buster process. The assumptions that underlie this series are that cyber space is an adversarial domain, that the adversary is tenacious, clever, and capable, and that re-examining cyber security solutions in the context of these assumptions will result in key insights that will lead to the novel solutions we desperately need. To ensure that our discussion has the requisite adversarial flavor, we are inviting researchers who develop solutions of the type under discussion, and researchers who exploit these solutions. The goal is to engage in robust debate of topics generally believed to be true to determine to what extent that claim is warranted. The adversarial nature of these debates is meant to ensure the threat environment is reflected in the discussion in order to elicit innovative research concepts that will have a greater chance of having a sustained positive impact on our cyber security posture.

The fourth topic to be explored in this series is "Abnormal Behavior Detection Finds Malicious Actors." The workshop on this topic will be held in the Washington, DC area on June 20, 2011.

Assertion: "Abnormal Behavior Detection Finds Malicious Actors."

In an effort to reduce losses due to fraud, financial services companies have been fairly successful in establishing fraud detection analytics, based on abnormal behavior identification, which identify financial transactions that seem out of norm for a particular financial services customer. For example, credit card companies acting on this information will contact cardholders to validate anomalous behavior, or if costs are high, and users unavailable, can freeze accounts until the anomaly is investigated. In this way, they can curtail the loss due to prolonged invalid use of a credit card. Fraud detection algorithms (based on user behavior models) and procedures immediately set off account alarms and/or deny additional transactions after they have detected a fraudulent or suspicious transaction. Depending upon the fraud method (*e.g.,* automated gasoline purchase), they may not always block the first fraudulent transaction on a given card.

Online banking financial institutions employ similar behavioral models to monitor the size and destinations of financial transfers, and/or on-line transactions (such as change of address or payee) will delay transfers until the customer can be reached to confirm the transactions and/or provide additional authentication. Despite the use of best available behavior modeling and monitoring, financial institutions continue to sustain significant financial loss from fraud. Can the field of fraud detection (and cybersecurity in general) be improved by new technology and approaches?

Fraud detection works on the assumption that malicious fiscal behavior is a subset of abnormal behavior—if the fraudulent user mimics the financial behavior of the authorized user, these methods do not work. Detection methods do not assume that malicious behavior is automatically distinguishable from unusual behavior on the part of authorized users. The fraud detection algorithms use the financial services customer's history to build a profile of "normal" transactions and develop thresholds for unusual behavior. The volume of transactions allows for reasonable thresholds to be established. Fraud detection methods rely on strong models of normal behavior, or known criminal behavior characteristics. The development of many of these models is aided by the fact that the value of a transaction is numeric and allows sets of values to be analyzed with well understood algorithms. For example, credit card purchases have relatively small and fixed semantics: Store names are typed, businesses are categorized, relationships among businesses and purchases by card users are fairly easy to establish (e.g., people who buy plane tickets may also purchase luggage, or may eat out more when they are away, or may spend more in general while traveling). These models enable gradual change in behavior to be learned and help drive down false alerts.

Many cyber intrusion detection techniques, or insider threat detection techniques, aim to achieve similar results by using abnormal behavior detection as a starting point. Yet, it is an open question whether these techniques can expect to attain the same broad-based success when applied in the broader cyber security domain. The domains share an adversarial dynamic that might indicate that similar analyses could be effective. But do the assumptions of the relationship between malicious and normal behavior hold true? Can we establish a solid footing in terms of models of normal transaction semantics and transaction value? Does the real time nature of cyber decision making, and the ease of dynamic changes in the criminal's attack signature, present insurmountable challenges for behavioral techniques?

In this workshop, representatives from government and industry financial organizations will present different financial services fraud detection mechanisms, strengths, and areas needing further development. This will allow workshop participants to have a common understanding of the state of fraud detection practice.

How To Apply

If you would like to participate in this workshop, please submit (1) a resume or curriculum vita of no more than two pages which highlights your expertise in this area and (2) a one-page paper stating your opinion of the assertion and exploring new ideas to improve fraud detection specifically, and malicious cyber behavior in general. The workshop will accommodate no more than 60 participants, so these brief documents need to make a compelling case for your participation. Applications should be submitted to *assumptionbusters@nitrd.gov* no later than 5 p.m. EDT on May 13, 2011.

Selection and Notification:

The SCORE committee will select an expert group that reflects a broad range of opinions on the assertion. Accepted participants will be notified by e-mail no later than May 25, 2011. We cannot guarantee that we will contact individuals who are not selected, though we will attempt to do so unless the volume of responses is overwhelming.

Submitted by the National Science Foundation for the National Coordination Office (NCO) for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) on April 19, 2011.

Suzanne H. Plimpton,

Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation.

