January 24, 2008 with the number of 73 FR 4194 is a joint Navy and Marine Corps system that covers this collection. Accordingly, all files have been merged into this system.

MMN00047

SYSTEM NAME:

Officer Slate File System (February 22, 1993, 58 FR 10630).

REASON:

Navy/Marine system of records notice NM05000–2, Program Management and Locator System printed in the **Federal Register** on January 24, 2008 with the number of 73 FR 4194 is a joint Navy and Marine Corps system that covers this collection. Accordingly, all files have been merged into this system.

MTE00001

SYSTEM NAME:

Telephone Billing/Accounting File (January 4, 2000, 65 FR 291).

REASON:

Records collection no longer required.

[FR Doc. E8–2146 Filed 2–5–08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5001–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Air Force

[USAF-2008-0001]

Privacy Act of 1974 System of Records

AGENCY: Department of Air Force, DOD. **ACTION:** Notice to Amend a System of Records.

SUMMARY: The Department of Air Force proposes to amend a system of records to its inventory of record systems subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), as amended.

DATES: The changes will be effective on March 7, 2008, unless comments are received that would result in a contrary determination.

ADDRESSES: Send comments to the Air Force Privacy Act Officer, Office of Warfighting Integration and Chief Information Officer, SAF/XCISI, 1800 Air Force Pentagon, Suite 220, Washington, DC 20330–1800.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Novella Hill at (703) 588–7855.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Department of the Air Force systems of records notices subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), as amended, have been published in the **Federal Register** and are available from the address above.

The specific changes to the record system being amended are set forth below followed by the notice, as amended, published in its entirety. The proposed amendments are not within the purview of subsection (r) of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), as amended, which requires the submission of a new or altered system report.

Dated: January 31, 2008.

C.R. Choate,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

DUSDA 13

SYSTEM NAME:

War Souvenir Registration/ Authorization (February 27, 2007, 72 FR 8697).

CHANGES:

* * * *

SYSTEM IDENTIFIER:

Delete entry and replace with "F024 AF USTRANSCOM A."

F024 AF USTRANSCOM A

SYSTEM NAME:

War Souvenir Registration/ Authorization.

SYSTEM LOCATION:

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), ATTN: TCJ5/4–PT, 508 Scott Drive, Scott AFB, IL 62225–5357.

CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS COVERED BY THE SYSTEM:

Military and DoD civilian personal serving in overseas theaters.

CATEGORIES OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:

Name, Social Security Number (SSN), rank and/or grade, Organization and/or unit, home address, war souvenir description, and overseas theater.

AUTHORITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM:

10 U.S.C. Part IV, Chapter 153, Sec. 2579; DoDD 5030.40, DoD Customs and Border Clearance Program; DoD 4500.9R Defense Transportation Regulation, Part V DoD Customs and Border Clearance Policies and Procedures; and E.O. 9397 (SSN).

PURPOSE(S):

To register and authorize an individual to retain a war souvenir and to return the item to the United States.

ROUTINE USES OF RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE SYSTEM, INCLUDING CATEGORIES OF USERS AND THE PURPOSES OF SUCH USES:

In addition to those disclosures generally permitted under 5 U.S.C.

552a(b) of the Privacy Act, these records or information contained therein may specifically be disclosed outside the DoD as a routine use pursuant to 552a(b)(3) as follows:

The DoD "Blanket Routine Uses" set forth at the beginning of Department of Air Force's compilation of systems of records notices apply to this system.

POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR STORING, RETRIEVING, ACCESSING, RETAINING, AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:

STORAGE:

Paper in file folders.

RETRIEVABILITY:

Name and Social Security Number (SSN).

SAFEGUARDS:

Access to the records is limited to those who require the records in the performance of their official duties. Physical entry is restricted by the use of locks, guards, and administrative procedures.

RETENTION AND DISPOSAL:

Disposition pending approval of records disposition schedule by the National Records and Administration Agency.

SYSTEM MANAGER(S) AND ADDRESS:

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), ATTN: TCJ5/4–PT—Transportation Specialist, 508 Scott Drive, Scott AFB, IL 62225– 5357.

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE:

Individuals seeking to determine whether information about themselves is contained in this system of records should address written inquiries to the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), ATTN: TCJ5/4–PT– Transportation Specialist, 508 Scott Drive, Scott AFB, IL 62225–5357.

Requests should contain individual's name, address, Social Security Number (SSN), unit, Company Commander/ Contracting Officer's Representative, and date requested war souvenir registration.

RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES:

Individuals seeking access to information about themselves contained in this system of records should address written inquiries to the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), ATTN: TCJ5/4–PT– Transportation Specialist, 508 Scott Drive, Scott AFB, IL 62225–5357.

Requests should contain individual's name, address, Social Security Number (SSN), unit, Company Commander/ Contracting Officer's Representative, and date requested war souvenir registration.

