

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

### § 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

**2007-18-02 Airbus:** Amendment 39-15182. Docket No. FAA-2007-28379; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-077-AD.

#### Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective October 2, 2007.

#### Affected ADs

(b) None.

#### Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A300 series airplanes, all certified models, all serial numbers, certificated in any category; except Model A300-600 series airplanes; and except those modified by Airbus Service Bulletin A300-24-0103, Revision 01, dated January 11, 2007.

#### Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 24: Electrical Power.

#### Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

[T]he FAA has published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88). In their letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296, dated March 4th, 2002 and 04/00/02/07/03-L024, dated February 3rd, 2003, the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) recommended the application of a similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA).

Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for passenger transport aircraft with either a passenger capacity of 30 or more, or a payload capacity of 7,500 pounds (3402 kg) or more, which have received their certification since January 1st, 1958, are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

This Airworthiness Directive (AD), which renders mandatory the modification of the fuel pump wiring against short circuit, is a consequence of this design review.

**Note:** For A310 and A300-600 aircraft, refer to [EASA] AD 2006-0284R1. [On March 7, 2007, the FAA issued a corresponding NPRM for Model A310 and A300-600 airplanes, which was published in the *Federal Register* (72 FR 11302, March 13, 2007.)]

The unsafe condition is chafing of the fuel pump cables, which could result in short circuits leading to fuel pump failure, intermittent operation, arcing, and possible fuel tank explosion.

#### Actions and Compliance

(f) Within 31 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already done, modify the inner and outer fuel pumps wiring, route 1P and 2P harnesses in the LH (left-hand) wing and in the RH (right-hand) wing, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A300-24-0103, Revision 01, dated January 11, 2007. Actions done before the effective date

of this AD in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A300-24-0103, dated March 15, 2006, for airplanes under configuration 1 as defined in the service bulletin, are acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

#### FAA AD Differences

**Note:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

#### Other FAA AD Provisions

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs):* The Manager, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Tom Stafford, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1622; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) *Airworthy Product:* For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) *Reporting Requirements:* For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

#### Related Information

(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Airworthiness Directive 2007-0066, dated March 13, 2007, and Airbus Service Bulletin A300-24-0103, Revision 01, dated January 11, 2007, for related information.

#### Material Incorporated by Reference

(i) You must use Airbus Service Bulletin A300-24-0103, Revision 01, dated January 11, 2007, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.

(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.

(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France.

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call

(202) 741-6030, or go to: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html>.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 17, 2007.

**Ali Bahrami,**

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. E7-16911 Filed 8-27-07; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2006-26771; Directorate Identifier 2005-SW-07-AD; Amendment 39-15059; AD 2007-11-02]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, TH-28, 280, 280C, 280F, 280FX, 480, and 480B Helicopters

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Enstrom Helicopter Corporation (Enstrom) Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, TH-28, 280, 280C, 280F, 280FX, 480, and 480B helicopters that requires determining the installation dates for each main rotor push-pull control rod (push-pull rod), inspecting the push-pull rods for corrosion, replacing any push-pull rod which has corrosion that is severe enough to cause pitting, or has visible moisture inside the rod, and repairing each push-pull rod that has corrosion but no pitting. This amendment is prompted by one reported incident in which the helicopter pilot encountered severe in-flight vibration due to the failure of a push-pull rod, requiring an emergency landing. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect corrosion and prevent failure of a push-pull rod, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

**DATES:** Effective October 2, 2007.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of October 2, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** You may get the service information identified in this AD from The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, Twin County Airport, P.O. Box 490, Menominee, Michigan 49858.

**Examining the Docket**

You may examine the docket that contains this AD, any comments, and other information on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov> or at the Docket Operations office, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Shawn Malekpour, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, 2300 East Devon Ave., Des Plaines, Illinois 60018, telephone (847) 294-7837, fax (847) 294-7834.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** A proposal to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD for the specified model helicopters was published in the **Federal Register** on January 8, 2007 (72 FR 669). That action proposed to require reviewing the helicopter maintenance records and determining the installation dates for the push-pull rods. If the dates cannot be determined from the maintenance records, using the “Date MFD”, which is located on the helicopter data plate, was proposed to be used as the installation date for the push-pull rods. That action also proposed to require a visual inspection for corrosion on the exterior and interior of the three push-pull rods, part number

(P/N) 28-16253-all dash numbers (for Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters) or P/N 4140532—all dash numbers (for Model TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters), using the compliance times stated in the following table. Replacing any push-pull rod that has corrosion that is severe enough to cause pitting or has moisture inside the rod, and repairing any push-pull rod that has corrosion but no pitting, was proposed to be required before further flight. Repairing a push-pull rod consists of cleaning the push-pull rod, applying a protective coating, and sealing the push-pull rod before remarking and reinstalling it on a helicopter.

Helicopter models	Push-pull rod service life	Compliance times
Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters.	Push-pull rod that has been installed for 20 or more years.	Inspect within 10 hours time-in-service (TIS) or at next annual inspection, whichever occurs first.
Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters.	Push-pull rod that has been installed for 10 or more years, but less than 20 years.	Inspect within 50 hours TIS or at the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first.
Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters.	Push-pull rod that has been installed for less than 10 years.	Inspect before the service life of the push-pull rod reaches 10 years since initial installation.
Model TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters .....	Push-pull rod that has been installed for 10 or more years.	Inspect within 50 hours TIS or at the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first.
Model TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters .....	Push-pull rod that has been installed for less than 10 years.	Inspect before the service life of the push-pull rod reaches 10 years since initial installation.

We have reviewed the following service information:

- Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Directive Bulletin No. 0096, dated September 10, 2003, which describes visually inspecting the push-pull rods for corrosion and internal moisture, provides for repairing light corrosion, and is applicable to Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters.
- Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Directive Bulletin No. T-019, dated September 10, 2003, which describes visually inspecting the push-pull rods for corrosion and internal moisture, provides for repairing light corrosion, and is applicable to Model TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters.
- Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Information Letter (SIL) No. T-019, dated December 9, 2003, applicable to Model TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters, which describes visually inspecting each push-pull rod for a crack, nick, scratch, dent, corrosion, damaged threads, bending, and contact wear. We are not proposing to require the inspections specified in the SIL.
- Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Information Letter No. 0156, dated December 9, 2003, applicable to Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters, which

describes visually inspecting each push-pull rod for a crack, nick, scratch, dent, corrosion, damaged threads, bending, and contact wear. We are not proposing to require the inspections specified in the SIL.

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. No comments were received on the proposal or the FAA’s determination of the cost to the public. The FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed.

The FAA estimates that this AD will affect 378 helicopters of U.S. registry, and the required actions will take the following numbers of work hours to accomplish on each helicopter at an average labor rate of \$80 per work hour:

- 8 work hours to remove, disassemble, and inspect the 3 push-pull rods;
- 9 work hours to repair corrosion without pitting, remark each push-pull rod, and reassemble each push-pull rod; and
- 3 work hours to reinstall 3 push-pull rods on the helicopter.

Required parts will cost approximately \$900 per helicopter. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators will be \$945,000

(\$2,500 per helicopter), assuming 3 push-pull rods are replaced on each helicopter.

**Regulatory Findings**

We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD. See the DMS to examine the economic evaluation.

**Authority for This Rulemaking**

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, "General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

**List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39**

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

**Adoption of the Amendment**

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

**PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

**§ 39.13 [Amended]**

■ 2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new airworthiness directive to read as follows:

**2007-11-02 Enstrom Helicopter Company:** Amendment 39-15059. Docket No.

FAA-2006-26771; Directorate Identifier 2005-SW-07-AD.

**Applicability:** Model F-28A, F-28C, and F-28F helicopters, excluding serial number (S/N) 816 and subsequent; Model 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters, excluding S/N 2100 and subsequent; and Model TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters, excluding S/N 5058 and subsequent, certificated in any category.

**Compliance:** Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To detect corrosion and prevent failure of a main rotor push-pull control rod (push-pull rod), and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 10 hours time-in-service (TIS) or at the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first, review the helicopter maintenance records and determine the date that each push-pull rod, part number (P/N) 28-16253—all dash numbers (for Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters) and P/N 4140532—all dash numbers (for Model TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters), was installed. If the date cannot be determined from the maintenance records, use the "Date MFD", which is located on the helicopter data plate, as the installation date for the push-pull rod.

(b) For Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters, using the compliance times stated in Table 1 of this AD, visually inspect the exterior and interior of each of the three push-pull rods for corrosion severe enough to cause pitting or any moisture, paying special attention to the area of the lower fitting, in accordance with section 5.1., INSPECTION, in Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Directive Bulletin No. 0096, dated September 10, 2003 (SDB 0096).

TABLE 1

Helicopter models	Push-pull rod service life	Compliance times
Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters.	Push-pull rod that has been installed for 20 or more years.	Inspect within 10 hours time-in-service (TIS) or at next annual inspection, whichever occurs first.
Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters.	Push-pull rod that has been installed for 10 or more years, but less than 20 years.	Inspect within 50 hours TIS or at the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first.
Model F-28A, F-28C, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters.	Push-pull rod that has been installed for less than 10 years.	Inspect before the service life of the push-pull rod reaches 10 years since initial installation.

(1) Before further flight, if corrosion without pitting is found on a push-pull rod, then repair, reassemble, remark, and reinstall it in accordance with section 5.2., REPAIR/REASSEMBLY, in SDB 0096.

(2) Before further flight, if corrosion is found that is severe enough to cause pitting, or if any moisture is visible on the inside of a push-pull rod, replace it with an airworthy push-pull rod.

**Note 1:** Determining continued serviceability of the push-pull rods by inspecting the exterior only of each push-pull rod is described in Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Information Letter No. 0156, dated December 9, 2003.

(c) For Model TH-28, 480 and 480B helicopters, using the compliance times stated in Table 2 of this AD, visually inspect

the exterior and interior of each of the three push-pull rods for corrosion severe enough to cause pitting or any moisture, paying special attention to the area of the lower fitting, in accordance with section 5.1., INSPECTION, in Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Directive Bulletin No. T-019, dated September 10, 2003 (SDB T-019).

