

**Subject**

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 57: Wings.

**Reason**

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

Some taperlocks used in the wing-to-fuselage junction at rib 1 were found to be non-compliant with the applicable specification, resulting in a loss of pretension in the fasteners. In such conditions, the structural integrity of the aircraft could be affected.

This Airworthiness Directive mandates a repetitive internal inspection of the lower stiffeners, and a repetitive external inspection of the lower panels in center and outer wing box at level of rib 1 junction.

The corrective action includes contacting Airbus for repair instructions and repair if any crack is found.

**Actions and Compliance**

(f) Unless already done, do the following actions.

(1) For A320-200 aircraft: Before the defined threshold or within the defined grace period after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, as listed in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-57-1129, Revision 01, dated July 28, 2006, and following the instructions given in the service bulletin, perform an internal ultrasonic inspection of the lower stiffeners in the center and outer wing box at the level of the rib 1 junction to detect cracks, and if any crack is found, before further flight contact Airbus for repair instructions and repair. Repeat this inspection at the intervals defined in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of the service bulletin.

(2) For all aircraft: Before the defined threshold or within the defined grace period after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, as listed in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-57-1130, Revision 01, dated July 28, 2006, and following the instructions given in the service bulletin, perform an external ultrasonic inspection of the lower stiffeners in the center and outer wing box at the level of the rib 1 junction to detect cracks, and if any crack is found, before further flight contact Airbus for repair instructions and repair. Repeat this inspection at the intervals defined in paragraph 1.E., "Compliance," of the service bulletin. Aircraft that have already accomplished Airbus Service Bulletin A320-57-1130, dated September 10, 2004, are compliant with this paragraph.

(3) Modification of the aircraft in accordance with the instructions contained in Airbus Service Bulletins A320-57-1131, A320-57-1137, or A320-57-1140, all dated November 21, 2006; terminates the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD.

**FAA AD Differences**

**Note:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows:

Although the MCAI or service information does not specify a compliance time for corrective action (repair of cracks), paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this AD require

that the corrective action be done before further flight.

Although the MCAI and/or service information specify a compliance time for accomplishing the inspections after the effective date on the MCAI, this AD requires compliance within the specified compliance time after the effective date of this AD.

**Other FAA AD Provisions**

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs):* The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tim Dulin, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2141; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) *Airworthy Product:* For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) *Reporting Requirements:* For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

**Related Information**

(h) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness Directive 2007-0067R1, dated June 7, 2007; and Airbus Service Bulletins A320-57-1129 and A320-57-1130, both Revision 01, both dated July 28, 2006; for related information.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 4, 2007.

**Stephen P. Boyd,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E7-18046 Filed 9-12-07; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION****Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. FAA-2007-29175; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-134-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

**Airworthiness Directives; Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 50, Mystere-Falcon 900, Falcon 900EX, Falcon 2000, and Falcon 2000EX Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

A rotating rod in the trailing edge flap control linkage broke in flight. Investigations revealed that the rotating rod had been installed in the wrong side during a maintenance operation. This incorrect installation caused a contact between the rotating rod and its retaining bracket leading, after some time in operation, to the rod breakage and flap asymmetry situation.

The consequence on the airplane of the flap asymmetry combined with a latent failure of the asymmetry detection system is classified as a catastrophic failure condition.

The unsafe condition is failure of the rotating rod in the control linkage of the trailing edge flap and consequent flap asymmetry during the approach to landing, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 15, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *DOT Docket Web Site:* Go to <http://dms.dot.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.

- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

- *Hand Delivery:* Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,

Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal*: <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

**Examining the AD Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov>; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, comments received and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

**Comments Invited**

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about

this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2007-29175; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-134-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://dms.dot.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

**Discussion**

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2006-0115, dated May 10, 2006 (referred to after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

A rotating rod in the trailing edge flap control linkage broke in flight. Investigations revealed that the rotating rod had been

installed in the wrong side during a maintenance operation. This incorrect installation caused a contact between the rotating rod and its retaining bracket leading, after some time in operation, to the rod breakage and flap asymmetry situation.

The consequence on the airplane of the flap asymmetry combined with a latent failure of the asymmetry detection system is classified as a catastrophic failure condition.

The unsafe condition is failure of the rotating rod in the control linkage of the trailing edge flap and consequent flap asymmetry during the approach to landing, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. The corrective actions include the following: Verifying the correct assembly of the flap rotating rods and associated brackets and installing the rod and bracket with correct orientation/positioning if necessary; and inspecting the rod for damage and replacing the rod if any damage is found. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

**Relevant Service Information**

Dassault has issued the following service information:

Airplane model	Service Bulletin No.	Date
Mystere-Falcon 50 .....	F50-468 .....	March 29, 2006.
Mystere-Falcon 900 .....	F900-367 .....	March 29, 2006.
Falcon 900EX .....	F900EX-269 .....	March 29, 2006.
Falcon 2000 .....	F2000-326 .....	March 29, 2006.
Falcon 2000EX .....	F2000EX-83 .....	March 29, 2006.

The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

**FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD**

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

**Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information**

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in

general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a **Note** within the proposed AD.

**Costs of Compliance**

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 739 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 2 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the

proposed AD on U.S. operators to be \$118,240, or \$160 per product.

**Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on

products identified in this rulemaking action.

**Regulatory Findings**

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

**The Proposed Amendment**

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

**§ 39.13 [Amended]**

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

**Dassault Aviation:** Docket No. FAA-2007-29175; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-134-AD.

**Comments Due Date**

(a) We must receive comments by October 15, 2007.

**Affected ADs**

(b) None.

**Applicability**

(c) This AD applies to the airplanes identified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) of this AD; certificated in any category.

(1) Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 50 airplanes on which Dassault Modification M2996 has not been implemented.

