment is invited within 60 days of the date of this notice. Such comments, including the name of the submitter, and responses thereto, will be posted on the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division's Internet Web site, filed with the Court and, under certain circumstances, published in the **Federal Register**. Comments should be directed to Maribeth Petrizzi, Chief, Litigation II Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 8700,

Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-307-0924).

Patricia A. Brink,

Director of Civil Enforcement.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Suite 8700, Washington, D.C. 20530, Plaintiff, v. STAR ATLANTIC WASTE HOLDINGS, L.P., 277 Park Avenue, 45th Floor, New York, NY 10172, VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT S.A., 36/38 avenue Kléber, Paris, 75116 France, and VEOLIA ES SOLID WASTE, INC., 200 E. Randolph Street, Suite 7900, Chicago, IL 60601, Defendants
Case No. 1:12-cv-01847

Complaint

Plaintiff, the United States of America ("United States"), acting under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil antitrust action against defendants Star Atlantic Waste Holdings, L.P. ("Star Atlantic") and Veolia Environnement S.A. to enjoin Star Atlantic's proposed acquisition of Veolia Environnement S.A.'s U.S. subsidiary, Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc. ("Veolia"). Plaintiff complains and alleges as follows:

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Pursuant to a share purchase agreement dated July 18, 2012, Star Atlantic proposes to acquire all of the outstanding shares of Veolia's common stock. Defendants Star Atlantic and Veolia currently compete to provide small container commercial waste collection and municipal solid waste ("MSW") disposal in certain geographic areas in the United States. The proposed transaction would substantially lessen competition for small container commercial waste collection services as a result of Star Atlantic's acquisition of Veolia in the Macon, Georgia area. The proposed transaction also would substantially lessen competition for MSW disposal service as a result of Star Atlantic's acquisition of Veolia's MSW disposal assets in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia.

2. Defendants Star Atlantic and Veolia are two of only a few significant providers of small container commercial waste collection services in the Macon Metropolitan Area and MSW disposal services in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia. Unless the acquisition is enjoined, consumers of small container commercial waste collection and/or MSW disposal services in these areas likely will pay higher prices and receive fewer services as a consequence

of the elimination of vigorous competition between Star Atlantic and Veolia. Accordingly, Star Atlantic's acquisition of Veolia would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

II. THE DEFENDANTS AND THE TRANSACTION

3. Star Atlantic is a Delaware limited partnership with its headquarters in New York, New York. Star Atlantic provides collection, transfer, recycling, and disposal services in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee through its subsidiary Advanced Disposal Services, Inc., and in Massachusetts, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia through its subsidiary, Interstate Waste Services, Inc. In 2011, Star Atlantic had estimated total revenues of \$563 million.

4. Veolia Environnement S.A. is a French corporation, with a wholly-owned subsidiary, Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc., that offers collection, transfer, recycling, and disposal services in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, Illinois, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. In 2011, Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc. had estimated total revenues of \$818 million.

5. On July 18, 2012, defendants Star Atlantic and Veolia entered into a share purchase agreement pursuant to which Star Atlantic proposes to acquire all of the outstanding shares of Veolia's common stock in a transaction valued at \$1.9 billion.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. The United States brings this action under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25, as amended, to prevent and restrain defendants from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

7. Defendants Star Atlantic and Veolia collect MSW from residential, commercial, and industrial customers, and they own and operate transfer stations and landfills that process and dispose of MSW. In their small container commercial waste collection and MSW disposal businesses, Star Atlantic and Veolia make sales and purchases in interstate commerce, ship waste in the flow of interstate commerce, and engage in activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. The Court has jurisdiction over this action and over the parties pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 22, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.

8. Defendants have consented to venue and personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. Venue is therefore proper in this district under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

IV. TRADE AND COMMERCE

A. The Relevant Service Markets

1. Small Container Commercial Waste Collection

9. Waste collection firms, or "haulers," collect MSW from residential, commercial, and industrial establishments and transport the waste to a disposal site, such as a transfer station, landfill, or incinerator, for processing and disposal. Private waste haulers typically contract directly with customers for the collection of waste generated by commercial accounts. MSW generated by residential customers, on the other hand, often is collected either by local governments or by private haulers pursuant to contracts bid by, or franchises granted by, municipal authorities.

10. "Small container commercial waste collection" means the business of collecting MSW from commercial and industrial accounts, usually in dumpsters (*i.e.*, a small container with one to ten cubic yards of storage capacity), and transporting or "hauling" such waste to a disposal site by use of a front-end or rear-end load truck. Typical small container commercial waste collection customers include office and apartment buildings and retail establishments (*e.g.*, stores and restaurants). As used herein, "small container commercial waste collection" does not include the collection of roll-off containers or residential collection service.

11. Small container commercial waste collection service differs in many important respects from the collection of residential or other types of waste. An individual commercial customer typically generates substantially more MSW than a residential customer. To handle this high volume of MSW efficiently, haulers often provide commercial customers with small containers, also called dumpsters, for storing the waste. Haulers organize their commercial accounts into routes, and collect and transport the MSW generated by these accounts in front-end load ("FEL") trucks uniquely well-suited for commercial waste collection. Less frequently, haulers may use more maneuverable, but less efficient, rear-end load ("REL") trucks, especially in those areas in which a collection route includes narrow alleyways or streets. FEL trucks are unable to navigate

narrow passageways easily and cannot efficiently collect the waste located in them.

12. On a typical small container commercial waste collection route, an operator drives a FEL vehicle to the customer's container, engages a mechanism that grasps and lifts the container over the front of the truck, and empties the container into the vehicle's storage section where the waste is compacted and stored. The operator continues along the route, collecting MSW from each of the commercial accounts, until the vehicle is full. The operator then drives the FEL truck to a disposal facility, such as a transfer station, landfill, or incinerator, and empties the contents of the vehicle. Depending on the number of locations and the amount of waste collected on the route, the operator may make one or more trips to the disposal facility in the servicing of the route.

13. In contrast to a small container commercial waste collection route, a residential waste collection route is significantly more labor-intensive. The customer's MSW is stored in much smaller containers (*e.g.*, garbage bags or trash cans) and, instead of FEL trucks, waste collection firms routinely use REL or side-load trucks manned by larger crews (usually, two-person or three-person teams). On residential routes, crews generally hand-load the customer's MSW, typically by tossing garbage bags and emptying trash cans into the vehicle's storage section. Because of the differences in the collection processes, residential customers and commercial customers usually are organized into separate routes.

14. Likewise, other types of collection activities, such as the use of roll-off containers (typically used for construction debris) and the collection of liquid or hazardous waste, are rarely combined with small container commercial waste collection. This separation of routes is due to differences in the hauling equipment required, the volume of waste collected, health and safety concerns, and the ultimate disposal option used.

15. The differences in the types and volume of MSW collected and in the equipment used in collection services distinguish small container commercial waste collection from all other types of waste collection activities. Absent competition from other small container commercial waste collection firms, a small container commercial waste collection service provider profitably could increase its charges without losing significant sales or revenues to firms engaged in the provision of other

types of waste collection services. Thus, small container commercial waste collection is a line of commerce, or relevant service, for purposes of analyzing the effects of the acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

2. Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste

16. "MSW" means municipal solid waste, a term of art used to describe solid putrescible waste generated by households and commercial establishments such as retail stores, offices, restaurants, warehouses, and non-manufacturing activities in industrial facilities. MSW does not include special handling waste (e.g., waste from manufacturing processes, regulated medical waste, sewage, and sludge), hazardous waste, or waste generated by construction or demolition sites. MSW has physical characteristics that readily distinguish it from other liquid or solid waste.

