(Tentative).

d. System Energy Resources, Inc. (Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf ESP Site); response to NEPA/terrorism issue (Tentative).

Tuesday, January 30, 2007

10 a.m. Discussion of Security Issues (Closed-Ex. 3).

1:30 p.m. Discussion of Security Issues (Closed-Ex. 1).

Thursday, February 1, 2007

9:25 a.m. Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) (Tentative)

a. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant) (Tentative).

9:30 a.m. Discussion of Management Issues (Closed-Ex. 2).

1:30 p.m. Briefing on Strategic Workforce Planning and Human Capital Initiatives (Public Meeting) (Contact: Mary Ellen Beach, 301 415–6803). This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address—*www.nrc.gov*

Week of February 5, 2007—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for the Week of February 5, 2007.

Week of February 12, 2007—Tentative

Thursday, February 15, 2007

9:30 a.m. Briefing on Office of Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) Programs, Performance, and Plans (Public Meeting) (Contact: Edward New, 301–415–5646).

This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address—*www.nrc.gov*.

Week of February 19, 2007—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for the Week of February 19, 2007.

Week of February 26, 2007—Tentative

Wednesday, February 28, 2007

9:30 a.m. Periodic Briefing on New Reactor Issues (Public Meeting) (Contact: Donna Williams, 301–415–1322).

This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address—*www.nrc.gov*.

Week of March 5, 2007—Tentative

Monday, March 5, 2007

1 p.m. Meeting with Department of Energy on New Reactor Issues (Public Meeting).

This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address—*www.nrc.gov.*

Tuesday, March 6, 2007

1 p.m. Discussion of Management Issues (Closed-Ex. 2) (Tentative).

Wednesday, March 7, 2007

9:30 a.m. Briefing on Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) Programs, Performance, and Plans (Public Meeting).

This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address—*www.nrc.gov.*

1 p.m. Discussion of Security Issues (Closed-Ex. 1 and 3).

Thursday, March 8, 2007

10 a.m. Briefing on Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) Programs, Performance, and Plans (Public Meeting).

This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address—*www.nrc.gov.*

1 p.m. Briefing on Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Programs, Performance, and Plans (Public Meeting).

This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address—*www.nrc.gov.*

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*The schedule for Commission meetings is subject to change on short notice. To verify the status of meetings call (recording)—(301) 415–1292. Contact person for more information: Michelle Schroll, (301) 415–1662.

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Additional Information

Affirmation of ''Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon ISFSI), Docket No. 72–26–ISFSI, response to the Supreme Court's potential denial of certiorari'' tentatively scheduled on Monday, January 29, 2007, at 10:50 a.m. has been postponed and will be rescheduled.

''Discussion of Security Issues (Closed-Ex. 1 & 3)'' previously scheduled on Wednesday, January 31, 2007, at 9:30 a.m. has been postponed and will be rescheduled.

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The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the Internet at: *www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/policy-making/schedule.html.*

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The NRC provides reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities where appropriate. If you need a reasonable accommodation to participate in these public meetings, or need this meeting notice or the transcript or other information from the public meetings in another format (*e.g.* braille, large print), please notify the NRC's Disability Program Coordinator, Deborah Chan, at 301–415–7041, TDD: 301–415–2100, or by e-mail at *DLC@nrc.gov.* Determinations on requests for reasonable accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis.

* * * * *

This notice is distributed by mail to several hundred subscribers; if you no longer wish to receive it, or would like to be added to the distribution, please contact the Office of the Secretary, Washington, D.C. 20555 (301–415–1969). In addition, distribution of this meeting notice over the Internet system is available. If you are interested in receiving this Commission meeting schedule electronically, please send an electronic message to *dkw@nrc.gov.*

Dated: January 25, 2007.

R. Michelle Schroll,

Office of the Secretary.

[FR Doc. 07–415 Filed 1–26–07; 1:50 pm]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

I. Background

Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from January 5, 2007 to January 18, 2007. The last biweekly notice was published on January 16, 2007 (72 FR 1779).

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3)

involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment period or the notice period, it will publish in the **Federal Register** a notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking, Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of this **Federal Register** notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ''Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/*. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed within 60 days, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.

Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner/requestor intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner/requestor intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/requestor who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing.

If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and

Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, *HearingDocket@nrc.gov*; or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415–1101, verification number is (301) 415–1966. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to (301) 415–3725 or by e-mail to *OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov*. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition, request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(a)(1)(i)–(viii).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the ADAMS Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html*. If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397–4209, (301) 415–4737 or by e-mail to *pdr@nrc.gov*.

AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket No. 50–461, Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, DeWitt County, Illinois

Date of amendment request: November 16, 2006.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.6.5.1, ''Drywell,'' Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.5.1.3 to delay the performance of the next drywell bypass leakage rate test (DBLRT) from the current requirement of ''November 23, 2008'' to ''prior to startup from the C1R12 refueling outage'' which is currently scheduled for January 2010. This request would also revise TS 5.5.13, ''Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program,'' to delay the performance of the next primary containment Type A integrated leak rate test (ILTR) from the current requirement of ''no later than November 23, 2008'' to ''prior to startup from the C1R12 refueling outage.''

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change will revise TS 3.6.5.1, ''Drywell,'' SR 3.6.5.1 .3 to defer the performance of the next DBLRT to prior to startup from the C1R12 refueling outage. This request will also revise CPS TS 5.5.13, ''Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program,'' to reflect a one-time deferral of the primary containment Type A test to prior to startup from the C1R12 refueling outage. The current Type A test and DBLRT interval of 15 years, based on past performance, would be extended on a onetime basis to 16.25 years (i.e., approximately 15 years plus 15 months) from the last Type A test and DBLRT.

The drywell houses the reactor pressure vessel, the reactor coolant recirculation loops, and branch connections of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), which have isolation valves at the primary containment boundary. The function of the drywell is to maintain a pressure boundary that channels steam resulting from a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) to the suppression pool, where it is condensed. Air forced from the drywell is released into the primary containment through the suppression pool. The suppression pool is a concentric open container of water with a stainless steel liner that is located at the bottom of the primary containment. The suppression pool is designed to absorb the decay heat and sensible heat released during a reactor blowdown from safety/relief valve (SRV) discharges or from a LOCA.

The function of the Mark III containment is to isolate and contain fission products released from the RCS following a design basis LOCA and to confine the postulated release of radioactive material to within limits. The test interval associated with the drywell bypass leakage and Type A testing is not a precursor of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, extending these test intervals on a one-time basis from 15 years to 16.25 years does not result in an increase in the probability of occurrence of an accident. The successful performance history of the drywell bypass leakage and Type A testing provides assurance that the CPS drywell and primary containment will not exceed allowable leakage rate values specified in the TS and will continue to perform its design function following an accident. The risk assessment of the proposed changes has concluded that there is an insignificant increase in total population dose rate and an insignificant increase in the conditional containment failure probability.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes for a one-time extension of the DBLRT and Type A test will not affect the control parameters governing unit operations or the response of plant equipment to transient and accident conditions. The proposed changes do not introduce any new equipment or modes of system operation. No installed equipment will be operated in a new or different manner. As such, no new failure mechanisms are introduced.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

CPS is a General Electric BWR/6 plant with a Mark III containment system. The Mark III containment design is a single-barrier pressure containment and a multi-barrier fission containment system consisting of the drywell and primary containment. The drywell houses the reactor pressure vessel, the reactor coolant recirculation loops, and branch connections of the RCS, which have isolation valves at the primary containment boundary. The function of the drywell is to maintain a pressure boundary that channels steam from a LOCA to the suppression pool, where it is condensed. The suppression pool is an annular pool of demineralized water between the drywell and the outer primary containment boundary. This pool covers the horizontal vent openings in the drywell to maintain a water seal between the drywell interior and the remainder of the containment volume. The primary containment consists of a steel-lined, reinforced concrete vessel, which surrounds the RCS and provides an essentially leak-tight barrier against an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to the environment. Additionally, the containment structure provides shielding from the fission products that may be present in the primary containment atmosphere following accident conditions. The primary containment is penetrated by access, piping and electrical penetrations.

The integrity of the drywell is periodically verified by performance of the DBLRT. This test ensures that the measured drywell bypass leakage is bounded by the safety analysis assumptions. The drywell integrity is further verified by a number of additional tests, including drywell airlock door seal leakage tests, overall drywell airlock leakage tests and periodic visual inspections of exposed accessible interior and exterior drywell surfaces. Additional confidence that significant degradation in the drywell leaktightness has not developed is provided by the periodic qualitative assessment of drywell performance.

