

the test procedures and resubmit the procedures for approval.

(e) The following reference atmospheric conditions must be used to establish the reference procedures:

(1) Sea level atmospheric pressure of 2,116 pounds per square foot (1,013.25 hPa);

(2) Ambient air temperature of 77°

Fahrenheit (25° Celsius, i.e., ISA + 10 °C);

(3) Relative humidity of 70 percent; and

(4) Zero wind.

(f) For tests conducted in accordance with sections K6.2, K6.3, and K6.4 of this appendix, use the maximum normal operating RPM corresponding to the airworthiness limit imposed by the manufacturer. For configurations for which the rotor speed automatically links with the flight condition, use the maximum normal operating rotor speed corresponding for that flight condition. For configurations for which the rotor speed can change by pilot action, use the highest normal rotor speed specified in the flight manual limitation section for power-on conditions.

**K6.2 Takeoff Reference Procedure.** The takeoff reference flight procedure is as follows:

(a) A constant takeoff configuration must be maintained, including the nacelle angle selected by the applicant;

(b) The tiltrotor power must be stabilized at the maximum takeoff power corresponding to the minimum installed engine(s) specification power available for the reference ambient conditions or gearbox torque limit, whichever is lower. The tiltrotor power must also be stabilized along a path starting from a point located 1,640 feet (500 m) before the flight path reference point, at 65 ft (20 m) above ground level;

(c) The nacelle angle and the corresponding best rate of climb speed, or the lowest approved speed for the climb after takeoff, whichever is the greater, must be maintained throughout the takeoff reference procedure;

(d) The rotor speed must be stabilized at the maximum normal operating RPM certificated for takeoff;

(e) The weight (mass) of the tiltrotors must be the maximum takeoff weight (mass) as requested for noise certification; and

(f) The reference takeoff flight profile is a straight line segment inclined from the starting point 1,640 feet (500 m) before to the center noise measurement point and 65 ft (20 m) above ground level at an angle defined by best rate of climb and the speed corresponding to the selected nacelle angle and for minimum specification engine performance.

**K6.3 Flyover Reference Procedure.** The flyover reference flight procedure is as follows:

(a) The tiltrotor must stabilize for level flight along the centerline flyover flight path and over the noise measurement reference point at an altitude of 492 ft (150 m) above ground level;

(b) A constant flyover configuration must be maintained;

(c) The weight (mass) of the tiltrotor must be the maximum takeoff weight (mass) as requested for noise certification;

(d) In the VTOL/Conversion mode:

(1) The nacelle angle must be at the authorized fixed operation point that is closest to the shallow nacelle angle certificated for zero airspeed;

(2) The airspeed must be 0.9V<sub>CON</sub>; and

(3) The rotor speed must be stabilized at the maximum normal operating RPM certificated for level flight.

**K6.4 Approach Reference Procedure.** The approach reference procedure is as follows:

(a) The tiltrotor must be stabilized to follow a 6.0 degree approach path;

(b) An approved airworthiness configuration in which maximum noise occurs must be maintained;

(1) An airspeed equal to the best rate of climb speed corresponding to the nacelle angle, or the lowest approved airspeed for the approach, whichever is greater, must be stabilized and maintained; and

(2) The tiltrotor power during the approach must be stabilized over the flight path reference point, and continue to a landing;

(c) The rotor speed must stabilize at the maximum normal operating RPM certificated for approach;

(d) The constant approach configuration used in airworthiness certification tests, with the landing gear extended, must be maintained; and

(e) The weight (mass) of the tiltrotor at landing must be the maximum landing weight (mass) as requested for noise certification.

#### Section K7 Test Procedures

**K7.1** [Reserved]

**K7.2** The test procedures and noise measurements must be conducted and processed to yield the noise evaluation measure designated in section K2 of this appendix.

**K7.3** If either the test conditions or test procedures do not conform to the applicable noise certification reference conditions or procedures prescribed by this part, the applicant must apply the correction methods described in section H36.205 of Appendix H of this part to the acoustic test data measured.

**K7.4** Adjustments for differences between test and reference flight procedures must not exceed:

(a) For takeoff: 4.0 EPNdB, of which the arithmetic sum of delta 1 and the term  $-7.5 \log(QK/QrKr)$  from delta 2 must not in total exceed 2.0 EPNdB;

(b) For flyover or approach: 2.0 EPNdB.

**K7.5** The average rotor RPM must not vary from the normal maximum operating RPM by more than  $\pm 1.0$  percent during the 10 dB-down time interval.