17. In order to be disposed of lawfully, MSW must be disposed in a landfill or an incinerator, and such facilities must be located on approved sites and operated under prescribed procedures. Federal, state, and local safety, environmental, zoning, and permit laws and regulations dictate critical aspects of storage, handling, transportation, processing, and disposal of MSW in each market. In less densely populated areas of the country, MSW often is disposed of directly into landfills that are permitted and regulated by the state. Landfill permit restrictions often impose limitations on the type and amount of waste that can be deposited. In many urban and suburban areas, landfills are scarce due to high population density and the limited availability of suitable land. Accordingly, MSW generated in such areas often is burned in an incinerator or taken to a transfer station. A transfer station is an intermediate disposal site for the processing and temporary storage of MSW before transfer, in bulk, to more distant landfills or incinerators for final disposal. Anyone who fails to dispose of MSW in a lawful manner can be subject to severe civil and criminal penalties.

18. Because of the strict laws and regulations that govern the disposal of MSW, there are no good substitutes for MSW disposal in landfills or incinerators, or at transfer stations located near the source of the waste. Absent competition from other providers of MSW disposal services, a firm providing MSW disposal services profitably could increase its charges to haulers of MSW without losing significant sales to any other firm. Thus, disposal of MSW is a line of commerce,

or relevant service, for purposes of analyzing the effects of the acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

B. Relevant Geographic Markets

1. Small Container Commercial Waste Collection

19. Small container commercial waste collection is generally provided in highly localized areas because, to operate efficiently and profitably, a hauler must have sufficient density (i.e., a large number of commercial accounts that are reasonably close together) in its small container commercial waste collection operations. If a hauler has to drive significant distances between customers, it earns less money for the time the truck is operating. For the same reason, the accounts must be near the operator's base of operations. It is economically impractical for a small container commercial waste collection firm to service metropolitan areas from a distant base, which requires that the FEL truck travel long distances just to arrive at its route. Haulers, therefore, generally establish garages and related facilities within each major local area served.

20. In Bibb, Jones, Peach, Monroe, and Crawford Counties in Georgia (the "Macon Metropolitan Area"), a local small container commercial waste collection firm, absent competition from other small container commercial waste collection firms, profitably could increase charges to local customers without losing significant sales to more distant competitors. Accordingly, the Macon Metropolitan Area is a section of the country, or relevant geographic market, for purposes of analyzing the effects of the acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

2. Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste

21. MSW is transported by collection trucks to landfills and transfer stations, and the price and availability of disposal sites close to a hauler's routes is a major factor that determines a hauler's competitiveness and profitability. The cost of transporting MSW to a disposal site often is a substantial component of the cost of disposal. The cost advantage of local disposal sites limits the areas where MSW can be transported economically and disposed of by haulers and creates localized markets for MSW disposal services.

22. In Bergen and Passaic Counties in New Jersey ("Northern New Jersey") and in Bibb, Jones, Peach, Monroe, Crawford, Twiggs, Taylor, Macon, and Houston Counties in Georgia ("Central

Georgia"), the high costs of transporting MSW, and the substantial travel time to other disposal facilities based on distance, natural barriers, and congested roadways, limit the distance that haulers of MSW generated in those areas can travel economically to dispose of their waste. The firms that compete for the disposal of MSW generated in each of these areas own landfills or transfer stations located within the area. In each area, absent competition from other local MSW disposal operators, a firm providing MSW disposal services profitably could increase its charges for the disposal of MSW generated in the area without losing significant sales to more distant disposal sites.

Accordingly, Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia are relevant geographic markets for purposes of analyzing the competitive effects of the acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15.

C. Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed Acquisition

23. The acquisition of Veolia by Star Atlantic would remove a significant competitor in small container commercial waste collection or the disposal of MSW in already highly concentrated and difficult-to-enter markets. In each of these markets, the resulting significant increase in concentration, loss of competition, and absence of any reasonable prospect of significant new entry or expansion by market incumbents likely will result in higher prices for the collection of small container commercial waste or the disposal of MSW.

1. Small Container Commercial Waste Collection Service in the Macon Metropolitan Area

24. In the Macon Metropolitan Area, the proposed acquisition would reduce from four to three the number of significant competitors in the collection of small container commercial waste. Annual revenue from small container commercial waste collection in the Macon Metropolitan Area is approximately \$7.1 million. After the acquisition, Star Atlantic would have approximately 80 percent of the total number of small container commercial waste collection routes in the market. Using a standard measure of market concentration called the "HHI" (defined and explained in Appendix A), incorporating market shares based on small container commercial waste collection routes, the post-merger HHI for small container commercial waste collection in the Macon Metropolitan Area would be approximately 6,595, an

increase of 1,714 points over the pre-merger HHI of 4,881.

2. MSW Disposal in Central Georgia

25. In Central Georgia, the proposed acquisition would reduce from four to three the number of significant competitors for the disposal of MSW. After the acquisition, defendants would have approximately 77 percent of the MSW disposal market based on waste tonnages accepted by the landfills in 2011. The post-merger HHI for MSW disposal service in Central Georgia would be approximately 6,093, an increase of 2,942 points over the premerger HHI of 3,151.

3. MSW Disposal in Northern New Jersey

26. In Northern New Jersey, the proposed acquisition would reduce from four to three the number of significant competitors for the disposal of MSW. Annual revenue from MSW disposal in this market is approximately \$65 million. After the acquisition, defendants would have approximately 40 percent of the MSW disposal market. Using market shares based on 2011 tonnages as a measure of concentration, the post-merger HHI for MSW disposal service would be approximately 2,701, an increase of 719 points over the pre-merger HHI of 1,982.

D. Entry into Small Container Commercial Waste Collection in the Macon Metropolitan Area

27. Significant new entry into small container commercial waste collection is difficult and time-consuming in the Macon Metropolitan Area. A new entrant into small container commercial waste collection cannot provide a significant competitive constraint on the prices charged by market incumbents until it achieves minimum efficient scale and operating efficiencies comparable to existing firms. In order to obtain a comparable operating efficiency, a new firm must achieve route densities similar to those of firms already competing in the market. However, the incumbent's ability to engage in price discrimination and to enter into long-term contracts with collection customers is often effective in preventing new entrants from winning a large enough base of customers to achieve efficient routes in sufficient time to constrain the post-acquisition firm from significantly raising prices. Differences in the service provided by an incumbent hauler to each customer permit the incumbent easily to meet competition from new entrants by pricing its services lower to any individual customer that wants to

switch to the new entrant. Incumbent firms frequently also use three- to five-year contracts, which may automatically renew or contain large liquidated damage provisions for contract termination. Such contracts make it more difficult for a customer to switch to a new hauler in order to obtain lower prices for its collection service. By making it more difficult for new haulers to obtain customers, these practices increase the cost and time required by an entrant to form an efficient route, reducing the likelihood that the entrant ultimately will be successful.

E. Entry into MSW Disposal in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia

28. Significant new entry into the disposal of MSW in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia would be difficult and time-consuming. Obtaining a permit to construct a new disposal facility or to expand an existing one is a costly and time-consuming process that typically takes many years to conclude. First, suitable land is scarce. Second, even when land is available, local public opposition often increases the time and uncertainty of successfully permitting a facility. Last, it is also difficult to overcome environmental concerns and satisfy other governmental requirements.

