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## Inspection and Applicable Related Investigative and Corrective Actions

(f) At the applicable compliance time and repeat intervals listed in Tables 1 and 2 of paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of Boeing Service Bulletin 747–53A2685, dated May 31, 2007; except that where the service bulletin specifies a compliance time after the date on the service bulletin, this AD requires compliance within the specified compliance time after the effective date of this AD: Do the inspection and applicable related investigative and corrective actions by accomplishing all the applicable actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of the service bulletin, except as provided by paragraph (g) of this AD.

# **Repair of Cracks**

(g) If any crack is found during any inspection required by this AD, and Boeing Service Bulletin 747–53A2685, dated May 31, 2007, specifies to contact Boeing for appropriate action: Before further flight, repair the crack using a method approved in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (h) of this AD.

# Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair required by this AD, if it is approved by an Authorized Representative for the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Delegation Option Authorization Organization who has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 9, 2007.

# Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E7–20467 Filed 10–16–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

# DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

**Federal Aviation Administration** 

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-0048; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-181-AD]

## RIN 2120-AA64

# Airworthiness Directives; Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA), Model CN–235, CN–235–100, CN–235–200, CN–235–300, and C–295 Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. **ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight \* \* \* and on ground, \* \* \* Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) \* \* \* required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System \* \* \*.

\* \* \* \*

Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an 'unsafe condition' \* \* \*. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements.

The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. **DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by November 16, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

• Fax: (202) 493–2251.

• *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

• *Hand Delivery:* Room W12–140 on the ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

• *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* Go to *http://www.regulations.gov.* Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

# **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http:// www.regulations.gov*; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly

## FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Shahram Daneshmandi, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM– 116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–1112; fax (425) 227–1149.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

### **Comments Invited**

after receipt.

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA–2007–0048; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–181–AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to *http:// dms.dot.gov*, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2007–0007, dated January 9, 2007 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight \* \* \* and on ground, the FAA published Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR 88) in June 2001. SFAR 88 required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System to determine that the design meets the requirements of FAR (Federal Aviation Regulation) § 25.901 and § 25.981(a) and (b).

A similar regulation has been recommended by the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) to the European National Aviation Authorities in JAA letter 04/00/02/ 07/03–L024 of 3 February 2003. The review was requested to be mandated by NAA's (National Aviation Authorities) using JAR (Joint Aviation Regulation) § 25.901(c), § 25.1309.

In August 2005 EASA published a policy statement on the process for developing instructions for maintenance and inspection of Fuel Tank System ignition source prevention (EASA D 2005/CPRO, www.easa.eu.int/home/ cert\_policy\_statements\_en.html) that also

included the EASA expectations with regard to compliance times of the corrective actions on the unsafe and the not unsafe part of the harmonised design review results. On a global scale the TC (type certificate) holders committed themselves to the EASA published compliance dates (see EASA policy statement). The EASA policy statement has been revised in March 2006: The date of 31–12–2005 for the unsafe related actions was set at 01–07–2006.

Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an 'unsafe condition' as defined in FAA's memo 2003–112–15 'SFAR 88—Mandatory Action Decision Criteria'. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements.

This EASA Airworthiness Directive mandates the Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations (comprising maintenance/ inspection tasks and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL)) for the type of aircraft, that resulted from the design reviews and the JAA recommendation and EASA policy statement mentioned above.

The corrective action is revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new limitations for fuel tank systems. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled "Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements" (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 ("SFAR 88," Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

# **Relevant Service Information**

European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) CASA has issued CN-235/C-295 Technical Document DT-0-C00-05001, Issue C, dated October 2006. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

# FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

# Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a **Note** within the proposed AD.

# **Costs of Compliance**

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect 8 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 1 work-hour per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be \$640, or \$80 per product.

### Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

## **Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. İs not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; 2. Is not a "significant rule" under the

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 3. Will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

## The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

# PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

### §39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA): Docket No. FAA–2007–0048; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–181–AD.

#### **Comments Due Date**

(a) We must receive comments by November 16, 2007.

#### Affected ADs

(b) None.

#### Applicability

(c) This AD applies to all CASA Model CN–235, CN–235–100, CN–235–200, CN– 235–300, and C–295 airplanes; certificated in any category.

**Note 1:** This AD requires revisions to certain operator maintenance documents to

include new inspections. Compliance with these inspections is required by 14 CFR 91.403(c). For airplanes that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the areas addressed by these inspections, the operator may not be able to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance according to paragraph (g) of this AD. The request should include a description of changes to the required inspections that will ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.

## Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

# Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight \* \* \* and on ground, the FAA published Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR 88) in June 2001. SFAR 88 required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System to determine that the design meets the requirements of FAR (Federal Aviation Regulation) § 25.901 and § 25.981(a) and (b).

A similar regulation has been recommended by the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) to the European National Aviation Authorities in JAA letter 04/00/02/ 07/03–L024 of 3 February 2003. The review was requested to be mandated by NAA's (National Aviation Authorities) using JAR (Joint Aviation Regulation) § 25.901(c), § 25.1309.