**K7.6** The tiltrotor airspeed must not vary from the reference airspeed appropriate to the flight demonstration by more than  $\pm 9$  km/h (5 kts) throughout the 10 dB-down time interval.

**K7.7** The number of level flyovers made with a head wind component must be equal to the number of level flyovers made with a tail wind component.

**K7.8** The tiltrotor must operate between  $\pm 10$  degrees from the vertical or between  $\pm 65$  feet ( $\pm 20$  m) lateral deviation tolerance, whichever is greater, above the reference track and throughout the 10 dB-down time interval.

**K7.9** The tiltrotor altitude must not vary during each flight by more than  $\pm 30$  ft ( $\pm 9$  m) from the reference altitude at the overhead point.

**K7.10** During the approach procedure, the tiltrotor must establish a stabilized constant speed approach and fly between approach angles of 5.5 degrees and 6.5 degrees.

**K7.11** During all test procedures, the tiltrotor weight (mass) must not be less than 90 percent and not more than 105 percent of the maximum certificated weight (mass). For each of the test procedures, complete at least one test at or above this maximum certificated weight (mass).

**K7.12** A tiltrotor capable of carrying external loads or external equipment must be noise certificated without such loads or equipment fitted.

**K7.13** The values of V<sub>CON</sub> and V<sub>MCP</sub> or V<sub>MO</sub> used for noise certification must be included in the approved Flight Manual.

Issued in Washington, DC, on June 10, 2011.

**Lourdes Maurice,**

*Director, Office of Environment and Energy.*

[FR Doc. 2011–15276 Filed 6–20–11; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0568; Directorate Identifier 2011–NM–010–AD]

**RIN 2120–AA64**

#### **Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Services B.V. Model F.27 Mark 050, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 Airplanes; and Model F.28 Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

[T]he Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker F27 and F28 type designs in response to these regulations revealed that, under certain failure conditions, a short circuit can develop in the fuel pilot valve solenoid or in the wiring to the solenoid. Such a short circuit may result in an ignition source in the wing tank vapour space.

This condition, if not corrected, could result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane.

\* \* \* \* \*

The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by August 5, 2011.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

- Fax: 202-493-2251.

- Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

- Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact Fokker Services B.V., Technical Services Dept., P.O. Box 231, 2150 AE Nieuw-Vennep, the Netherlands; telephone +31 (0)252-627-350; fax +31 (0)252-627-211; e-mail [technicalservices.fokker.services@stork.com](mailto:technicalservices.fokker.services@stork.com); Internet: <http://www.myfokkerfleet.com>. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-1137; fax 425-227-1149.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2011-0568; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-010-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

#### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2010-0195, dated September 29, 2010 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

[T]he Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker F27 and F28 type designs in response to these regulations revealed that, under certain failure conditions, a short circuit can develop in the fuel pilot valve solenoid or in the wiring to the solenoid. Such a short circuit may result in an ignition source in the wing tank vapour space.

This condition, if not corrected, could result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires [re-working the wiring and] the installation of a fuse packed in a jiffy junction [i.e., crimped wire in-line junction device] in the wiring to the fuel pilot valve solenoid.

The required actions also include revising the maintenance program to include a certain Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation (CDCCL). You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank

systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled "Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements" (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 ("SFAR 88," Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination

with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

#### Relevant Service Information

Fokker Services B.V. has issued the Fokker service bulletins listed in the following table.

TABLE—*Service Bulletins*

Fokker Service Bulletin—	Dated—
SBF50–28–024, including Drawing W7916–057, Sheets 006 and 007, Issue E, dated June 23, 2010, Drawing W7987–520, Sheets 1 and 2, dated October 24, 2005, and Manual Change Notification—Maintenance Document MCNM–F50–070, dated June 23, 2010.	June 23, 2010.
SBF28–28–051, including Drawing W57231, Sheets 010 and 011, Issue K, dated June 23, 2010, Drawing W58048, Sheet 2, dated April 29, 2010, and Manual Change Notification—Maintenance Document MCNM–F28–034, dated June 23, 2010.	June 23, 2010.
SBF27–28–069, including Drawing W7202–138, Sheets 001 and 002, Issue B, dated June 23, 2010, and Manual Change Notification—Maintenance Document MCNM–F27–025, dated June 23, 2010.	June 23, 2010.
SBF100–28–042, including Drawing W41192, Sheet 012, Issue AG, dated June 23, 2010, Drawing W59520, Sheet 1, Issue A, dated April 29, 2010, and Manual Change Notification—Maintenance Document MCNM–F100–129, dated June 23, 2010.	June 23, 2010.

The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

#### FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

#### Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.