29. Where it is not practical to construct and permit a landfill, it is necessary to use a transfer station to facilitate the use of more distant disposal options. Many of the problems associated with the permitting and construction of a landfill likewise make it difficult to permit and construct a transfer station.

30. In Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia, entry by constructing and permitting a new MSW disposal facility would be costly and time-consuming, and unlikely to prevent market incumbents from significantly raising prices for the disposal of MSW following the acquisition.

V. VIOLATIONS ALLEGED

31. Star Atlantic's proposed acquisition of Veolia's outstanding shares likely would lessen competition substantially for small container commercial waste collection services in the Macon Metropolitan Area and for MSW disposal services in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

32. Unless enjoined, the proposed acquisition likely would have the following anticompetitive effects relating to small container commercial waste collection services, among others:

(a) actual and potential competition between Star Atlantic and Veolia would be eliminated;

(b) competition likely would be lessened substantially; and

(c) prices likely would increase.

33. Unless enjoined, the proposed acquisition likely would have the following anticompetitive effects relating to MSW disposal, among others:

(a) actual and potential competition between Star Atlantic and Veolia would be eliminated;

(b) competition likely would be lessened substantially; and

(c) prices likely would increase.

VI. REQUESTED RELIEF

34. Plaintiff requests that this Court:

(a) adjudge and decree that Star Atlantic's acquisition of Veolia would be unlawful and violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18;

(b) permanently enjoin and restrain defendants and all persons acting on their behalf from consummating the proposed acquisition of Veolia by Star Atlantic, or from entering into or carrying out any other contract, agreement, plan, or understanding, the effect of which would be to combine Star Atlantic with Veolia;

(c) award the United States such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper; and

(d) award the United States its costs for this action.

FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

/s/

Joseph F. Wayland,
Acting Assistant Attorney General

/s/

Renata B. Hesse (D.C. Bar #466107)
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

/s/

Patricia A. Brink
Director of Civil Enforcement

/s/

Maribeth Petrizzi (D.C. Bar #435204)
Chief, Litigation II Section

/s/

Dorothy B. Fountain (D.C. Bar #439469)
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/s/

Michael K. Hammaker, (D.C. Bar #233684)
#503143) Dando B. Cellini Frederick H. Parmenter

Attorneys, United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Suite 8700, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 307-0938

Dated: November 15, 2012

APPENDIX A

The term "HHI" means the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a

commonly accepted measure of market concentration. The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting of four firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20 percent, the HHI is 2,600 ($30^2 + 30^2 + 20^2 + 20^2 = 2,600$). The HHI takes into account the relative size distribution of the firms in a market. It approaches zero when a market is occupied by a large number of firms of relatively equal size and reaches its maximum of 10,000 points when a market is controlled by a single firm. The HHI increases both as the number of firms in the market decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms increases.

Markets in which the HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500 points are considered to be moderately concentrated, and markets in which the HHI is in excess of 2,500 points are considered to be highly concentrated. *See* U.S. Department of Justice & FTC, *Horizontal Merger Guidelines* § 5.3 (2010). Transactions that increase the HHI by more than 200 points in highly concentrated markets presumptively raise antitrust concerns under the *Horizontal Merger Guidelines* issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. *See id.*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, v. STAR ATLANTIC WASTE
HOLDINGS, L.P., VEOLIA
ENVIRONNEMENT S.A. and VEOLIA
ES SOLID WASTE, INC.,
Defendants

Case No. 1:12-cv-01847

COMPETITIVE IMPACT STATEMENT

Plaintiff United States of America (“United States”), pursuant to Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (“APPA” or “Tunney Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the Final Judgment submitted for entry in this civil antitrust proceeding.

I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE PROCEEDING

Pursuant to a share purchase agreement dated July 18, 2012, Star Atlantic Waste Holdings, L.P. (“Star Atlantic”) proposes to acquire all of the outstanding shares of common stock of Veolia Environnement S.A.’s U.S. subsidiary, Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc. (“Veolia”) in a transaction valued at approximately \$1.9 billion.

The United States filed a civil antitrust Complaint on November 15, 2012, seeking to enjoin the proposed

acquisition. The Complaint alleges that the proposed acquisition likely would substantially lessen competition for small container commercial waste collection service in the area of Macon, Georgia and for municipal solid waste (“MSW”) disposal service in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. This loss of competition would result in consumers paying higher prices and receiving fewer services for the collection and disposal of MSW.

At the same time the Complaint was filed, the United States also filed a Hold Separate Stipulation and Order and proposed Final Judgment, which are designed to eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition. Under the proposed Final Judgment, which is explained more fully below, defendants are required to divest specified small container commercial waste collection and MSW disposal assets. Under the terms of the Hold Separate Stipulation and Order, Star Atlantic and Veolia are required to take certain steps to ensure that the assets to be divested will be preserved and held separate from other assets and businesses.

The United States and the defendants have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the provisions of the Final Judgment and to punish violations thereof.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS GIVING RISE TO THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS

A. The Defendants

Star Atlantic is a Delaware limited partnership with its headquarters in New York, New York. Star Atlantic provides collection, transfer, recycling, and disposal services in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee through its subsidiary Advanced Disposal Services, Inc., and in Massachusetts, Vermont, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia through its subsidiary, Interstate Waste Services, Inc. In 2011, Star Atlantic had estimated total revenues of \$563 million.

Veolia Environnement S.A. is a French corporation, with a wholly-owned subsidiary, Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc., that offers collection, transfer, recycling, and disposal services in Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri, Illinois, Minnesota,

Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. In 2011, Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc. had estimated total revenues of \$818 million.

B. The Competitive Effects of the Transaction

MSW is solid, putrescible waste generated by households and commercial establishments. Waste collection firms, or haulers, contract to collect MSW from residential and commercial customers and transport the waste to private and public MSW disposal facilities (*e.g.*, transfer stations and landfills), which, for a fee, process and legally dispose of the waste. Small container commercial waste collection is one component of MSW collection, which also includes residential and other waste collection. Star Atlantic and Veolia compete in the collection of small container commercial waste and the disposal of MSW.

1. The Effect of the Transaction on Competition in Small Container Commercial Waste Collection in the Macon Metropolitan Area

Small container commercial waste collection service is the collection of MSW from commercial businesses such as office and apartment buildings and retail establishments (*e.g.*, stores and restaurants) for shipment to, and disposal at, an approved disposal facility. Because of the type and volume of waste generated by commercial accounts and the frequency of service required, haulers organize commercial accounts into routes, and generally use specialized equipment to store, collect, and transport MSW from these accounts to approved MSW disposal sites. This equipment (*e.g.*, one to ten-cubic-yard containers for MSW storage, and front-end load vehicles commonly used for collection and transportation of MSW) is uniquely well-suited for providing small container commercial waste collection service. Providers of other types of waste collection services (*e.g.*, residential and roll-off services) are not good substitutes for small container commercial waste collection firms. In these types of waste collection efforts, firms use different waste storage equipment (*e.g.*, garbage cans or semi-stationary roll-off containers) and different vehicles (*e.g.*, rear-load, side-load, or roll-off trucks), which, for a variety of reasons, cannot be conveniently or efficiently used to store, collect, or transport MSW generated by commercial accounts and, hence, are rarely used on small container commercial waste collection routes. In the event of a small but significant

increase in price for small container commercial waste collection services, customers would not switch to any other alternative. Thus, the Complaint alleges that the provision of small container commercial waste collection services constitutes a line of commerce, or relevant service, for purposes of analyzing the effects of the transaction.