The integrity of the primary containment penetrations and isolation valves is verified

through Type B and Type C local leak rate tests (LLRTs) and the overall leak-tight integrity of the primary containment is verified by a Type A integrated leak rate test (ILRT) as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. These tests are performed to verify the essentially leak-tight characteristics of the primary containment at the design basis accident pressure. The proposed changes for a one-time extension of the drywell bypass leakage and Type A tests do not affect the method for drywell or containment testing or the test acceptance criteria.

AmerGen has conducted a risk assessment to determine the impact of a change to the CPS Type A ILRT and DBLRT schedule from the originally licensed baseline frequency of three tests in 10 years to one test in 15 years plus 15 months (*i.e.*, approximately 16.25 years) for the risk measures of Large Early Release Frequency (*i.e.*, LERF), Population Dose, and Conditional Containment Failure Probability (*i.e.*, CCFP). This assessment indicated that the proposed CPS interval extension has a small change in risk to the public and is an acceptable plant change from a risk perspective.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, AmerGen concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, ''Issuance of amendment,'' paragraph (c), and, accordingly, a finding of ''no significant hazards consideration'' is justified.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Assistant General Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 200 Exelon Way, Kennett Square, PA 19348.

NRC Branch Chief: Michael L. Marshall, Jr.

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50–293, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth County, Massachusetts

Date of amendment request: November 2, 2006.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would modify requirements for inoperable snubbers consistent with the Technical Specification Task Force 372, Revision 4.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported system technical specification (TS) when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated seismic event requiring snubbers is a low-probability occurrence and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the vast majority of anticipated challenges. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased, if at all. The consequences of an accident while relying on allowance provided by proposed LCO [limiting condition for operation] 3.0.8 are no different than the consequences of an accident while relying on the TS required actions in effect without the allowance provided by proposed LCO 3.0.8. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated.

The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). Allowing delay times for entering supported system TS when inoperability is due solely to inoperable snubbers, if risk is assessed and managed, will not introduce new failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in [a] Margin of Safety.

The proposed change allows a delay time for entering a supported system TS when the inoperability is due solely to an inoperable snubber, if risk is assessed and managed. The postulated seismic event requiring snubbers is a low-probability occurrence and the overall TS system safety function would still be available for the vast majority of anticipated challenges. The risk impact of the proposed TS changes was assessed following the three-tiered approach recommended in RG [Regulatory Guide] 1.177. A bounding risk assessment was performed to justify the proposed TS changes. This application of LCO 3.0.8 is predicated upon the licensee's performance of a risk assessment and the management of plant risk. The net change to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: J. M. Fulton, Esquire, Assistant General Counsel, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, 600 Rocky Hill Road, Plymouth, Massachusetts, 02360–5599

NRC Branch Chief: Richard Laufer.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC, Docket Nos. 50–254 and 50–265, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois

Date of amendment request: November 7, 2006.

Description of amendment request: The proposed change revises Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.4.3.1 to increase the allowable as-found main steam safety valve (MSSV) lift setpoint tolerance from ± 1 percent to ± 3 percent. In addition, the proposed change revises SR 3.1.7.10 to increase the enrichment of sodium pentaborate used in the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) system from ≥ 30.0 atom percent boron-10 to ≥ 45.0 atom percent boron-10.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change increases the allowable as-found MSSV lift setpoint tolerance, determined by test after the valves have been removed from service, from ± 1% to ± 3%. The proposed change does not alter the TS requirements for the number of MSSVs required to be operable, the nominal lift setpoints, the allowable as-left lift setpoint tolerance, the MSSV testing frequency, or the manner in which the valves are operated.

Consistent with current TS requirements, the proposed change continues to require that the MSSVs be adjusted to within ± 1% of their nominal lift setpoints following testing. Since the proposed change does not alter the manner in which the valves are operated, there is no significant impact on reactor operation.

The proposed change does not involve a physical change to the valves, nor does it change the safety function of the valves. The proposed TS revision involves no significant changes to the operation of any systems or components in normal or accident operating

conditions and no changes to existing structures, systems, or components, with the exception of the SLC system enrichment change. The proposed change to increase the enrichment of sodium pentaborate used in the SLC system will ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62, ''Requirements for reduction of risk from anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events for light-water-cooled nuclear power plants,'' continue to be met. The SLC system is not an initiator to an accident; rather, the SLC system is used to mitigate an ATWS event. Therefore, these changes will not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