[FR Doc. 2011–9877 Filed 4–22–11; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 70–0036; NRC–2009–0278]

Notice of Availability of Draft Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for a License Amendment to Materials, License No. SNM–33, Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, Hematite Decommissioning Project, Festus, Missouri (TAC NO. J00357)

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Availability.

DATES: The public comment period on the draft Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) closes on May 25, 2011. Written comments should be submitted as described in the **ADDRESSES** section of

this notice. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or before May 25, 2011.

ADDRESSES: Please include Docket ID NRC–2009–0278 in the subject line of your comments. Comments submitted in writing or in electronic form will be posted on the NRC Web site and on the Federal rulemaking Web site, *http://www.regulations.gov*. Because your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information, the NRC cautions you against including any information in your submission that you do not want to be publicly disclosed.

The NRC requests that any party soliciting or aggregating comments received from other persons for submission to the NRC inform those persons that the NRC will not edit their comments to remove any identifying or contact information, and therefore, they should not include any information in their comments that they do not want publicly disclosed. You may submit comments by any one of the following methods:

- Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to *http://www.regulations.gov* and search for documents filed under Docket ID NRC–2009–0278. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher, telephone: 301–492–3668; e-mail: *Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov*.
- Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Chief, Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB), Office of Administration, Mail Stop: TWB–05–B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001.
- Fax comments to: RADB at 301–492–3446.

You can access publicly available documents related to this notice using the following methods:

- NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine and have copied, for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's PDR, O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
- NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC are available online in the NRC Library at *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html*. From this page, the public can gain entry into ADAMS, which provides text and image files of the NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by e-mail to *pdr.resource@nrc.gov*. The draft Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact is available electronically under ADAMS Accession Number ML110870992.
- Federal Rulemaking Web site: Public comments and supporting materials related to this notice can be found at *http://www.regulations.gov* by searching on Docket ID: NRC–2009–0278.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John J. Hayes, Senior Project Manager, Decommissioning and Uranium Recovery Licensing Directorate, Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone: 301–415–5928; fax number: 301–415–5369; e-mail: *John.Hayes@nrc.gov*.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is intending to issue a license amendment to special nuclear material (SNM) license number SNM–33. SNM–33 was issued to Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC (WEC) for the former Hematite Fuel Cycle Facility in Hematite, Missouri. Since the fuel cycle facility operations have ceased, the Hematite site is undergoing preparation for site decommissioning. The facility is now referred to as the Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP). The purpose of the proposed amendment is to authorize disposal of approximately 23,000 m^3 (30,000 yd^3) of soil and debris containing low concentrations of byproduct material and SNM at the US Ecology Idaho, Inc. (USEI) hazardous waste disposal facility near Grand View, Idaho. WEC requested authority for this action on May 21, 2009 (ADAMS No. ML091480071), pursuant to Section 20.2002 of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR 20.2002), "Method of Obtaining Approval of Proposed Disposal Procedures." This action would also exempt USEI from further NRC licensing requirements to possess and dispose of byproduct material and special nuclear material (SNM) identified in WEC's proposed license amendment. Waste generated from the proposed action would be classified as meeting regulatory requirements for unrestricted release or as radioactive material and be packaged, transported and disposed of based on applicable regulations.

NRC has prepared a draft EA (ML110870992) in support of this amendment to allow WEC HDP, under their current license, to dispose of certain low-level waste (LLW) at the USEI hazardous waste disposal facility in Grand View, Idaho.

II. EA Summary

Under 10 CFR 20.2002, WEC proposes to dispose of about 23,000 m^3 (30,000 yd^3) of LLW from the HDP that contains byproduct material and SNM at the USEI hazardous waste disposal facility. The LLW will be generated as part of decommissioning activities, which will include exhumation of existing burial pits, as described in the Hematite DP. There are 40 unlined pits, each of which is approximately 12 meters (40 feet) long, 6 meters (20 feet) wide, and 3.6 meters (12 feet) deep. The pits were used to dispose of waste generated by the former owners of the facility from 1965 to 1971. In addition, it is estimated that there are 20–25 burials for which there are no records. These unrecorded burials are believed to be in the area between the documented Burial Pits and the site buildings, under roadways in the eastern portion of the central tract area of the HDP site. Additional impacted material may come from underneath the site buildings.

The NRC staff has prepared the draft EA in support of the proposed license amendment. The NRC staff considered impacts to many aspects of the surrounding environment as listed in Table 1.

TABLE 1—ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS CONSIDERED FOR THE HEMATITE DECOMMISSIONING PROJECT SITE AND US ECOLOGY IDAHO, INC.

Land use	Noise
Transportation	Historic and cultural resources
Geology and soils	Visual/scenic resources
Water resources	Socioeconomics
Ecological resources	Public and occupational health
Air Quality	Waste management

The NRC has concluded that the proposed action to grant a license amendment to WEC HDP, and an exemption to USEI from the requirements for a license under 10 CFR 30.3 and 10 CFR 70.3 is authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and is otherwise in the public interest.