The Complaint alleges that the provision of small container commercial waste collection service takes place in compact, highly localized geographic markets. It is expensive to transport MSW long distances between collection customers or to disposal sites. To minimize transportation costs and maximize the scale, density, and efficiency of their MSW collection operations, small container commercial waste collection firms concentrate their customers and collection routes in small areas. Firms with operations concentrated in a distant area cannot easily compete against firms whose routes and customers are locally based. Distance may significantly limit a remote firm's ability to provide commercial waste collection service as frequently or conveniently as that offered by local firms with nearby routes. Also, local small container commercial waste collection firms have significant cost advantages over other firms, and can profitably increase their charges to local small container commercial waste collection customers without losing significant sales to firms outside the area.

Applying this analysis, the Complaint alleges that in Bibb, Jones, Peach, Monroe and Crawford Counties in Georgia (the "Macon Metropolitan Area"), a local small container commercial waste collection monopolist, absent competition from other small container commercial waste collection firms, profitably could increase charges to local customers without losing significant sales to more distant competitors. Accordingly, the Macon Metropolitan Area is a section of the country or a relevant geographic market for the purpose of assessing the competitive effects of a combination of Star Atlantic and Veolia in the provision of small container commercial waste collection services.

There are significant entry barriers into small container commercial waste collection. A new entrant into small container commercial waste collection services must achieve a minimum efficient scale and operating efficiencies comparable to those of existing firms in order to provide a significant competitive constraint on the prices charged by market incumbents. In order to obtain comparable operating

efficiencies, a new firm must achieve route density similar to existing firms. However, the incumbent's ability to price discriminate and to enter into long-term contracts with existing small container commercial waste collection firms can leave too few customers available to the entrant to create an efficient route in a sufficiently confined geographic area. The incumbent firm can selectively and temporarily charge an unbeatably low price to specified customers targeted by new entrants. Long-term contracts often run for three to five years and may automatically renew or contain large liquidated damage provisions for contract termination. Such terms make it more costly or difficult for a customer to switch to a new small container commercial waste collection firm and obtain lower prices for its collection service. Because of these factors, a new entrant may find it difficult to compete by offering its services at pre-entry price levels comparable to the incumbent and may find an increase in the cost and time required to form an efficient route, thereby limiting a new entrant's ability to build an efficient route and reducing the likelihood that the entrant will ultimately succeed.

The need for route density, the use of long-term contracts with restrictive terms, and the ability of existing firms to price discriminate raise significant barriers to entry by new firms, which likely will be forced to compete at lower than pre-entry price levels. In the past, such barriers have made entry and expansion difficult by new or smaller-sized competitors in small container commercial waste collection markets.

In the Macon Metropolitan Area, the proposed acquisition would reduce from four to three the number of significant competitors in the collection of small container commercial waste. Annual revenue from small container commercial waste collection in the Macon Metropolitan Area is approximately \$7.1 million. After the acquisition, Star Atlantic would have approximately 80 percent of the total number of small container commercial waste collection routes in the market.

2. The Effects of the Transaction on Competition in the Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia

A number of federal, state, and local safety, environmental, zoning, and permit laws and regulations dictate critical aspects of storage, handling, transportation, processing and disposal of MSW. In order to be disposed of lawfully, MSW must be disposed in a landfill or an incinerator permitted to

accept MSW, and such facilities must be located on approved sites and operated under prescribed procedures. Federal, state, and local safety, environmental, zoning, and permit laws and regulations dictate critical aspects of storage, handling, transportation, processing, and disposal of MSW in each market. In less densely populated areas of the country, MSW often is disposed of directly into landfills that are permitted and regulated by the state. Landfill permit restrictions often impose limitations on the type and amount of waste that can be deposited. In many urban and suburban areas, landfills are scarce due to high population density and the limited availability of suitable land. Accordingly, MSW generated in such areas often is burned in an incinerator or taken to a transfer station. A transfer station is an intermediate disposal site for the processing and temporary storage of MSW before transfer, in bulk, to more distant landfills or incinerators for final disposal. Anyone who fails to dispose of MSW in a lawful manner can be subject to severe civil and criminal penalties.

Because of the strict laws and regulations that govern the disposal of MSW, there are no good substitutes for MSW disposal in landfills or incinerators, or at transfer stations located near the source of the waste. A local monopolist providing MSW disposal services, absent competition from other providers of MSW disposal services, profitably could increase its charges to haulers of MSW by a small but significant amount without losing significant sales to any other firm. Thus the disposal of MSW constitutes a line of commerce, or relevant service, for purposes of analyzing the effects of the acquisition. MSW is transported by collection trucks to landfills and transfer stations, and the price and availability of disposal sites close to a hauler's routes is a major factor that determines a hauler's competitiveness and profitability. The cost of transporting MSW to a disposal site often is a substantial component of the cost of disposal. The cost advantage of local disposal sites limits the areas where MSW can be transported economically and disposed of by haulers and creates localized markets for MSW disposal services.

In Bergen and Passaic Counties in New Jersey ("Northern New Jersey") and in Bibb, Jones, Peach, Monroe, Crawford, Twiggs, Taylor, Macon, and Houston Counties in Georgia ("Central Georgia"), the high costs of transporting MSW, and the substantial travel time to other disposal facilities based on distance, natural barriers, and congested

roadways, limit the distance that haulers of MSW generated in those areas can travel economically to dispose of their waste. The firms that compete for the disposal of MSW generated in each of those areas own landfills or transfer stations located within the area. In the event that all of the owners of those local disposal facilities imposed a small but significant increase in the price of MSW disposal, haulers of MSW generated in each area could not profitably turn to more distant disposal facilities. Firms that compete for the disposal of MSW generated in each area, absent competition from other local MSW disposal operators, profitably could increase their charges for disposal of MSW generated in the area without losing significant sales to more distant disposal sites. Accordingly, Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia are relevant geographic markets for purposes of analyzing the competitive effects of the acquisition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 18 U.S.C. § 15.

There are significant barriers to entry in MSW disposal. Obtaining a permit to construct a new disposal facility or to expand an existing one is a costly and time-consuming process that typically takes many years to conclude. Local public opposition often increases the time and uncertainty of successfully permitting a facility. It is also difficult to overcome environmental concerns and satisfy other governmental requirements. Likewise, many of the problems associated with the permitting and construction of a landfill make it difficult to permit and construct a transfer station. In Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia, entry by a new MSW disposal facility would be costly and time-consuming, and unlikely to prevent market incumbents from significantly raising prices for the disposal of MSW following the acquisition.

In Northern New Jersey, the proposed acquisition would reduce from four to three the number of significant competitors for the disposal of MSW. Annual revenue from MSW disposal in this market is approximately \$65 million. After the acquisition, defendants would have approximately 40 percent of the MSW disposal market. In Central Georgia, the proposed acquisition would reduce from four to three the number of significant competitors for the disposal of MSW. After the acquisition, defendants would have approximately 77 percent of the MSW disposal market based on waste tonnages accepted by the landfills in 2011.

III. EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

The divestiture requirements of the proposed Final Judgment will eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in small container commercial waste collection service in the Macon Metropolitan Area and MSW disposal service in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia. The requirements will remove sufficient small container commercial waste collection and/or MSW disposal assets from the merged firm's control and place them in the hands of a firm that is independent of the merged firm and capable of preserving the competition that otherwise would have been lost as a result of the acquisition.

