

additional special conditions may apply.

10. The inflatable restraints must function properly after loss of normal airplane electrical power and after a transverse separation of the fuselage at the most critical location. A separation at the location of the lap belt does not have to be considered.

11. It must be shown that the inflatable restraints will not release hazardous quantities of gas or particulate matter into the cabin.

12. The inflatable restraints installation must be protected from the effects of fire such that no hazard to occupants will result.

13. The system must be protected from lightning and HIRF. The threats specified in Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-23 are incorporated by reference for the purpose of measuring lightning and HIRF protection. For the purposes of complying with HIRF requirements, the inflatable lapbelt system is considered a critical system if its deployment could have a hazardous effect on the airplane; otherwise it is considered an essential system.

14. There must be a means for a crewmember to verify the integrity of the inflatable restraints activation system prior to each flight or it must be demonstrated to reliably operate between inspection intervals.

15. The inflatable material may not have an average burn rate of greater than 2.5 inches/minute when tested using the horizontal flammability test as defined in 14 CFR part 25, appendix F, part I, paragraph (b)(5).

Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 12, 2008.

Stephen P. Boyd,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8-27541 Filed 11-19-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0850; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-342-AD; Amendment 39-15710; AD 2008-22-14]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0100 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

* * * * *

During recent inspections it was found that some * * * bolts, that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links, were broken. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to [the loss of the flight control input connection to the horizontal stabilizer and consequent] partial loss of control of the aircraft.

* * * * *

We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective December 26, 2008.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of December 26, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov> or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on August 7, 2008 (73 FR 45898) and proposed to supersede AD 97-13-05, Amendment 39-10051 (62 FR 34617, June 27, 1997). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

In January 1996, Fokker issued Service Bulletin (SB) SBF100-27-069 (referencing Menasco, now Goodrich, SB 23100-27-19) to introduce an inspection of bolt Part Number (P/N) 23233-1 for cracks after the examination of a failed bolt. This Service Bulletin was made mandatory by CAA-NL (Civil Aviation Authority—the Netherlands) with the issuance of AD BLA 1996-006 (A) [reference corresponding FAA AD 97-13-05].

Additionally the same SB introduced a lower torque value for these bolts.

During recent inspections it was found that some of these bolts, that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links, were broken. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to [the loss of the flight control input connection to the horizontal stabilizer and consequent] partial loss of control of the aircraft.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that continues to exist or develop on other aircraft of the same type design, this Airworthiness Directive supersedes CAA-NL AD 1996-006 and requires an integrity check by a re-torque in accordance with SBF100-27-091 and the installation of a tie wrap through the bolt, which will act as a retainer for the bolt and nut. The key function for this tie-wrap is to keep the bolt in place in the event the bolt head fails.

The corrective action includes replacing any failed bolt (i.e., broken or loose bolt) with a serviceable bolt. This AD also expands the applicability of AD 97-13-05. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of the cost to the public.

Conclusion

We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have required different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a Note within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD will affect about 9 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about 3 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD to the U.S. operators to be \$2,160, or \$240 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

■ Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by removing Amendment 39-10051 (62 FR 34617, June 27, 1997) and adding the following new AD:

2008-22-14 Fokker Services B.V.:
Amendment 39-15710. Docket No. FAA-2008-0850; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-342-AD.

Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective December 26, 2008.

Affected ADs

(b) This AD supersedes AD 97-13-05, Amendment 39-10051.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0100 airplanes, certificated in any category, all serial numbers.

Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight Controls.

Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states: In January 1996, Fokker issued Service Bulletin (SB) SBF100-27-069 (referencing Menasco, now Goodrich, SB 23100-27-19) to introduce an inspection of bolt Part Number (P/N) 23233-1 for cracks after the examination of a failed bolt. This Service Bulletin was made mandatory by CAA-NL (Civil Aviation Authority—the Netherlands) with the issuance of AD BLA 1996-006 (A) [reference corresponding FAA AD 97-13-05]. Additionally the same SB introduced a lower torque value for these bolts.

During recent inspections it was found that some of these bolts, that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links, were broken. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to [the loss of the flight control input connection to the horizontal stabilizer and consequent] partial loss of control of the aircraft.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that continues to exist or develop on other aircraft of the same type design, this Airworthiness Directive [European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Airworthiness Directive 2007-0287, dated November 15,

2007] supersedes CAA-NL AD 1996-006 and requires an integrity check by a re-torque in accordance with SBF100-27-091 and the installation of a tie wrap through the bolt, which will act as a retainer for the bolt and nut. The key function for this tie-wrap is to keep the bolt in place in the event the bolt head fails.

The corrective action includes replacing any failed bolt (*i.e.*, broken or loose bolt) with a serviceable bolt.

Actions and Compliance

(f) Unless already done, within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, do the following actions.

(1) Perform a one-time inspection (integrity check) for failure of the lower bolts of the stabilizer control unit dog-links, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-27-091, dated August 31, 2007. If a failed bolt is found, before further flight, replace the bolt with a serviceable bolt in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin.

(2) Install a tie-wrap through the lower bolts of the stabilizer control unit, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-27-091, dated August 31, 2007.

FAA AD Differences

Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

Related Information

(h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2007-0287, dated November 15,

2007; and Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-27-091, dated August 31, 2007; for related information.

Material Incorporated by Reference

(i) You must use Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-27-091, dated August 31, 2007, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Fokker Services B.V., Technical Services Dept., P.O. Box 231, 2150 AE Nieuw-Vennep, the Netherlands; telephone +31 (0)252-627-350; fax +31 (0)252-627-211; e-mail technicalservices.fokkerservices@stork.com; Internet <http://www.myfokkerfleet.com>.

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 9, 2008.

Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8-25755 Filed 11-19-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0270; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-255-AD; Amendment 39-15628; AD 2008-16-10]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Gulfstream Aerospace LP Model Galaxy Airplanes and Gulfstream 200 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

The 3 supporting blocks [installed on hydraulic tubes] were made of Teflon, which is unsuitable material for this application.

Excessive wear of the blocks was discovered on numerous aircraft, as well as several cases of chafing between the loosely supported tubes. In one case, hydraulic fluid was lost due to fatigue failure of an inadequately supported tube. Loss of hydraulic fluid causes subsequent multiple failures of hydraulically operated systems.

Multiple failures of hydraulically operated systems (for the flight air brake actuators, brake system, right thrust reverser, etc.) could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD becomes effective December 26, 2008.

The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of December 26, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov> or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Borfritz, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2677; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. That NPRM was published in the **Federal Register** on March 13, 2008 (73 FR 13490). That NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

The 3 supporting blocks [installed on hydraulic tubes] were made of Teflon, which is unsuitable material for this application. Excessive wear of the blocks was discovered on numerous aircraft, as well as several cases of chafing between the loosely supported tubes. In one case, hydraulic fluid was lost due to fatigue failure of an inadequately supported tube. Loss of hydraulic fluid causes subsequent multiple failures of hydraulically operated systems.

Multiple failures of hydraulically operated systems (for the flight air brake actuators, brake system, right thrust reverser, etc.) could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. The corrective actions include repetitive visual inspections of the attaching blocks for wear and of the hydraulic

tubes to determine if any tube is loose or damaged; an inspection of the entire length of the tubes for chafing, damage, and cracking; replacement of chafed, damaged, or cracked tubes; and replacement of blocks made of Teflon in the right-hand aft fuselage equipment bay with new blocks made of Nylon 6/6. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Comments

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. We received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of the cost to the public.

Conclusion

We reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

Changes to Note 1 and Service Information References

The statement specified in Note 1 of the NPRM is informational only and is not part of the requirements of this AD. The actions specified in that statement are required regardless of AD action. We have removed Note 1 of the NPRM from this AD and revised the numbering on the subsequent Note in this AD.

We have revised paragraph (f)(1)(iii) of this AD to clarify that the repair may be done in accordance with Chapter 20-10-12 of the Gulfstream G200 Maintenance Manual, Revision 15, dated March 31, 2008.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have required different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow our FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a NOTE within the AD.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD will affect about 129 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about 2 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about \$54 per