III. Finding of No Significant Impact

On the basis of this EA, NRC has concluded that there are no significant environmental impacts and the issuance of a license amendment does not warrant the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement. Accordingly, it has been determined that a Finding of No Significant Impact is appropriate.

IV. Further Information

Documents related to this action, including the letter requesting the amendment and supporting documentation, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic Reading Room at *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html*. The ADAMS accession numbers for the documents related to this notice are:

1. May 21, 2009 Hematite Alternate Disposal Request (ML091480071)

2. July 31, 2009 HDP Environmental Report (ML092870403 and ML092870405)

3. Hematite Response to NRC RAIs, December 29 2009, (ML100320540)

4. Response to Additional Information Requested for Alternate Waste Disposal Authorization, March 31, 2010, (ML100950386)

5. Hematite Soil Contour Data, March 31, 2010, (ML100950393)

6. Hematite Additional Information and Clarifications Concerning 10 CFR 20.2002 Alternate Waste Disposal Authorization and Exemption for Specific Hematite Decommissioning Project Waste, May 24, 2010, (ML101450240)

7. Waste Characterization for Alternate Disposal Request for Decommissioning Soils, December 21, 2010, (ML103570023)

If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to *pdr.resource@nrc.gov*.

These documents may also be viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's PDR, O–1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR reproduction contractor will copy documents for a fee.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of April 2011.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Keith I. McConnell,

Deputy Director, Decommissioning and Uranium Recovery Licensing Directorate, Division of Waste Management and Environmental Protection, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs.

[FR Doc. 2011–9828 Filed 4–22–11; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–266 and 50–301; NRC–2010–0380]

Nextera Energy Point Beach, LLC; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact Related to the Proposed License Amendment To Increase the Maximum Reactor Power Level

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering issuance of an amendment for Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–24 and DPR–27, issued to NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra, the licensee) for operation of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2, located near Two Rivers, Wisconsin. In accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 51.21, the NRC has prepared an environmental assessment (EA) documenting its finding. The NRC concluded that the proposed actions will have no significant environmental impact.

The NRC published a draft EA and draft finding of no significant impact (FONSI) on the proposed action for public comment in the **Federal Register** on December 10, 2010 (75 FR 77010). Comments were received on the draft EA from: (1) the licensee; (2) members of the public; and 3) the Wisconsin Public Service Commission. Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC, including the public comments and responses, are available online in the NRC Library at *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.* From this site, the public can access the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC's public documents. The document summarizing and addressing the public comments is located at ADAMS accession number ML110950476.

Environmental Assessment

Plant Site and Environs

The PBNP site is located approximately 6 miles (10 kilometers) east-northeast of the town of Mischot on the western shore of Lake Michigan, midway along the western shore, near the northeastern corner of Manitowoc County, Wisconsin. The City of Green Bay is located approximately 25 miles (40 kilometers) northwest of PBNP, and the Kewaunee Nuclear Plant is located approximately 4 miles (6 kilometers) north of PBNP on the shore of Lake Michigan. The PBNP site is comprised of approximately 1,260 acres (510 hectares), with 104 acres (42 hectares) that includes the two nuclear reactors, parking and ancillary facilities. Approximately 1,050 acres (425 hectares) are used for agriculture, and the remaining land is a mixture of woods, wetlands, and open areas. Each of the two units at PBNP use Westinghouse pressurized water reactors.

Identification of the Proposed Action

By application dated April 7, 2009, the licensee requested an amendment for an extended power uprate (EPU) for PBNP to increase the licensed thermal power level from 1,540 megawatts thermal (MWt) to 1,800 MWt for each unit, which represents an increase of approximately 17 percent above the current licensed thermal power and approximately 18 percent over the original licensed thermal power level. This change in core thermal power level requires the NRC to amend the facility's operating license. The operational goal of the proposed EPU is a corresponding increase in electrical output for each unit from 519 megawatts electric (MWe) to 607 MWe. The proposed action is considered an EPU by NRC because it exceeds the typical 7 percent power increase that can be accommodated with only minor plant changes. EPUs typically involve extensive modifications to the nuclear steam supply system.

The licensee plans to make extensive physical modifications to the plant's secondary side to implement the proposed EPU over the course of two refueling outages currently scheduled for spring 2011 and fall 2011. The actual power uprate, if approved by the NRC, would occur for each unit following the respective refueling outages in 2011.

The Need for the Proposed Action

NextEra stated in their environmental report that the proposed action is needed to provide the licensee flexibility to increase the electrical output of PBNP Units 1 and 2.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

As part of the licensing process for PBNP Units 1 and 2, the NRC published