inspections described in the revisions. In this situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) according to paragraph (k) of this AD. The request should include a description of changes to the required inspections that will ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent electrical current from flowing through a motor operated valve (MOV) actuator into a fuel tank, which could create a potential ignition source inside the fuel tank. This condition, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Compliance

(e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

Inspection

(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD, do an inspection of the MOV actuators of the main and center fuel tanks for part number MA20A1001–1, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–28A0034, dated August 2, 2007.

Replacement

(g) If any part number MA20A1001–1 is found during the inspection required by paragraph (f) of this AD, within 60 months after the effective date of this AD, do the actions specified in paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD by accomplishing all the applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 777–28A0034, dated August 2, 2007. Do all applicable corrective actions before further flight.

(1) Replace the MOV actuator with a new MOV actuator, part number MA030A1001.

(2) Measure the electrical resistance of the bond from the adapter plate to the airplane structure, and do all applicable corrective actions.

Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs): Revision for AWL No. 28–AWL–19 and 28–AWL–20

(h) Concurrently with accomplishing the actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD, revise the AWLs section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) by incorporating AWL No. 28–AWL–19 and No. 28–AWL–20 of Subsection E of Section 9, Revision 28, dated February 2006, of the Boeing 777 Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) Document, D622W001–9.

No Alternative Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCLs)

(i) After accomplishing the action specified in paragraph (h) of this AD, no alternative CDCCLs may be used unless the CDCCLs are approved as an AMOC in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (k) of this AD.

Terminating Action for AWLs Revision

(j) Incorporating AWL No. 28–AWL–19 and No. 28–AWL–20 into the AWLs section of the ICA in accordance with paragraph (g)(2) of AD 2008–11–13, amendment 39–15536, terminates the action required by paragraph (h) of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(k)(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA, ATTN: Margaret Langsted, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, SACO, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6500; fax (425) 917–6590; has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 29, 2008.

Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8–18211 Filed 8–6–08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0846; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–045–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757–200, 757–200PF, and 757–300 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 757–200, 757–200PF, and 757–300 series airplanes. This proposed AD would require, for certain airplanes, measuring the electrical bond resistance at certain stations and doing any applicable repair; installing support brackets for the hot short protector and new support clamps for the wire bundles; installing the equipment of the hot short protector; and modifying an existing wire bundle and installing a new wire bundle. This proposed AD would also require, for certain other airplanes, measuring the electrical bond resistance at certain stations, measuring the electrical bonding resistance between the hot short protector and rear spar web, and doing any applicable repair. This proposed AD also would require revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. This proposed AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are proposing this AD to prevent the center fuel tank densitometer from overheating and becoming a potential ignition source inside the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a center fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by September 22, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* Go to *http://www.regulations.gov*. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
- *Fax:* 202–493–2251.
- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
- *Hand Delivery:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http://www.regulations.gov*; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jen Pei, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6409; fax (425) 917–6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include ''Docket No. FAA–2008–0846; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–045–AD'' at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to *http://www.regulations.gov*, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled ''Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (''SFAR 88,'' Amendment 21–78, and subsequent Amendments 21–82 and 21–83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Boeing has found that no separation was provided for the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) wires. A potential hot short of the FQIS lead wire could cause the densitometer in the center fuel tank to overheat. In situations where the fuel level in the center fuel tank is low, the overheated densitometer could ignite flammable fuel vapors inside the center fuel tank. This condition, if not corrected, could result in a center fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Other Related Rulemaking

On April 29, 2008, we issued AD 2008–10–11, amendment 39–15517 (73 FR 25974, May 8, 2008), applicable to all Boeing Model 757 airplanes. That AD requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) by incorporating new limitations for fuel tank systems to satisfy SFAR 88 requirements. That AD also requires the initial inspection of certain repetitive AWL inspections to phase in those inspections, and repair if necessary. That AD resulted from a design review of the fuel tank systems. We issued that AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. Incorporating AWL No. 28–AWL–22 into the AWLs section of the ICA in accordance with paragraph (g)(3) of AD 2008–10–11 would terminate the action in paragraph (h) of this proposed AD.

Relevant Service Information

We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–28A0085, Revision 2, dated December 11, 2007. The service bulletin describes the following procedures:

- For certain airplanes: Measuring the electrical bonding resistance between the stiffeners located at inboard rear spar station (IRSS) 164.9 and IRSS 179.2 and the rear spar web, and doing any applicable repair; installing the support brackets of the hot short protector (HSP) and the new support clamps of the wire bundles; installing the equipment of the HSP; and modifying the existing wire bundle and installing a new wire bundle (includes re-routing).
- For certain other airplanes: Measuring the electrical bonding resistance between the stiffeners located at IRSS 164.9 and IRSS 179.2 and the rear spar web, measuring the electrical bonding resistance between the HSP and the rear spar web, and doing any applicable repair.

We have also reviewed section 9, Revision November 2007, of the Boeing 757 Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) Document, D622N001–9 (hereafter referred to as ''the MPD''). Subsection G ''AIRWORTHINESS LIMITATIONS—FUEL SYSTEM AWLs'' of the MPD describes AWLs for fuel tank systems and includes AWL No. 28–AWL–22, which is the critical design configuration control limitation to maintain the design features of the center fuel tank's HSP during its replacement.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the(se) same type design(s). This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 433 airplanes of U.S. registry. The following table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to comply with this proposed AD.

