# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

DTAA, Inc.: Docket No. FAA–2008–0013; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–230–AD.

#### **Comments Due Date**

(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by February 28, 2008.

#### Affected ADs

(b) None.

## **Applicability**

(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 727–200 series airplanes, certificated in any category and equipped with an auxiliary fuel tank system installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate SA1350NM.

#### **Unsafe Condition**

(d) This AD results from fuel tank system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

## Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

#### Report

- (f) Within 45 days after the effective date of this AD, submit a report to the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA. The report must include the information listed in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this AD. Under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements contained in this AD, and assigned OMB Control Number 2120–
- (1) The airplane registration and serial number.
- (2) The usage frequency in terms of total number of flights per year and total number of flights per year for which the auxiliary fuel tank system is used.

#### **Prevent Usage of Auxiliary Fuel Tank**

(g) On or before December 16, 2008, deactivate the auxiliary fuel tank system, in accordance with a deactivation procedure approved by the Manager of the Wichita ACO. Any auxiliary fuel tank system component that remains on the airplane must be secured and must have no effect on the continued operational safety and airworthiness of the airplane. Deactivation may not result in the need for additional

Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA).

**Note 1:** Appendix A of this AD provides criteria that must be included in the deactivation procedure. The proposed deactivation procedures should be submitted to the Wichita ACO as soon as possible to ensure timely review and approval, prior to implementation.

**Note 2:** For technical information, contact Steve Forness, DTAA, Inc., 101 Deer Meadow Court, St. Charles, Missouri 63304, (636) 928–9606, fax (314) 749–7513.

# Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(h)(1) The Manager, Wichita ACO, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

## Appendix A—Deactivation Criteria

The auxiliary fuel tank system deactivation procedure required by paragraph (g) of this AD should address the following actions.

- (1) Permanently drain the auxiliary fuel tank system tanks, and clear them of fuel vapors to eliminate the possibility of outgassing of fuel vapors from the emptied auxiliary tank.
- (2) Disconnect all auxiliary fuel tank system electrical connections from the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS), float, pressure and transfer valves and switches, and all other electrical connections required for auxiliary fuel tank system operation, and stow them at the auxiliary fuel tank interface.
- (3) Disconnect all auxiliary fuel tank system bleed-air connections, cap them at the bleed air source, and secure them.
- (4) Disconnect all auxiliary fuel tank system fuel supply and fuel vent plumbing interfaces with airplane original equipment manufacturer (OEM) fuel tanks, cap them at the airplane tank side, and secure them. All disconnected auxiliary fuel tank system vent systems must not alter the OEM fuel tank vent system configuration or performance. All empty auxiliary fuel tank system tanks must be vented to eliminate the possibility of structural deformation during cabin decompression. The configuration must not permit the introduction of fuel vapor into any compartments of the airplane.
- (5) Pull and collar all circuit breakers used to operate the auxiliary fuel tank system.
- (6) Revise the weight and balance document, if required, and obtain FAA approval.
- (7) Amend the applicable sections of the applicable Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to indicate that the auxiliary fuel tank system is deactivated. Remove auxiliary fuel tank system operating procedures to ensure that only the OEM fuel system operational procedures are contained in the AFM.

Amend the Limitations Section of the AFM to indicate that the AFM Supplement for the STC is not in effect. Place a placard in the flight deck indicating that the auxiliary fuel tank system is deactivated. The AFM revisions specified in this paragraph may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD into the AFM.

- (8) Amend the applicable sections of the applicable airplane maintenance manual to remove auxiliary fuel tank system maintenance procedures.
- (9) After the auxiliary fuel tank system is deactivated, accomplish procedures such as leak checks, pressure checks, and functional checks deemed necessary before returning the airplane to service. These procedures must include verification that the basic airplane OEM FQIS, fuel distribution, and fuel venting systems function properly and have not been adversely affected by deactivation of the auxiliary fuel tank system.
- (10) Include with the proposed deactivation procedures any relevant information or additional steps that are deemed necessary by the operator to comply with the deactivation of the auxiliary fuel tank system and return of the airplane to service.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 21, 2007.

#### Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8–384 Filed 1–11–08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

# **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

## **Federal Aviation Administration**

## 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2008-0015; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-328-AD]

# RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, DC-10-15, and MD-10-10F Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

summary: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC–10–10, DC–10–10F, DC–10–15, and MD–10–10F airplanes. This proposed AD would require repetitive inspections for the presence of stray nickel or chrome plating deposits on the air filler valve bore of certain main landing gear (MLG) shock strut cylinders, and if necessary, related investigative and corrective actions. Doing the corrective action would terminate the repetitive inspections. This proposed AD results from a report of a left MLG collapse

during landing rollout. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct stray nickel and chrome plating deposits, corrosion, and cracking of the air filler valve bore on the MLG cylinder, which could result in landing gear failure, significant damage to the airplane, and injury to personnel.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by February 28, 2008.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
  - Fax: 202-493-2251.
- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
- Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M— 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A (D800–0024).