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES: From the individual.

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR THE SYSTEM: None.

[FR Doc. E8–2145 Filed 2–5–08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5001–06–P

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 2008–1]

Safety Classification of Fire Protection Systems

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice, recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5) which addresses the safety classification of fire protection systems at defense nuclear facilities in the Department of Energy complex.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the recommendation are due on or before March 7, 2008.

ADDRESS: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004–2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 694–7000.

Dated: January 31, 2008. A.J. Eggenberger,

Chairman.

Recommendation 2008–1 to the Secretary of Energy Safety Classification of Fire Protection Systems Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5) Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended

Date: January 29, 2008.

Fire protection systems in defense nuclear facilities have generally not been designated as "safety-class" as that term pertains to protection of the public from accidents. Such designation would bring into play a variety of Department of Energy (DOE) rules and directives, among them DOE Order 420.1B, *Facility Safety*, and DOE Guide 420.1–1, *Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design* *Criteria and Explosives Safety Criteria.* While these documents describe general requirements for safety-class systems, e.g., redundancy and quality assurance, they do not provide specific guidance on how a fire protection system such as an automatic sprinkler system should be designed, operated, and maintained.

Accordingly, when DOE's Savannah River Site contractor proposed in the late 1990s that certain fire protection systems employed in the site's tritium facilities be designated as safety-class (and thus credited with protecting the public from accidents involving an offsite release of tritium), both DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) were forced to conduct reviews of the proposal on an ad hoc basis without reference to specific guidance. The Board's review led to a March 18, 1999, letter to the Secretary of Energy agreeing with the reclassification of certain fire protection systems at the site's tritium facilities. The technical basis for the Board's agreement is found in the report appended to the letter:

Controlling incipient fires through operability of a more reliable fire suppression system would make large fires less likely to occur. To substantially reduce the predicted likelihood of such fires to the "extremely unlikely" frequency range, WSRC reclassified the fire suppression (and some detection) systems as safety class. TSRs will be applied to fire protection systems falling in this category * * * WSRC acknowledges that installed fire suppression systems will not meet criteria such as redundancy or nucleargrade quality assurance, nor are these systems seismically qualified. Imposition of safety-class requirements means that, in addition to meeting National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code requirements, higher levels of maintenance and surveillance and of operability for these systems will be addressed in the TSRs. The intent is to increase the reliability of the suppression systems to maintain the SAR assumption that full-facility fires will be extremely unlikely. The TSRs will require that immediate actions be taken, such as cessation of operations and posting of a fire watch, should a safety-class fire suppression system be taken out of service or found to be inoperative.

In June of 2000, the Board addressed more broadly the safety classification of fire protection systems. In Section 3.3 of Technical Report DNFSB/TECH-27, *Fire Protection at Defense Nuclear Facilities*, the Board stated:

Designation of safety-class or safetysignificant structures, systems, and components (SSCs), administrative controls, and engineered design features is determined through a prescribed methodology (DOE– STD–3009–94, [U.S. Department of Energy, 1994] and DOE G 420.1–2, [U.S. Department of Energy, 2000]) that relies to a large extent on the engineering judgment of the safety analysts and designers. Overall, the objective is to prevent a fire, or to control and confine a fire should one occur. Methods of accomplishing this objective are set forth in NFPA codes that have been a requirement of the DOE program for decades. It is essential that decisions concerning the application of these codes and the selection of features and controls be made by qualified and experienced fire protection engineers.

This section of the report provided additional guidance on application of these principles to the control of ignition sources, use of passive fire barriers, suppression of incipient fires, minimization of transient combustibles, and enhancement and protection of confinement systems such as ventilation through HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filters. The report acknowledged the Board's letter regarding Savannah River's tritium facilities and encouraged the safety designation of suppression systems when they are relied on for critical safety functions: "Fire sprinkler systems relied upon for worker safety and public protection should be classified as safetyclass or safety-significant SSCs because they provide the most effective, automated, and quick response to a fire." (Report, p. 3–3) The report noted that the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) had identified the fire sprinkler system in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility as a vital system and had begun an effort to inspect and test the system for functional performance.

Subsequent to the Board's 1999 letter and 2000 technical report, DOE expanded its reliance on fire protection systems as primary lines of defense against accidents. For example, the following projects initially planned or reclassified fire protection systems as safety-class or safety-significant:

• Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project, LANL.

• Device Assembly Facility, Nevada Test Site.

• Building 9212, Y–12 National Security Complex.

• Explosive Bays and Cells, Pantex Plant.

• Building 332, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

• Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, Y–12 National Security Complex.

• Uranium Processing Facility, Y–12 National Security Complex.

• K-Area Container Surveillance and Storage Capability, Savannah River Site.

Although it should be clear from the Board's earlier statements that it can support reliance on fire protection systems as primary safety measures, the Board is no longer comfortable with