The proposed Final Judgment requires defendants, within 90 days after the filing of the Complaint, or five (5) days after notice of the entry of the Final Judgment by the Court, whichever is later, to divest, as a viable ongoing business or businesses: (a) small container commercial waste collection assets (routes, trucks, containers, and customer lists) in the Macon Metropolitan Area; and (b) MSW disposal assets (landfills, transfer stations, material recovery facilities,¹ leasehold rights, garages and offices, trucks and vehicles, scales, permits and intangible assets such as customer lists and contracts) in Northern New Jersey and in Central Georgia. The assets must be divested to purchasers approved by the United States and in such a way as to satisfy the United States that they can and will be operated by the purchaser or purchasers as part of a viable, ongoing business or businesses that can compete effectively in each relevant market. Defendants must take all reasonable steps necessary to accomplish the divestitures quickly and shall cooperate with prospective purchasers.

In the event that defendants do not accomplish the divestitures within the period prescribed in the proposed Final Judgment, the Final Judgment provides that the Court will appoint a trustee selected by the United States to effect the divestitures. If a trustee is appointed, the proposed Final Judgment provides that defendants will pay all costs and expenses of the trustee. The trustee's commission will be structured so as to provide an incentive for the trustee based on the price obtained and the speed with which the divestitures are accomplished. After his or her

¹ A material recovery facility is a facility permitted to accept and recover those recyclable portions of a commercial waste stream, such as paper, plastic, and glass.

appointment becomes effective, the trustee will file monthly reports with the Court and the United States, setting forth his or her efforts to accomplish the divestitures. At the end of six months, if the divestitures have not been accomplished, the trustee and the United States will make recommendations to the Court, which shall enter such orders as appropriate in order to carry out the purpose of the trust, including extending the trust or the term of the trustee's appointment.

To eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the market for small container commercial waste collection service in the Macon Metropolitan Area, defendants must divest: (1) Veolia's small container commercial waste collection routes 801 and 802 and, at the acquirer's option, the Veolia hauling facility in Byron, Georgia and (2) Veolia's small container commercial waste collection route 710 and, at the acquirer's option, the Veolia hauling facility in Thomaston, Georgia.

To eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the market for MSW disposal service in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia, defendants must divest: (1) Veolia's two transfer stations in Paterson, New Jersey and its transfer station in Totowa, New Jersey, and (2) Veolia's two transfer stations in Byron, Georgia and Thomaston, Georgia and the Veolia landfill in Mauk, Georgia.

The proposed Final Judgment provides that divestiture of the divestiture assets may be made to one or more acquirers, so long as the Northern New Jersey disposal assets are divested to a single acquirer and the Central Georgia disposal assets and the Macon Metropolitan Area waste collection assets are divested to a single acquirer. In Central Georgia and the Macon Metropolitan Area, this provision is intended to encourage the continued operation of an efficient, vertically integrated competitor whose participation in each market would replicate closely the competition existing prior to the acquisition. In Northern New Jersey, buyers of MSW disposal and recycling services generally prefer to have a single supplier of both, and owners of transfer stations that also can recycle have an advantage over those that cannot. The single acquirer provision for the Northern New Jersey disposal assets ensures that the acquirer will be able to offer customers MSW disposal services through each of the three divested transfer stations, as well as recycling services through the material recovery facility associated with the Veolia River Street transfer station, one of the three

stations to be divested. The ability of the acquirer to offer customers both MSW disposal and recycling services will allow it to operate more effectively and replicate closely the competition existing in Northern New Jersey prior to the acquisition.

In addition, Star Atlantic, for the duration of its contracts with any of its current small container commercial waste collection service customers in the Macon Metropolitan Area, shall not initiate new contracts or lengthen or alter any material term of such contracts, except when a customer seeks a contractual change without prompting or encouragement from Star Atlantic. This provision is intended to prevent Star Atlantic from using its acquisition of Veolia as a justification for extending the contracts of its small container commercial waste customers in the Macon Metropolitan Area, thereby precluding competition in a large segment of this market.

IV. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO POTENTIAL PRIVATE LITIGANTS

Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, provides that any person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no *prima facie* effect in any subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Defendants.

V. PROCEDURES AVAILABLE FOR MODIFICATION OF THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

The United States and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public interest.

The APPA provides a period of at least sixty days preceding the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person may submit to the United States written comments regarding the proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within sixty days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact Statement in the **Federal Register**, or the last date of publication

in a newspaper of the summary of this Competitive Impact Statement, whichever is later. All comments received during this period will be considered by the United States Department of Justice, which remains free to withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time prior to the Court's entry of judgment. The comments and the response of the United States will be filed with the Court. In addition, comments will be posted on the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division's internet Web site, and, under certain circumstances, published in the **Federal Register**. Written comments should be submitted to: Maribeth Petrizzi, Chief, Litigation II Section, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street NW., Suite 8700, Washington, DC 20530.

The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains jurisdiction over this action and the parties may apply to the Court for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.

VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed Final Judgment, a full trial on the merits against Defendants. The United States could have continued the litigation and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing Star Atlantic's acquisition of Veolia. The United States is satisfied, however, that the divestiture of the assets described in the proposed Final Judgment will preserve competition for small container commercial waste collection service in the Macon Metropolitan Area and for MSW disposal service in Northern New Jersey and Central Georgia. Thus, the proposed Final Judgment would achieve all or substantially all of the relief the United States would have obtained through litigation, but would avoid the time, expense, and uncertainty of a full trial on the merits of the Complaint.

VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER THE APPA FOR THE PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the court shall determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment "is in the public interest." 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1). In making that determination, the court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is required to consider:

(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public interest; and

(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)(A) & (B).

In considering these statutory factors, the court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the government is entitled to "broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the reaches of the public interest." *United States v. Microsoft Corp.*, 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995); *see generally United States v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc.*, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public interest standard under the Tunney Act); *United States v. InBev N.V./S.A.*, 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 76,736, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, No. 08-1965 (JR), at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the court's review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires "into whether the government's determination that the proposed remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in the complaint was reasonable, and whether the mechanisms to enforce the final judgment are clear and manageable.")²

As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held, under the APPA a court considers, among other things, the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and whether the decree may positively harm third parties. *See Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by the

²The 2004 amendments substituted "shall" for "may" in directing relevant factors for a court to consider and amended the list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. *Compare* 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2004) *with* 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (2006); *see also SBC Commc'ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments "effected minimal changes" to Tunney Act review).

decree, a court may not “engage in an unrestricted evaluation of what relief would best serve the public.” *United States v. BNS, Inc.*, 858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing *United States v. Bechtel Corp.*, 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1460–62; *United States v. Alcoa, Inc.*, 152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2001); *InBev*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. Courts have held that:

[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court’s role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but whether the settlement is “within the reaches of the public interest.” More elaborate requirements might undermine the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.

Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).³ In determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest, a district court “must accord deference to the government’s predictions about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require that the remedies perfectly match the alleged violations.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17; see also *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need for courts to be “deferential to the government’s predictions as to the effect of the proposed remedies”); *United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.*, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the court should grant due respect to the United States’s prediction as to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market structure, and its views of the nature of the case).

Courts have greater flexibility in approving proposed consent decrees than in crafting their own decrees following a finding of liability in a litigated matter. “[A] proposed decree must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own, as long as it falls within the

range of acceptability or is ‘within the reaches of public interest.’” *United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting *United States v. Gillette Co.*, 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)), *aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States*, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also *United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd.*, 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (approving the consent decree even though the court would have imposed a greater remedy). To meet this standard, the United States “need only provide a factual basis for concluding that the settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for the alleged harms.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.