(2) Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 900 airplanes on which Dassault Modification M5007 has not been implemented.

(3) Dassault Model Falcon 900EX airplanes on which Dassault Modification M5007 has not been implemented (including serial number 601 and subsequent, also known as "DX" airplanes).

(4) Dassault Model Falcon 2000 and Falcon 2000EX airplanes on which Dassault Modification M2465 has not been implemented.

**Subject**

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight controls.

**Reason**

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states: A rotating rod in the trailing edge flap control linkage broke in flight. Investigations revealed that the rotating rod had been installed in the wrong side during a maintenance operation. This incorrect

installation caused a contact between the rotating rod and its retaining bracket leading, after some time in operation, to the rod breakage and flap asymmetry situation.

The consequence on the airplane of the flap asymmetry combined with a latent failure of the asymmetry detection system is classified as a catastrophic failure condition.

The unsafe condition is failure of the rotating rod in the control linkage of the trailing edge flap and consequent flap asymmetry during the approach to landing, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. The corrective actions include the following: Verifying the correct assembly of the flap rotating rods and associated brackets and installing the rod and bracket with correct orientation/positioning if necessary; and inspecting the rod for damage and replacing the rod if any damage is found.

**Actions and Compliance**

(f) Unless already done, within 330 flight hours or 7 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, do the following actions.

(1) Verify the correct assembly of the flap rotating rods and associated retaining brackets installed in the LH (left-hand)/RH (right-hand) wing root compartment and in the LH and RH main landing gear compartment and inspect the rod for damage, in accordance with the applicable Dassault Service Bulletin given in Table 1 of this AD.

(2) If a rod is found damaged, replace this rod prior to next flight in accordance with the applicable Dassault Service Bulletin given in Table 1 of this AD. If the rod orientation or bracket positioning is not correct, correct the orientation or positioning, as applicable, prior to next flight in accordance with the applicable Dassault Service Bulletin given in Table 1 of this AD.

(3) Label the rods and associated retaining brackets in accordance with the applicable Dassault Service Bulletin given in Table 1 of this AD.

TABLE 1.—DASSAULT SERVICE BULLETINS

Airplane Model	Service Bulletin No.	Date
Mystere-Falcon 50	F50-468	March 29, 2006.
Mystere-Falcon 900	F900-367	March 29, 2006.
Falcon 900EX	F900EX-269	March 29, 2006.
Falcon 2000	F2000-326	March 29, 2006.
Falcon 2000EX	F2000EX-83	March 29, 2006.

**FAA AD Differences**

**Note:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

**Other FAA AD Provisions**

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs):* The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) *Airworthy Product:* For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from

a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) *Reporting Requirements:* For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

**Related Information**

(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness Directive 2006-0115, dated May 10, 2006; and the Dassault Service Bulletins listed in Table 1 of this AD, for related information.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 31, 2007.

**Stephen P. Boyd,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E7-18045 Filed 9-12-07; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION****Federal Aviation Administration****14 CFR Part 39**

[Docket No. FAA-2007-29174; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-125-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

**Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 Series Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This proposed AD would require repetitive inspections to detect cracking of the body station 303.9 frame, and corrective action if necessary. This proposed AD also provides for optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This proposed AD results from reports of cracks found at the cutout in the web of body station frame 303.9 inboard of stringer 16L. We are proposing this AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could prevent the left forward entry door from sealing correctly, and could cause in-flight decompression of the airplane.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 29, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this proposed AD.

- *DOT Docket Web site:* Go to <http://dms.dot.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Government-wide rulemaking Web site:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.
- *Hand Delivery:* Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207, for the service information identified in this proposed AD.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**

Howard Hall, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6430; fax (425) 917-6590.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:****Comments Invited**

We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed in the **ADDRESSES** section. Include the docket number "FAA-2007-29174; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-125-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the proposed AD in light of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://dms.dot.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of that web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the **Federal Register** published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you may visit <http://dms.dot.gov>.

**Examining the Docket**

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov>, or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is located on the

ground floor of the West Building at the DOT street address stated in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.

**Discussion**

We have received reports of cracks found at the cutout in the web of the body station 303.9 frame inboard of stringer 16L on seven Boeing Model 737 "classic" airplanes. The cracks were found on airplanes that had accumulated between 37,562 and 64,000 total flight cycles. Such cracking, if not corrected, could prevent the left forward entry door from sealing correctly, and could cause in-flight decompression of the airplane.

**Relevant Service Information**

We have reviewed two service bulletins related to this action. The service bulletins are similar but affect different groups of airplanes.

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1188, Revision 2, dated May 9, 2007, for certain Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes, describes the following actions:

- Repetitive high-frequency eddy current (HFEC) and detailed inspections to detect cracking in the station 303.9 web and doubler around the cutouts for door stop straps at stringers 15L and 16L.

- A repair/preventive change, which includes installing a new web, doubler, and stop fitting assemblies; changing the shape of the web cutout; and doing an eddy current inspection.

Service Bulletin 737-53A1188 specifies a threshold for the initial inspection of 10,000 total flight cycles and a grace period of 2,250 flight cycles.

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-53A1197, dated August 25, 2006, for certain Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes, describes the following actions:

- Repetitive ultrasound inspections of the slot-shaped cutout in the web for the door stop strap at stringer 16L.

- Repetitive HFEC inspections of the web along the upper edge and lower edge of the doubler around the doorstop strap at stringer 16L.

- Repetitive detailed inspections of the web around the doubler for the cutout at stringer 16.

- A repair/preventive change, which involves installing a new web and doubler.

Service Bulletin 737-53A1197 specifies a threshold for the initial inspection of 30,000 total flight cycles and a grace period of 2,250 flight cycles.

For both service bulletins, a repair/preventive change eliminates the need