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action	Work hours	Average labor rate per hour	Parts [1]	Cost per product [1]	Number of U.S.-registered airplanes	Fleet cost [1]
Groups 1–3; measurement, installations, and modification.	8	$80	Between $14,110 and $14,215.	Between $14,750 and $14,855.	433	Between $6,386,750 and $6,432,215.
Group 4; measurements	2	80	None	$160	433	$69,280.
AWL Revision	1	80	None	$80	433	$34,640.

[1] Depending on airplane configuration.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. ''Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in ''Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: General requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866,

2. Is not a ''significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and

3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Boeing: Docket No. FAA–2008–0846; Directorate Identifier 2008–NM–045–AD.

Comments Due Date

(a) We must receive comments by September 22, 2008.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 757–200, 757–200PF, and 757–300 series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–28A0085, Revision 2, dated December 11, 2007.

Note 1: This AD requires revisions to certain operator maintenance documents to include new inspections. Compliance with these inspections is required by 14 CFR 91.403(c). For airplanes that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the areas addressed by these inspections, the operator may not be able to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) according to paragraph (l) of this AD. The request should include a description of changes to the required inspections that will ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent the center fuel tank densitometer from overheating and becoming a potential ignition source inside the fuel tank, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a center fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Compliance

(e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

Measurement, Installation, Modifications, Replacement, and Repair

(f) For Groups 1 through 3 airplanes, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–28A0085, Revision 2, dated December 11, 2007: Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD, do the measurement, installations, modifications, replacement, and applicable repair by accomplishing all the applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. Do the applicable repair before further flight.

Measure and Repair

(g) For Group 4 airplanes, as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–28A0085, Revision 2, dated December 11, 2007: Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD, do the measurements and applicable repair by accomplishing all the applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin. Do the applicable repair before further flight.

Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) Revision for AWL No. 28–AWL–22

(h) Concurrently with accomplishing the actions required by paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD, revise the AWLs section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) by incorporating AWL No. 28–AWL–22 of Subsection G of section 9, Revision November 2007, Boeing 757 Maintenance Planning Data (MPD) Document, D622N001–9.

No Alternative Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCLs)

(i) After accomplishing the action specified in paragraph (h) of this AD, no alternative CDCCLs may be used unless the CDCCLs are approved as an AMOC in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (k) of this AD.

Credit for Actions Done According to Previous Issue of the Service Bulletin

(j) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–28A0085, Revision 1, dated April 16, 2007, are acceptable for compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (f) and (g) of this AD.

Terminating Action for AWLs Revision

(k) Incorporating AWL No. 28–AWL–22 into the AWLs section of the ICA in accordance with paragraph (g)(3) of AD 2008–10–11, amendment 39–15517, terminates the action in paragraph (h) of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(l)(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA, ATTN: Jen Pei, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, FAA, Seattle ACO, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6409; fax (425) 917–6590; has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 29, 2008.

Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8–18222 Filed 8–6–08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0850; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–342–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0100 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would supersede an existing AD. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

* * * * *

During recent inspections it was found that some * * * bolts, that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links, were broken. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to [the loss of the flight control input connection to the horizontal stabilizer and consequent] partial loss of control of the aircraft.

* * * * *

The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by September 8, 2008.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* Go to *http://www.regulations.gov*. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
- *Fax:* (202) 493–2251.
- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
- *Hand Delivery:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http://www.regulations.gov*; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–1137; fax (425) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include ''Docket No. FAA–2008–0850; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–342–AD'' at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to *http://www.regulations.gov*, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

On June 13, 1997, we issued AD 97–13–05, Amendment 39–10051 (62 FR 34617, June 27, 1997). That AD required actions intended to address an unsafe condition on the products listed above.

Since we issued AD 97–13–05, we received reports of inspection results indicating that the bolt that connects the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links was broken (one on the nut side, and one on the head side). When the bolts fails at the nut end, the remaining part of the bolt cannot drop out of the connection due to the limited amount of space available between the bolt head and plate, and the affected connection is still able to carry the system loads. However, if the head side of the bolt fails, then the bolt may drop out of the connection.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2007–0287, dated November 15, 2007 (referred to after this as ''the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

In January 1996, Fokker issued Service Bulletin (SB) SBF–100–27–069 (referencing Menasco, now Goodrich, SB 23100–27–19) to introduce an inspection of bolt Part Number (P/N) 23233–1 for cracks after the examination of a failed bolt. This Service Bulletin was made mandatory by CAA–NL (Civil Aviation Authority—the Netherlands) with the issuance of AD BLA 1996–006 (A) [reference corresponding FAA AD 97–13–05]. Additionally the same SB introduced a lower torque value for these bolts.

During recent inspections it was found that some of these bolts, that connect the horizontal stabilizer control unit actuator with the dog-links, were broken. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to [the loss of the flight control input connection to the horizontal stabilizer and consequent] partial loss of control of the aircraft.

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that continues to exist or develop on other aircraft of the same type design, this Airworthiness Directive supersedes CAA–NL AD 1996–006 and requires an integrity check by a re-torque in accordance with SBF–100–27–091 and the installation of a tie-wrap through the bolt, which will act as a retainer for the bolt and nut. The key function for this tie-wrap is to keep the bolt in place in the event the bolt head fails.

The corrective action includes replacing any failed bolt (i.e., broken or