Moreover, the court’s role under the APPA is limited to reviewing the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the court to “construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree against that case.” *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also *InBev*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (“the ‘public interest’ is not to be measured by comparing the violations alleged in the complaint against those the court believes could have, or even should have, been alleged”) (citations omitted). Because the “court’s authority to review the decree depends entirely on the government’s exercising its prosecutorial discretion by bringing a case in the first place,” it follows that “the court is only authorized to review the decree itself,” and not to “effectively redraft the complaint” to inquire into other matters that the United States did not pursue. *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1459–60. As this Court recently confirmed in *SBC Communications*, courts “cannot look beyond the complaint in making the public interest determination unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a mockery of judicial power.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15.

In its 2004 amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve the practical benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding the unambiguous instruction that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to require the court to permit anyone to intervene.” 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2). The language wrote into the statute what Congress intended when it enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney explained: “[t]he court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement

through the consent decree process.” 119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Senator Tunney). Rather, the procedure for the public interest determination is left to the discretion of the court, with the recognition that the court’s “scope of review remains sharply proscribed by precedent and the nature of Tunney Act proceedings.” *SBC Commc’ns*, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.⁴

VIII. DETERMINATIVE DOCUMENTS

There are no determinative materials or documents within the meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in formulating the proposed Final Judgment. Dated: November 15, 2012
Respectfully submitted,

/s/
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, v. STAR ATLANTIC WASTE
HOLDINGS, L.P., VEOLIA
ENVIRONNEMENT S.A. and VEOLIA
ES SOLID WASTE, INC., Defendants
Case No. 1:12-cv-01847

PROPOSED FINAL JUDGMENT

WHEREAS, plaintiff, the United States of America, having filed its Complaint on November 15, 2012, and plaintiff and defendants, Star Atlantic Waste Holdings, L.P. (“Star Atlantic”) and Veolia Environnement S.A. (“Veolia”), by their respective attorneys, having consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and without this Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or an admission by any party with respect to any issue of law or fact herein;

AND WHEREAS, defendants have agreed to be bound by the provisions of

⁴ See *United States v. Enova Corp.*, 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the “Tunney Act expressly allows the court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the competitive impact statement and response to comments alone”); *United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc.*, 1977–1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (“Absent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should * * * carefully consider the explanations of the government in the competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the circumstances.”); S. Rep. No. 93–298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1973) (“Where the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments, that is the approach that should be utilized.”).

³ Cf. *BNS*, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court’s “ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or disapproving the consent decree”); *United States v. Gillette Co.*, 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the court is constrained to “look at the overall picture not hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist’s reducing glass”). See generally *Microsoft*, 56 F.3d at 1461 (discussing whether “the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the ‘reaches of the public interest’”).

this Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;

AND WHEREAS, the essence of this Final Judgment is the prompt and certain divestiture of the Divestiture Assets to assure that competition is not substantially lessened;

AND WHEREAS, the United States requires certain divestitures to be made for the purpose of remedying the loss of competition alleged in the Complaint;

AND WHEREAS, defendants have represented to the United States that the divestitures required below can and will be made, and that defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture or other injunctive provisions contained below;

NOW, THEREFORE, before any testimony is taken, without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of the parties, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:

I. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over each of the parties hereto and over the subject matter of this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against defendants under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

II. Definitions

As used in this Final Judgment:

A. "Acquirer" or "Acquirers" means the entity or entities to which the defendants divest the Divestiture Assets.

B. "Star Atlantic" means defendant Star Atlantic Waste Holdings, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership with its headquarters in New York, New York, its successors and assigns, and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships and joint ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.

C. "Veolia" means defendant Veolia Environnement S.A., a French corporation with its headquarters in Paris, France, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Veolia ES Solid Waste, Inc., their successors and assigns, and their subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships and joint ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.

D. "Disposal" means the business of disposing of waste into approved disposal sites, including the use of transfer stations to facilitate shipment of waste to other disposal sites.

E. "Divestiture Assets" means the Relevant Disposal Assets and the Relevant Collection Assets.

F. "Route" means a group of customers receiving regularly scheduled

small container commercial waste collection service and all tangible and intangible assets relating to the route, as of October 1, 2012 (except for *de minimis* changes, such as customers lost or gained in the ordinary course of business), including capital equipment, trucks and other vehicles; containers; supplies; and if requested by the Acquirer, the real property and improvements to real property (e.g., garages and buildings that support the route) as specified in Paragraph II(L) below, customer lists; customer and other contracts; leasehold interests; permits/licenses and accounts receivable.

G. "MSW" means municipal solid waste, a term of art used to describe solid putrescible waste generated by households and commercial establishments. MSW does not include special handling waste (e.g., waste from manufacturing processes, regulated medical waste, sewage, and sludge), hazardous waste, or waste generated by construction or demolition sites.

H. "Small container commercial waste collection service" means the business of collecting MSW from commercial and industrial accounts, usually in "dumpsters" (i.e. a small container with one to ten cubic yards of storage capacity), and transporting or "hauling" such waste to a disposal site by use of a front- or rear-end loader truck.

I. "Northern New Jersey" means Bergen and Passaic Counties in New Jersey.

J. "Central Georgia" means Bibb, Crawford, Peach, Jones, Monroe, Twiggs, Taylor, Macon and Houston Counties in Georgia.

K. "Macon Metropolitan Area" means Bibb, Jones, Peach, Monroe, and Crawford Counties in Georgia.

L. "Relevant Disposal Assets" means, with respect to each transfer station and landfill listed and described herein, all of defendants' rights, titles and interests in any tangible asset related to each transfer station and landfill listed, including all fee simple or ownership rights to offices, garages, related facilities, including material recovery facilities, capital equipment, trucks and other vehicles, scales, power supply equipment, and supplies; and all of defendants' rights, titles and interests in any related intangible assets, including all leasehold interests and renewal rights thereto, permits, customer lists, contracts, and accounts, or options to purchase any adjoining property. Relevant Disposal Assets, as used herein, includes each of the following:

1. Northern New Jersey Disposal Assets

(a) Veolia's River Street transfer station located at 178 River Street, Paterson, New Jersey 07544;

(b) Veolia's Fulton Street transfer station located at 30-25 Fulton Street, Paterson, New Jersey 07544; and

(c) Veolia's Totowa transfer station located at 301 Maltese Drive, Totowa, New Jersey 07512.

2. Central Georgia Disposal Assets

(a) Veolia's Peach County transfer station located at 750 Dunbar Road, Byron, Georgia 31008;

(b) Veolia's Taylor County landfill located at County Road 33, Stewart Road, Mauk, Georgia 31058; and

(c) Veolia's Upson County transfer station located at 2616 Waymanville Road, Thomaston, Georgia 30286.

M. "Relevant Collection Assets" means the small container commercial waste collection routes and other assets listed below:

Macon Metropolitan Area Collection Assets

1. Veolia's small container commercial waste collection routes 801 and 802 and, at the Acquirer's option, the hauling facility located at 750 Dunbar Road, Byron, Georgia 31008; and

2. Veolia's small container commercial waste collection route 710 and, at the Acquirer's option, the hauling facility located at 2616 Waymanville Road, Thomaston, Georgia 30286.

III. Applicability

A. This Final Judgment applies to Star Atlantic and Veolia, as defined above, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.