Generic considerations related to the change in setpoint tolerance were addressed in NEDC–3175310, ''BWROG In-Service Pressure Relief Technical Specification Revision Licensing Topical Report,'' and were reviewed and approved by the NRC in a safety evaluation dated March 8, 1993. General Electric Company (GE) completed plant-specific analyses to assess the impact of the setpoint tolerance increase on Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3 and QCNPS [Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station] Units 1 and 2. The impact of the MSSV setpoint tolerance increase, as addressed in this analysis, included vessel overpressure, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 15 events, ATWS, Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), containment response and loads, high pressure systems performance, Appendix R fire protection, vessel thermal cycle, operating mode and equipment out of service review, and extended power uprate evaluation review. The proposed change to 3% setpoint tolerance is supported by Westinghouse SVEA–96 Optimal fuel analysis of events that credit the MSSVs.

The plant specific evaluations, required by the NRC's safety evaluation and performed to support this proposed change, show that there is no change to the design core thermal limits and adequate margin to the reactor vessel pressure limits using a ±3% lift setpoint tolerance. These analyses also show that operation of Emergency Core Cooling Systems is not affected, and the containment response following a LOCA is acceptable. The plant systems associated with these proposed changes are capable of meeting applicable design basis requirements and retain the capability to mitigate the consequences of accidents described in the UFSAR. The accident analyses that credit the initiation of SLC as a dose mitigation feature are not impacted by the proposed change because the chemical properties of the SLC boron solution are not affected. Therefore, these changes do not involve an increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change increases the allowable as-found lift setpoint tolerance for the QCNPS MSSVs, and increases the required enrichment of sodium pentaborate used in the SLC system. The proposed change to increase the enrichment of sodium pentaborate used in the SLC system will ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 continue to be met.

The proposed change to increase the MSSV tolerance was developed in accordance with the provisions contained in the NRC safety evaluation for NEDC–31753P. MSSVs installed in the plant following testing or refurbishment will continue to meet the current tolerance acceptance criteria of ± 1% of the nominal setpoint. The proposed change does not affect the manner in which the overpressure protection system is operated; therefore, there are no new failure mechanisms for the overpressure protection system. The proposed change to allow an increase in the MSSV setpoint tolerance does not alter the nominal MSSV lift setpoints or the number of MSSVs currently required to be operable by QCNPS TS. The proposed change does not involve physical changes to the valves, nor does it change the safety function of the valves. There is no alteration to the parameters within which the plant is normally operated. As a result, no new failure modes are being introduced.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The margin of safety is established through the design of the plant structures, systems, and components, the parameters within which the plant is operated, and the establishment of the setpoints for the actuation of equipment relied upon to respond to an event. The proposed change does not modify the safety limits or setpoints at which protective actions are initiated, and does not change the requirements governing operation or availability of safety equipment assumed to operate to preserve the margin of safety.

Establishment of the ± 3% MSSV setpoint tolerance limit does not adversely impact the operation of any safety-related component or equipment. Evaluations performed in accordance with the NRC safety evaluation for NEDC–31753P have concluded that all design limits will continue to be met.

The proposed change to increase the enrichment of sodium pentaborate used in the SLC system will ensure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 continue to be met.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Based upon the above, EGC [Exelon Generation Company] concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92 (c), and, accordingly, a finding of no significant hazards consideration is justified.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Assistant General Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 200 Exelon Way, Kennett Square, PA 19348.

NRC Branch Chief: Michael L. Marshall, Jr.

Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska

Date of amendment request: December 20, 2006.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would remove annotations referencing Technical Data Book (TDB)–VIII, ''Equipment Operability Guidance,'' and annotations referencing Technical Specification Interpretations (TSIs) from the NRC Authority File. These documents are used by Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) personnel for additional guidance in applying certain Limiting Conditions for Operation requirements to specific equipment and/or situations. OPPD has annotated references to these documents in the Technical Specification (TS) copies used at Fort Calhoun Station (FCS); however, the annotations are ''pointers'' to additional guidance and are not officially a part of the FCS TS. The proposed amendment also corrects an administrative discrepancy in TS 2.10.4(1)(c).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The correction of administrative discrepancies in the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Technical Specifications (TS) is not an initiator of any previously evaluated accident. The proposed changes will not prevent safety systems from performing their accident mitigation function as assumed in the safety analysis.

Therefore, this change does not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes only affect the Technical Specifications and do not involve a physical change to the plant. Modifications

will not be made to existing components nor will any new or different types of equipment be installed. This change will not alter assumptions made in safety analysis and licensing bases.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The correction of administrative discrepancies in the Technical Specifications has no impact on any safety analysis assumptions and thus this TS change does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: James R. Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006–3817.