TABLE 2

Helicopter models	Push-pull rod service life	Compliance times
Model TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters .....	Push-pull rod that has been installed for 10 or more years.	Inspect within 50 hours TIS or at the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first.
Model TH-28, 480, and 480B helicopters .....	Push-pull rod that has been installed for less than 10 years.	Inspect before the service life of the push-pull rod reaches 10 years since initial installation.

(1) Before further flight, if corrosion without pitting is found on a push-pull rod, then repair, reassemble, remark, and reinstall it in accordance with section 5.2., REPAIR/REASSEMBLY, in SDB T-019.

(2) Before further flight, if corrosion is found that is severe enough to cause pitting, or if any moisture is visible on the inside of a push-pull rod, replace it with an airworthy push-pull rod.

**Note 2:** Determining continued serviceability of the push-pull rods by inspecting the exterior only of each push-pull rod is described in Enstrom Helicopter

Corporation Service Information Letter No. T-019, dated December 9, 2003.

(d) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Contact the Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, Small Airplane Directorate, FAA, for information about previously approved alternative methods of compliance.

(e) The inspection and replacement, if necessary, shall be done in accordance with Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Directive Bulletin No. 0096, dated September 10, 2003; Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Directive Bulletin No. T-019, dated September 10, 2003; Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Information Letter No. T-019, dated December 9, 2003; or Enstrom Helicopter Corporation Service Information Letter No. 0156, dated December 9, 2003, as applicable. The Director of the Federal Register approved these incorporations by reference in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation, Twin County Airport, P.O. Box 490, Menominee, Michigan 49858. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: [http://www.archives.gov/federal\\_register/code\\_of\\_federal\\_regulations/ibr\\_locations.html](http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html).

(f) This amendment becomes effective on October 2, 2007.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on July 5, 2007.

**David A. Downey,**

*Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E7-16770 Filed 8-27-07; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2003-NM-194-AD; Amendment 39-15177; AD 2007-17-19]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### **Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

**ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections and functional tests of the static port heater

assemblies, and corrective actions if necessary. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an electrical short of the static port heater from sparking and igniting the insulation blanket adjacent to the static port heater, which could result in smoke and/or fire in the cabin area. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.

**DATES:** Effective October 2, 2007.

The incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of October 2, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Natalie Phan-Tran, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone (562) 627-5343; fax (562) 627-5210.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 airplanes was published as a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the **Federal Register** on December 20, 2005 (70 FR 75435). That action proposed to require repetitive inspections and functional tests of the static port heater assemblies, repetitive inspections of the static port heaters and insulators, and corrective actions if necessary.

#### **Actions Since Issuance of Supplemental NPRM**

We proposed in paragraph (b)(2) of the supplemental NPRM to require repetitive inspections for proper installation of the static port heaters and insulation. This proposal was in response to a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) comment on the original NPRM. However, we have reassessed the safety implications of the issue based on additional information that we received from Boeing. Although we understand the NTSB's concern, we

have determined that the inspections in paragraph (b)(2) of the supplemental NPRM are not necessary to address the identified unsafe condition. We have revised paragraph (b) of this AD to remove the requirement to inspect for proper installation for the following reasons.

We have concluded that the incorrect stacking of the heater assembly does not contribute to the heater connector wire damage and is therefore not a safety concern.

We based our original decision to incorporate a one-time inspection for incorrect stacking into the original NPRM on the following statement made to the FAA in Boeing Letter C1-L4L-03-0700, dated June 3, 2003.

Boeing's evaluation included Delta's recommendation to redesign the " \* \* \* heater resistance wires \* \* \*" or heater element to incorporate larger bend radii. The problems of excessive localized heating near the bend radii of the element encountered by Delta may be attributed to heaters that were assembled improperly due to the AMM error. Delta's statements in its report indicate finding heater blankets improperly assembled. Boeing concurs with Delta that this assembly error would cause excessive heating and Boeing also believes this condition could lead to delamination or other damage in the bend radii areas.

Then, in the supplemental NPRM, we agreed with the NTSB recommendation to require repetitive inspections to address any incorrect stacking that might occur in the future.

After Boeing commented on the supplemental NPRM (see "Comments" section below), we contacted Boeing to clarify its comments. At the same time, in order to better understand the need for a repetitive inspection for proper installation as the NTSB recommended, we asked Boeing to provide us with additional information on the cause and effect of improper installation (incorrect stacking).

We specifically requested that Boeing clarify the definition of "excessive heating" and "other damage in the bend radii areas." Boeing confirmed that the bend radii area of the heater assembly is the internal heating element bend radii, within the laminated elastomer and is not the bend radii of the connector wire. Based on this statement, we concluded that the incorrect stacking of the heater as we understood before does not contribute to heater connector wire damage.

Our evaluation of the additional information has resulted in a better understanding of "excessive heating." We determined that improper stack-up of the static port heater might cause the heater assembly to run longer at the