B. If, prior to complying with Sections IV and V of this Final Judgment, defendants sell or otherwise dispose of all or substantially all of their assets or of lesser business units that include the defendants' Divestiture Assets, they shall require the purchaser to be bound by the provisions of this Final Judgment. Defendants need not obtain such an agreement from the Acquirer of the assets divested pursuant to the Final Judgment.

IV. Divestitures

A. Defendants are ordered and directed, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the Complaint in this matter, or five (5) calendar days after notice of the entry of this Final Judgment by the Court, whichever is

later, to divest all Divestiture Assets in a manner consistent with this Final Judgment to an Acquirer(s) acceptable to the United States in its sole discretion. The United States, in its sole discretion, may agree to one or more extensions of this time period of up to sixty (60) calendar days in total, and shall notify the Court in such circumstances. Defendants agree to use their best efforts to accomplish the divestitures ordered by this Final Judgment as expeditiously as possible.

B. In accomplishing the divestitures ordered by this Final Judgment, defendants promptly shall make known, by usual and customary means, the availability of the Divestiture Assets. Defendants shall inform any person making an inquiry regarding a possible purchase of the Divestiture Assets that they are being divested pursuant to this Final Judgment and provide that person with a copy of this Final Judgment. Defendants shall also offer to furnish to all prospective Acquirers, subject to customary confidentiality assurances, all information and documents relating to the Divestiture Assets customarily provided in a due diligence process except such information or documents subject to the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. Defendants shall make available such information to the United States at the same time that such information is made available to any other person.

C. Defendants shall provide the Acquirer(s) and the United States information relating to the personnel involved in the operation and management of the Divestiture Assets to enable the Acquirer(s) to make offers of employment. Defendants shall not interfere with any negotiations by the Acquirer(s) to employ or contract with any defendant employee whose primary responsibility is the operation or management of the Divestiture Assets.

D. Defendants shall permit prospective Acquirers of the Divestiture Assets to have reasonable access to personnel and to make inspections of the physical facilities of the Divestiture Assets; access to any and all environmental, zoning, and other permit documents and information; and access to any and all financial, operational, or other documents and information customarily provided as part of a due diligence process.

E. Defendants shall warrant to the Acquirers of the Divestiture Assets that each asset will be operational on the date of sale.

F. Defendants shall not take any action that will impede in any way the permitting, operation, or divestiture of the Divestiture Assets.

G. Defendants shall warrant to each Acquirer that there are no material defects in the environmental, zoning, or other permits pertaining to the operation of each asset, and that following the divestiture of the Divestiture Assets, defendants will not undertake, directly or indirectly, any challenges to the environmental, zoning, or other permits relating to the operation of the Divestiture Assets.

H. Unless the United States otherwise consents in writing, the divestitures pursuant to Section IV, or by trustee appointed pursuant to Section V of this Final Judgment, shall be accomplished in such a way as to satisfy the United States, in its sole discretion, that the Divestiture Assets can and will be used by the Acquirer(s) as part of a viable, ongoing disposal or hauling business in each relevant area. Divestiture of the Divestiture Assets may be made to one or more Acquirers, provided that the Northern New Jersey Disposal Assets are divested to a single Acquirer, that the Central Georgia Disposal Assets and the Macon Metropolitan Area Collection Assets are divested to a single Acquirer, and that in each instance it is demonstrated to the sole satisfaction of the United States that the Divestiture Assets will remain viable and the divestiture of such assets will achieve the purposes of this Final Judgment and remedy the competitive harm alleged in the Complaint. The divestitures, whether pursuant to Section IV or Section V of this Final Judgment:

(1) shall be made to an Acquirer(s) that, in the United States's sole judgment, has the intent and capability (including the necessary managerial, operational, technical, and financial capability) of competing effectively in the relevant disposal and/or hauling business; and

(2) shall be accomplished so as to satisfy the United States, in its sole discretion, that none of the terms of any agreement between an Acquirer(s) and defendants gives defendants the ability unreasonably to raise the Acquirer's costs, to lower the Acquirer's efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in the ability of the Acquirer(s) to compete effectively.

V. Appointment of Trustee

A. If defendants have not divested the Divestiture Assets within the time period specified in Paragraph IV(A), defendants shall notify the United States of that fact in writing. Upon application of the United States, the Court shall appoint a trustee selected by the United States and approved by the Court to effect the divestiture of the Divestiture Assets.

B. After the appointment of a trustee becomes effective, only the trustee shall have the right to sell the Divestiture Assets. The trustee shall have the power and authority to accomplish the divestiture to an Acquirer(s) acceptable to the United States at such price and on such terms as are then obtainable upon reasonable effort by the trustee, subject to the provisions of Sections IV, V, and VI of this Final Judgment, and shall have such other powers as this Court deems appropriate. Subject to Paragraph V(D) of this Final Judgment, the trustee may hire at the cost and expense of defendants any investment bankers, attorneys, or other agents, who shall be solely accountable to the trustee, reasonably necessary in the trustee's judgment to assist in the divestiture.

C. Defendants shall not object to a sale by the trustee on any ground other than the trustee's malfeasance. Any such objection by defendants must be conveyed in writing to the United States and the trustee within ten (10) calendar days after the trustee has provided the notice required under Section VI.

D. The trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of defendants, on such terms and conditions as the United States approves, and shall account for all monies derived from the sale of the assets sold by the trustee and all costs and expenses so incurred. After approval by the Court of the trustee's accounting, including fees for its services and those of any professionals and agents retained by the trustee, all remaining money shall be paid to defendants and the trust shall then be terminated. The compensation of the trustee and any professionals and agents retained by the trustee shall be reasonable in light of the value of the Divestiture Assets and based on a fee arrangement providing the trustee with an incentive based on the price and terms of the divestitures and the speed with which it is accomplished, but timeliness is paramount.

E. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the trustee in accomplishing the required divestitures. The trustee and any consultants, accountants, attorneys, and other persons retained by the trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books, records, and facilities of the business to be divested, and defendants shall develop financial and other information relevant to such business as the trustee may reasonably request, subject to reasonable protection for trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information. Defendants shall take no action to interfere with or to impede the

trustee's accomplishment of the divestitures.

F. After its appointment, the trustee shall file monthly reports with the United States and the Court setting forth the trustee's efforts to accomplish the divestiture ordered under this Final Judgment. To the extent that such reports contain information that the trustee deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the public docket of the Court. Such reports shall include the name, address, and telephone number of each person who, during the preceding month, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about acquiring, any interest in the Divestiture Assets, and shall describe in detail each contact with any such person. The trustee shall maintain full records of all efforts made to divest the Divestiture Assets.

G. If the trustee has not accomplished the divestitures ordered under this Final Judgment within six (6) months after its appointment, the trustee shall promptly file with the Court a report setting forth: (1) the trustee's efforts to accomplish the required divestitures, (2) the reasons, in the trustee's judgment, why the required divestitures have not been accomplished, and (3) the trustee's recommendations. To the extent that such report contains information that the trustee deems confidential, such report shall not be filed in the public docket of the Court. The trustee shall at the same time furnish such report to the United States, which shall have the right to make additional recommendations consistent with the purpose of the trust. The Court thereafter shall enter such orders as it shall deem appropriate to carry out the purpose of the Final Judgment, which may, if necessary, include extending the trust and the term of the trustee's appointment by a period requested by the United States.

VI. Notice of Proposed Divestiture

A. Within two (2) business days following execution of a definitive divestiture agreement, defendants or the trustee, whichever is then responsible for effecting the divestiture required herein, shall notify the United States of any proposed divestiture required by Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. If the trustee is responsible, it shall similarly notify defendants. The notice shall set forth the details of the proposed divestiture and list the name, address, and telephone number of each person not previously identified who offered or expressed an interest in or desire to acquire any ownership interest

in the Divestiture Assets, together with full details of the same.