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <a href="http://www.regulations.gov">http://www.regulations.gov</a>; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Maureen Moreland, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5238; fax (562) 627-5210.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

## **Comments Invited**

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include "Docket No. FAA–2008–0015; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–328–AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

## Discussion

We received a report that one McDonnell Douglas Model MD-10-10 airplane experienced a left main landing gear (MLG) collapse during landing rollout, which was caused by combined fatigue and stress corrosion cracking failure of the MLG shock strut cylinder assembly. Metallurgical analysis has determined that the origin of the fracture was located in the bore of the air filler valve port located on the aft side of the MLG cylinder. The primary crack initiation point was in an area of stray nickel plating deposits on the bore. A secondary origination of the crack was initiated from a shallow corrosion pit located at the opposite side of the

bore to the primary initiation point. Stray nickel or chrome plating deposits, corrosion, or cracking in the air filler valve bore of the MLG cylinder, if not corrected, could result in landing gear failure, significant damage to the airplane, and injury to personnel.

#### **Relevant Service Information**

We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC10-32A259, dated October 30, 2007. The service bulletin describes procedures for repetitive video probe inspections to detect the presence of stray nickel or chrome plating deposits on the air filler valve bore of certain main landing gear (MLG) shock strut cylinders, and if necessary, related investigative and corrective actions. The related investigative actions include a video probe inspection for corrosion of the air filler valve bore in the MLG shock strut cylinder and an eddy current inspection for cracking of the air filler valve bore. The corrective actions include repair of the air filler valve bore of the MLG shock strut cylinder, removal of corrosion, and replacement of the MLG cylinder. The service bulletin specifies that doing the repair or replacement ends the repetitive inspections for that MLG shock strut cylinder only.

# FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design. This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously.

# **Costs of Compliance**

We estimate that this proposed AD would affect 75 airplanes of U.S. registry. The following table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to comply with this proposed AD.

## **ESTIMATED COSTS**

Action	Work hours	Average labor rate per hour	Cost per product	Number of U.Sregistered airplanes	Fleet cost
Inspection	4	\$80	\$320, per inspection cycle	75	\$24,000, per inspection cycle.

#### **Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority

because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

# **Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

- 1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866,
- 2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
- 3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

## The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA-2008-0015; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-328-AD.

## **Comments Due Date**

(a) We must receive comments by February 28, 2008.

#### Affected ADs

(b) None.

# Applicability

(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC–10–10, DC–10–10F, DC–10–15, and MD–10–10F airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC10–32A259, dated October 30, 2007.

#### **Unsafe Condition**

(d) This AD results from a report of a left main landing gear (MLG) collapse during landing rollout. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct stray nickel and chrome plating deposits, corrosion, and cracking of the air filler valve bore on the MLG cylinder, which could result in landing gear failure, significant damage to the airplane, and injury to personnel.

## Compliance

(e) Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done

# **Inspections and Corrective Actions**

- (f) At the applicable time specified in paragraph (f)(1), (f)(2), or (f)(3) of this AD, do a video probe inspection for the presence of stray nickel or chrome plating deposits on the air filler valve bore of the MLG shock strut cylinders, and before further flight, do all applicable related investigative and corrective actions, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC10-32A259, dated October 30, 2007. Repeat the video probe inspection thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,400 flight cycles or 20 months, whichever occurs first. Accomplishment of the repair specified in Part 2 of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin or the replacement specified in Part 3 of the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin terminates the repetitive inspections for that MLG shock strut cylinder.
- (1) For passenger airplanes: Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD.
- (2) For freighter airplanes with MLG cylinders that have accumulated fewer than 7,200 flight cycles in a freighter configuration as of the effective date of this AD: Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD.
- (3) For freighter airplanes with MLG cylinders that have accumulated 7,200 flight cycles or more in a freighter configuration as of the effective date of this AD: Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD.

#### **Parts Installation**

(g) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install a MLG shock strut cylinder assembly, part number ARG7002–1, –501, –503, or –505, on any airplane, unless the air filler valve bore hole has been oversized and closing action has been accomplished in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin DC10–32A259, dated October 30, 2007, and the MLG shock strut cylinder assembly has been permanently identified with part number SB10320259–3 adjacent to the existing ARG7002 part number.

# Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(h)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, ATTN: Maureen Moreland, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM—120L, FAA, Los Angeles ACO, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712—4137; telephone (562) 627—5238; fax (562) 627—5210; has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if

requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 26, 2007.

#### Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E8–385 Filed 1–11–08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

# ARCHITECTURAL AND TRANSPORTATION BARRIERS COMPLIANCE BOARD

36 CFR Parts 1190 and 1191

RIN 3014-AA22

# **Emergency Transportable Housing Advisory Committee**

**AGENCY:** Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board.

**ACTION:** Notice of meeting.

SUMMARY: The Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) has established an advisory committee to make recommendations for possible revisions to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines to include provisions for emergency transportable housing. This notice announces the dates, time, and location of the next committee meeting.

**DATES:** The meeting is scheduled for January 24 and 25, 2008 from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. on January 24 and from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on January 25.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at the Access Board's offices, 1331 F Street, NW., Suite 1000, Washington, DC.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Marsha Mazz, Office of Technical and Information Services, Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, 1331 F Street, NW., Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20004–1111. Telephone number (202) 272–0020 (Voice); (202) 272–0082 (TTY). These are not toll-free numbers. E-mail address: mazz@access-board.gov.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On August 23, 2007, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance