

**Terminating Action for AWLs Revision**

(k) Incorporating AWL No. 28—AWL—22 into the AWLs section of the ICA in accordance with paragraph (g)(3) of AD 2008—10—11, amendment 39—15517, terminates the action in paragraph (h) of this AD.

**Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)**

(l)(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA, ATTN: Jen Pei, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM—130S, FAA, Seattle ACO, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057—3356; telephone (425) 917—6409; fax (425) 917—6590; has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 29, 2008.

**Ali Bahrami,**

*Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E8—18222 Filed 8—6—08; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910—13—P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION****Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. FAA—2008—0850; Directorate Identifier 2007—NM—342—AD]

**RIN 2120—AA64**

**Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0100 Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would supersede an existing AD. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

\* \* \* \* \*

During recent inspections it was found that some \* \* \* bolts, that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links, were broken. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to [the loss of the flight

control input connection to the horizontal stabilizer and consequent] partial loss of control of the aircraft.

\* \* \* \* \*

The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by September 8, 2008.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- **Federal eRulemaking Portal:** Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
- **Fax:** (202) 493—2251.
- **Mail:** U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M—30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12—140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
- **Hand Delivery:** U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M—30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12—40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

**Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647—5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM—116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98057—3356; telephone (425) 227—1137; fax (425) 227—1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:****Comments Invited**

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include “Docket No. FAA—2008—0850; Directorate Identifier 2007—NM—342—AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

**Discussion**

On June 13, 1997, we issued AD 97—13—05, Amendment 39—10051 (62 FR 34617, June 27, 1997). That AD required actions intended to address an unsafe condition on the products listed above.

Since we issued AD 97—13—05, we received reports of inspection results indicating that the bolt that connects the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links was broken (one on the nut side, and one on the head side). When the bolts fails at the nut end, the remaining part of the bolt cannot drop out of the connection due to the limited amount of space available between the bolt head and plate, and the affected connection is still able to carry the system loads. However, if the head side of the bolt fails, then the bolt may drop out of the connection.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2007—0287, dated November 15, 2007 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

In January 1996, Fokker issued Service Bulletin (SB) SBF—100—27—069 (referencing Menasco, now Goodrich, SB 23100—27—19) to introduce an inspection of bolt Part Number (P/N) 23233—1 for cracks after the examination of a failed bolt. This Service Bulletin was made mandatory by CAA—NL (Civil Aviation Authority—the Netherlands) with the issuance of AD BLA 1996—006 (A) [reference corresponding FAA AD 97—13—05]. Additionally the same SB introduced a lower torque value for these bolts.

During recent inspections it was found that some of these bolts, that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links, were broken. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to [the loss of the flight control input connection to the horizontal stabilizer and consequent] partial loss of control of the aircraft.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that continues to exist or develop on other aircraft of the same type design, this Airworthiness Directive supersedes CAA—NL AD 1996—006 and requires an integrity check by a re-torque in accordance with SBF—100—27—091 and the installation of a tie-wrap through the bolt, which will act as a retainer for the bolt and nut. The key function for this tie-wrap is to keep the bolt in place in the event the bolt head fails.

The corrective action includes replacing any failed bolt (i.e., broken or

loose bolt) with a serviceable bolt. This proposed AD also expands the applicability of AD 97-13-05. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

#### Relevant Service Information

Fokker Services B.V. has issued Fokker Service Bulletin SBF-100-27-091, dated August 31, 2007. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

#### FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

#### Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a Note within the proposed AD.

#### Costs of Compliance

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 9 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 3 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be \$2,160, or \$240 per product.

#### Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of

the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

#### Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

#### The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

#### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by removing Amendment 39-10051 (62 FR 34617, June 27, 1997) and adding the following new AD:

**Fokker Services B.V.:** Docket No. FAA-2008-0850; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-342-AD.

#### Comments Due Date

- (a) We must receive comments by September 8, 2008.

#### Affected ADs

- (b) The proposed AD supersedes AD 97-13-05, Amendment 39-10051.

#### Applicability

- (c) This AD applies to Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0100 airplanes, certificated in any category, all serial numbers.

#### Subject

- (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight Controls.