#### Costs of Compliance

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 6 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 6 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of

this proposed AD. The average labor rate is \$85 per work-hour. Required parts would cost up to \$2,198 per product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these parts. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be up to \$16,248, or up to \$2,708 per product.

#### Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

#### Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and

responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

#### The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

#### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

**Fokker Services B.V.:** Docket No. FAA–2011–0568; Directorate Identifier 2011–NM–010–AD.

#### Comments Due Date

- (a) We must receive comments by August 5, 2011.

#### Affected ADs

- (b) None.

**Applicability**

(c) This AD applies to Fokker Services B.V. Model F.27 Mark 050, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 airplanes; Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 0070, 0100, 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 airplanes; certificated in any category; all serial numbers.

**Note 1:** This AD requires revisions to certain operator maintenance documents to include a new Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation (CDCCL). Compliance with this CDCCL is required by 14 CFR 91.403(c). For airplanes that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the areas addressed by this AD, the operator may not be able to accomplish the actions described in the revisions. In this situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) according to paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. The request should include a description of

changes to the required inspections that will ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.

**Subject**

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

**Reason**

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states: [T]he Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88, and the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) have published Interim Policy INT/POL/25/12. The review conducted by Fokker Services on the Fokker F27 and F28 type designs in response to these regulations revealed that, under certain failure conditions, a short circuit can develop in the fuel pilot valve solenoid or in the wiring to the solenoid. Such a short circuit

may result in an ignition source in the wing tank vapour space.

This condition, if not corrected, could result in a wing fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Compliance**

(f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

**Installation of Fuses Packed in Jiffy Junctions**

(g) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, re-work the wiring and install the fuses packed in jiffy junctions (i.e., crimped wire in-line junction device), in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the applicable Fokker service bulletin identified in table 1 of this AD.

TABLE 1—*Service Bulletins*

Fokker Service Bulletin—	Dated—
SBF50–28–024, including Drawing W7916–057, Sheets 006 and 007, Issue E, dated June 23, 2010, Drawing W7987–520, Sheets 1 and 2, dated October 24, 2005, and Manual Change Notification—Maintenance Document MCNM–F50–070, dated June 23, 2010.	June 23, 2010.
SBF28–28–051, including Drawing W57231, Sheets 010 and 011, Issue K, dated June 23, 2010, Drawing W58048, Sheet 2, dated April 29, 2010, and Manual Change Notification—Maintenance Document MCNM–F28–034, dated June 23, 2010.	June 23, 2010.
SBF27–28–069, including Drawing W7202–138, Sheets 001 and 002, Issue B, dated June 23, 2010, and Manual Change Notification—Maintenance Document MCNM–F27–025, dated June 23, 2010.	June 23, 2010.
SBF100–28–042, including Drawing W41192, Sheet 012, Issue AG, dated June 23, 2010, Drawing W59520, Sheet 1, Issue A, dated April 29, 2010, and Manual Change Notification—Maintenance Document MCNM–F100–129, dated June 23, 2010.	June 23, 2010.

**Critical Design Configuration Control Limitation (CDCCL)**

(h) Before further flight after doing the actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD: Revise the aircraft maintenance program by incorporating the CDCCL specified in paragraph 1.L.(1)(c) of the applicable Fokker service bulletins identified in table 1 of this AD.

**No Alternative Actions, Intervals, and/or CDCCLs**

(i) After accomplishing the revision required by paragraph (h) of this AD, no alternative CDCCLs may be used unless the CDCCLs are approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (j) of this AD.

**FAA AD Differences**

**Note 2:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: Although European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Airworthiness Directive 2010–0195, dated September 29, 2010, specifies revising the maintenance program to include maintaining CDCCLs, this AD only requires the revision. Requiring a revision of the maintenance program, rather than requiring maintaining CDCCLs, requires operators to record AD compliance only at the time the revision is made. Maintaining CDCCLs specified in the airworthiness limitations must be complied with in accordance with 14 CFR 91.403(c).

**Other FAA AD Provisions**

(j) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance: The Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the International Branch, send it to ATTN: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone 425–227–1137; fax 425–227–1149. Information may be e-mailed to: 9-ANM-116-AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

**Related Information**

(k) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2010–0195, dated September 29, 2010, and the Fokker service bulletins identified in table 1 of this AD, for related information.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 14, 2011.

**Ali Bahrami,**

*Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 2011–15360 Filed 6–20–11; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION****Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 71**

[Docket No. Docket No. FAA–2011–0527; Airspace Docket No. 11–AWA–2]

**RIN 2120–AA66**

**Proposed Amendment of Class C Airspace; Palm Beach International Airport, FL**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).