In August 2005 EASA published a policy statement on the process for developing instructions for maintenance and inspection of Fuel Tank System ignition source prevention (EASA D 2005/CPRO, www.easa.eu.int/home/ *cert policy statements en.html*) that also included the EASA expectations with regard to compliance times of the corrective actions on the unsafe and the not unsafe part of the harmonised design review results. On a global scale the TC (type certificate) holders committed themselves to the EASA published compliance dates (see EASA policy statement). The EASA policy statement has been revised in March 2006: the date of 31-12-2005 for the unsafe related actions was set at 01-07-2006.

Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an 'unsafe condition' as defined in FAA's memo 2003–112–15 'SFAR 88—Mandatory Action Decision Criteria'. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements.

This EASA Airworthiness Directive mandates the Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations (comprising maintenance/ inspection tasks and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL)) for the type of aircraft, that resulted from the design reviews and the JAA recommendation and EASA policy statement mentioned above.

The corrective action is revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new limitations for fuel tank systems.

#### **Actions and Compliance**

(f) Unless already done, do the following actions.

(1) Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD, or before December 16, 2008, whichever occurs first, revise the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate the Fuel Airworthiness Limitation maintenance and inspection tasks as defined in European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS) CASA CN-235/ C295 Technical Document DT-0-C00-05001, Issue C, dated October 2006. For all tasks identified in Technical Document DT-0-C00–05001, the initial compliance times start from the later of the times specified in paragraphs (f)(1)(i) and (f)(1)(ii) of this AD, and the repetitive inspections must be accomplished thereafter at the interval specified in Technical Document DT-0-C00-05001, except as provided by paragraph (f)(3) of this AD.

(i) The effective date of this AD.(ii) The date of issuance of the original Spanish standard airworthiness certificate or the date of issuance of the original Spanish export certificate of airworthiness.

(2) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, or before December 16, 2008, whichever occurs first, revise the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to include the CDCCL data contained in EADS CASA CN-235/C-295 Technical Document DT-0-C00-05001, Issue C, dated October 2006.

(3) Except as provided by paragraph (g) of this AD: After accomplishing the actions specified in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this AD, no alternative inspection, inspection intervals, or CDCCLs may be used.

## **FAA AD Differences**

**Note 2:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

#### **Other FAA AD Provisions**

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, ANM-116, International Branch, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Shahram Daneshmandi, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1112; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) *Reporting Requirements:* For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056.

# **Related Information**

(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Airworthiness Directive 2007–0007, dated January 9, 2007; and EADS CASA CN–235/C–295 Technical Document DT–0–C00–05001, Issue C, dated October 2006, for related information.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 9, 2007.

#### Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E7–20470 Filed 10–16–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

## **Federal Aviation Administration**

## 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2007-0049; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-168-AD]

#### RIN 2120-AA64

# Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737–600, –700, –700C, –800, and –900 Series Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, –700C, –800, and –900 series airplanes. This proposed AD would require replacing the drain tube assemblies and support clamps on the aft fairings of the engine struts. This proposed AD results from reports of failure of the drain tube assembly and clamp on the aft fairings of an engine strut. We are proposing this AD to prevent failure of the drain tube assemblies and clamps on the aft fairings of the engine struts. Such a failure could allow leaked flammable fluids in the drain systems to discharge on to the heat shields of the aft fairings of the engine struts, which could result

in an undetected and uncontrollable fire.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by December 3, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

• Fax: 202–493–2251.

• *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

• *Hand Delivery:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207.

## **Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at *http:// www.regulations.gov;* or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

## FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kathrine Rask, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6505; fax (425) 917–6590.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

## **Comments Invited**

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA–2007–0049; Directorate Identifier 2007–NM–168–AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD because of those comments. We will post all comments we receive, without change, to *http:// www.regulations.gov*, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

#### Discussion

We have received reports of failure of the drain tube assembly and support clamp on the aft fairing of an engine strut. In most of the reports, the failure occurred at the brazed joint between the tube and the drain cast fitting. Failure of the drain tube assembly and support clamp on the aft fairing of an engine strut, if not corrected, could allow leaked flammable fluids in the drain system to discharge on to the heat shield of the aft fairing of an engine strut, which may result in an undetected and uncontrollable fire.

## **Relevant Service Information**

We have reviewed Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 737–54– 1043, dated May 2, 2007. The service information describes procedures for replacing the drain tube assemblies and support clamps on the aft fairing of the struts of the number 1 and number 2 engines with new drain tube assemblies and new support clamps. Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.

# FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing this AD, which would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously.

## **Costs of Compliance**

There are about 2,058 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. This proposed AD would affect about 721 airplanes of U.S. registry. The proposed actions would take about 4 work hours per airplane, at an average labor rate of \$80 per work hour. Required parts would cost about \$2,351 per airplane. Based on these figures, the estimated cost of the proposed AD for U.S. operators is \$1,925,791, or \$2,671 per airplane.

# Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,