#### Reason

- (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

In January 1996, Fokker issued Service Bulletin (SB) SBF-100-27-069 (referencing Menasco, now Goodrich, SB 23100-27-19) to introduce an inspection of bolt Part Number (P/N) 23233-1 for cracks after the examination of a failed bolt. This Service Bulletin was made mandatory by CAA-NL (Civil Aviation Authority—the Netherlands) with the issuance of AD BLA 1996-006 (A) [reference corresponding FAA AD 97-13-05]. Additionally the same SB introduced a lower torque value for these bolts.

During recent inspections it was found that some of these bolts, that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links, were broken. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to [the loss of the flight control input connection to the horizontal stabilizer and consequent] partial loss of control of the aircraft.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that continues to exist or develop on other aircraft of the same type design, this Airworthiness Directive [European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Airworthiness Directive 2007-0287, dated November 15, 2007] supersedes CAA-NL AD 1996-006 and requires an integrity check by a re-torque in accordance with SBF100-27-091 and the installation of a tie wrap through the bolt, which will act as a retainer for the bolt and nut. The key function for this tie-wrap is to keep the bolt in place in the event the bolt head fails.

The corrective action includes replacing any failed bolt (i.e., broken or loose bolt) with a serviceable bolt.

#### Actions and Compliance

- (f) Unless already done, within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, do the following actions.

- (1) Perform a one-time inspection (integrity check) for failure of the lower bolts of the stabilizer control unit dog-links, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-27-091, dated August 31, 2007. If a failed bolt is found, before further flight, replace the bolt with a serviceable bolt in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin.

(2) Install a tie-wrap through the lower bolts of the stabilizer control unit, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-27-091, dated August 31, 2007.

#### FAA AD Differences

**Note:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

#### Other FAA AD Provisions

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

#### Related Information

(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness Directive 2007-0287, dated November 15, 2007, and Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-27-091, dated August 31, 2007, for related information.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 29, 2008.

#### Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8-18225 Filed 8-6-08; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0854; Directorate Identifier 2008-CE-050-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Allied Ag Cat Productions, Inc. G-164 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD) 78-08-09, which applies to certain Allied Ag Cat Productions, Inc. (formerly Grumman-American) Models G-164, G-164A, and G-164B airplanes. AD 78-08-09 currently requires repetitively inspecting the interior and the exterior of the main tubular spar of the rudder assembly for corrosion, taking necessary corrective action if corrosion is found, and applying corrosion protection. Since we issued AD 78-08-09, the rudder main tubular spar failed on a later production airplane. Consequently, this proposed AD would retain the actions required in AD 78-08-09 and expand the applicability to include all G-164 series airplanes. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct corrosion in the rudder main tubular spar, which could result in failure of the weld to the main spar tube. This failure could lead to loss of directional control.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 6, 2008.

**ADDRESSES:** Use one of the following addresses to comment on this proposed AD:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.

- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

- *Hand Delivery:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact Grumman American Aviation Corporation, P.O. Box 2206, Savannah, Georgia 31402; telephone: (912) 964-3000.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Andy McAnaul, Aerospace Engineer, ASW-150, FAA San Antonio MIDO-43, 10100 Reunion Place, Suite 650, San Antonio, Texas 78216, phone: (210) 308-3365, fax: (210) 308-3370.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include the docket number, "FAA-2008-0854; Directorate Identifier 2008-CE-050-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the proposed AD in light of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive concerning this proposed AD.

##### Discussion

Excessive corrosion on the main tubular spar, part number A1203-11, of the rudder assembly resulting from moisture accumulating in the lower internal cavity on Allied Ag Cat Productions, Inc. (formerly Grumman-American) Models G-164, G-164A, and G-164B airplanes caused us to issue AD 78-08-09, Amendment 39-3191. AD 78-08-09 currently requires the following on certain Models G-164, G-164A, and G-164B airplanes:

- Repetitively inspecting the rudder main tubular spar for corrosion;
- Repairing any corrosion found; and
- Applying corrosion protection.

AD 78-08-09 applies only to early production Allied Ag Cat airplanes. In March 2008, the rudder main tubular spar failed on a Model G164B airplane, serial number 586B (not affected by AD 78-08-09). The spar failed where the lower fitting is welded to the main tube. Investigation revealed that the failure was a result of severe internal corrosion caused by moisture trapped in the lower internal cavity of the spar tube.

AD 78-08-09 does not establish a way to identify affected rudders. It is a common practice to repair agricultural airplanes with repaired or used serviceable parts from other sources, or using removed parts from other airplanes. Based on the lack of traceability, rudders affected by AD 78-08-09 are potentially being installed on