B. Within fifteen (15) calendar days of receipt by the United States of such notice, the United States may request from defendants, the proposed Acquirer(s), any other third party, or the trustee if applicable, additional information concerning the proposed divestiture, the proposed Acquirer(s), and any other potential Acquirer. Defendants and the trustee shall furnish any additional information requested within fifteen (15) calendar days of the receipt of the request, unless the parties shall otherwise agree.

C. Within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the notice or within twenty (20) calendar days after the United States has been provided the additional information requested from defendants, the proposed Acquirer(s), any third party, and the trustee, whichever is later, the United States, in its sole discretion, shall provide written notice to defendants and the trustee, if there is one, stating whether or not it objects to the proposed divestiture. If the United States provides written notice that it does not object, the divestiture may be consummated, subject only to defendants' limited right to object to the sale under Paragraph V(C) of this Final Judgment. Absent written notice that the United States does not object to the proposed Acquirer or upon objection by the United States, a divestiture proposed under Section IV or Section V shall not be consummated. Upon objection by defendants under Paragraph V(C), a divestiture proposed under Section V shall not be consummated unless approved by the Court.

VII. Contractual Restrictions

Defendant Star Atlantic, for the duration of its contracts with any of its current small container commercial waste collection service customers in the Macon Metropolitan Area, shall not initiate new contracts or lengthen or alter any material term of such contracts, except when a customer seeks a contractual change without prompting or encouragement from Star Atlantic.

VIII. Financing

Defendants shall not finance all or any part of any purchase made pursuant to Section IV or V of this Final Judgment.

IX. Hold Separate

Until the divestitures required by this Final Judgment have been accomplished, defendants shall take all steps necessary to comply with the Hold Separate Stipulation and Order entered

by this Court. Defendants shall take no action that would jeopardize the divestitures ordered by this Court.

X. Affidavits

A. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint in this matter, and every thirty (30) calendar days thereafter until the divestitures have been completed under Section IV or V, defendants shall deliver to the United States an affidavit as to the fact and manner of their compliance with Section IV or V of this Final Judgment. Each such affidavit shall include the name, address, and telephone number of each person who, during the preceding thirty (30) days, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about acquiring, any interest in the Divestiture Assets, and shall describe in detail each contact with any such person during that period. Each such affidavit shall also include a description of the efforts defendants have taken to solicit buyers for the Divestiture Assets, and to provide required information to prospective Acquirers, including the limitations, if any, on such information. Assuming the information set forth in the affidavit is true and complete, any objection by the United States to information provided by defendants, including limitation on information, shall be made within fourteen (14) days of receipt of such affidavit.

B. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint in this matter, defendants shall deliver to the United States an affidavit that describes in reasonable detail all actions defendants have taken and all steps defendants have implemented on an ongoing basis to comply with Section IX of this Final Judgment. Defendants shall deliver to the United States an affidavit describing any changes to the efforts and actions outlined in defendants' earlier affidavits filed pursuant to this section within fifteen (15) calendar days after the change is implemented.

C. Defendants shall keep all records of all efforts made to preserve and divest the Divestiture Assets until one year after such divestitures have been completed.

XI. Compliance Inspection

A. For the purposes of determining or securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or of determining whether the Final Judgment should be modified or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege, from time to time duly authorized representatives of the United States Department of Justice,

including consultants and other persons retained by the United States, shall, upon written request of an authorized representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to defendants, be permitted:

(1) access during defendants' office hours to inspect and copy, or at the option of the United States, to require defendants to provide hard copies or electronic copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, records, data and documents in the possession, custody or control of defendants, relating to any matters contained in this Final Judgment; and

(2) to interview, either informally or on the record, defendants' officers, employees, or agents, who may have their individual counsel present, regarding such matters. The interviews shall be subject to the reasonable convenience of the interviewee and without restraint or interference by defendants.

B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, defendants shall submit such written reports or responses to written interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the matters contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested.

C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in this section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other than an authorized representative of the executive branch of the United States, except in the course of legal proceedings to which the United States is a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as otherwise required by law.

D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by defendants to the United States, defendants represent and identify in writing the material in any such information or documents to which a claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and defendants mark each pertinent page of such material, "Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," then the United States shall give defendants ten (10) calendar days notice prior to divulging such material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding).

XII. No Reacquisition

During the term of this Final Judgment, defendants may not reacquire any part of the Divestiture Assets, nor may any defendant participate in any

other transaction that would result in a combination, merger, or other joining together of any parts of the Divestiture Assets with assets of the divesting company.

XIII. Retention of Jurisdiction

This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any time for further orders and directions as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe this Final Judgment, to modify any of its provisions, to enforce compliance, and to punish violations of its provisions.

XIV. Expiration of Final Judgment

Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall expire ten (10) years from the date of its entry.

XV. Public Interest Determination

Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16, including making copies available to the public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, and any comments thereon, and the United States's responses to comments. Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive Impact Statement and any comments and responses to comments filed with the Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.

Date: _____

Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16

United States District Judge
 [FR Doc. 2012-28730 Filed 11-26-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

Importer of Controlled Substances; Notice of Application; Johnson Matthey, Inc.

Pursuant to Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations 1301.34(a), this is notice that on September 10, 2012, Johnson Matthey, Inc., Pharmaceutical Materials, 2003 Nolte Drive, West Deptford, New Jersey 08066-1742, made application by renewal to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for registration as an importer of the following basic classes of controlled substances:

Drug	Schedule
Coca Leaves (9040)	II

Drug	Schedule
Thebaine (9333)	II
Opium, raw (9600)	II
Noroxymorphone (9668)	II
Poppy Straw Concentrate (9670)	II

The company plans to import the listed controlled substances as raw materials, to be used in the manufacture of bulk controlled substances, for distribution to its customers.

No comments, objections, or requests for any hearings will be accepted on any application for registration or re-registration to import crude opium, poppy straw, concentrate of poppy straw, and coca leaves. Comments and requests for hearings on applications to import narcotic raw material are not appropriate, in accordance with 72 FR 3417 (2007).

In reference to the non-narcotic raw material, the company plans to import gram amounts to be used as reference standards for sale to its customers. Any bulk manufacturer who is presently, or is applying to be, registered with DEA to manufacture such basic classes of controlled substances listed in schedule I or II, which fall under the authority of section 1002(a)(2)(B) of the Act (21 U.S.C. 952(a)(2)(B)) may, in the circumstances set forth in 21 U.S.C. 958(i), file comments or objections to the issuance of the proposed registration and may, at the same time, file a written request for a hearing on such application pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43 and in such form as prescribed by 21 CFR 1316.47.

Any such written comments or objections should be addressed, in quintuplicate, to the Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Diversion Control, **Federal Register** Representative (ODL), 8701 Morrisette Drive, Springfield, Virginia 22152; and must be filed no later than December 27, 2012.

This procedure is to be conducted simultaneously with, and independent of, the procedures described in 21 CFR 1301.34(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f). As noted in a previous notice published in the **Federal Register** on September 23, 1975, 40 FR 43745, all applicants for registration to import a basic class of any controlled substance in schedules I or II are, and will continue to be, required to demonstrate to the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, that the requirements for such registration pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 958(a); 21 U.S.C. 823(a); and 21 CFR 1301.34(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) are satisfied.