NRC Branch Chief: David Terao.

Omaha Public Power District, Docket No. 50–285, Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, Washington County, Nebraska

Date of amendment request: December 20, 2006.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would delete the Technical Specification (TS) requirements related to the hydrogen purge system in TS 2.6(3) and TS Table 3–5, Item 17. The proposed TS changes support implementation of the revisions to 10 CFR 50.44, ''Standards for Combustible Gas Control System in Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors,'' that became effective on September 16, 2003. The changes are consistent with Revision 1 of NRC-approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF–447, ''Elimination of Hydrogen Recombiners and Change to Hydrogen and Oxygen Monitors.''

The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity to comment in the **Federal Register** dated August 2, 2002 (67 FR 50374), on possible amendments for the elimination of requirements for hydrogen recombiners, and hydrogen and oxygen monitors from the TSs, including a model safety evaluation and model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination, using the consolidated line item improvement process. The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of availability of the model for referencing in license amendment applications in the **Federal Register** on September 25, 2003 (68 FR 55416). The licensee affirmed the applicability of the NSHC in its application dated December 20, 2006.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The revised 10 CFR 50.44 no longer defines a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) hydrogen release, and eliminates requirements for hydrogen control systems to mitigate such a release. The installation of hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge systems required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen generation that was postulated from a design-basis LOCA. The Commission has found that this hydrogen release is not risk-significant because the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not contribute to the conditional probability of a large release up to approximately 24 hours after the onset of core damage. In addition, these systems were ineffective at mitigating hydrogen releases from risk-significant accident sequences that could threaten containment integrity.

With the elimination of the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release, hydrogen [and oxygen] monitors are no longer required to mitigate design-basis accidents and, therefore, the hydrogen monitors do not meet the definition of a safety-related component as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. RG 1.97 Category 1, is intended for key variables that most directly indicate the accomplishment of a safety function for design-basis accident events. The hydrogen [and oxygen] monitors no longer meet the definition of Category 1 in RG 1.97. As part of the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44 the Commission found that Category 3, as defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate categorization for the hydrogen monitors because the monitors are required to diagnose the course of beyond design-basis accidents. [Also, as part of the rulemaking to revise 10 CFR 50.44, the Commission found that Category 2, as defined in RG 1.97, is an appropriate categorization for the oxygen monitors, because the monitors are required to verify the status of the inert containment.]

The regulatory requirements for the hydrogen [and oxygen] monitors can be relaxed without degrading the plant emergency response. The emergency response, in this sense, refers to the methodologies used in ascertaining the condition of the reactor core, mitigating the consequences of an accident, assessing and projecting offsite releases of radioactivity, and establishing protective action recommendations to be communicated to offsite authorities. Classification of the hydrogen monitors as Category 3, [classification of the oxygen monitors as Category 2] and removal of the hydrogen [and oxygen] monitors from TS will not prevent an accident management strategy through the use of the SAMGs, the emergency plan (EP), the emergency operating procedures (EOP), and site survey monitoring that support modification of emergency plan protective action recommendations (PARs).

Therefore, the elimination of the hydrogen recombiner requirements and relaxation of the hydrogen [and oxygen] monitor requirements, including removal of these requirements from TS, does not involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

The elimination of the hydrogen recombiner requirements and relaxation of the hydrogen [and oxygen] monitor requirements, including removal of these requirements from TS, will not result in any failure mode not previously analyzed. The hydrogen recombiner and hydrogen [and oxygen] monitor equipment was intended to mitigate a design-basis hydrogen release. The hydrogen recombiner and hydrogen [and oxygen] monitor equipment are not considered accident precursors, nor does their existence or elimination have any adverse impact on the pre-accident state of the reactor core or post accident confinement of radionuclides within the containment building.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

The elimination of the hydrogen recombiner requirements and relaxation of the hydrogen [and oxygen] monitor requirements, including removal of these requirements from TS, in light of existing plant equipment, instrumentation, procedures, and programs that provide effective mitigation of and recovery from reactor accidents, results in a neutral impact to the margin of safety.

The installation of hydrogen recombiners and/or vent and purge systems required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(3) was intended to address the limited quantity and rate of hydrogen generation that was postulated from a design-basis LOCA. The Commission has found that this hydrogen release is not risk-significant because the design-basis LOCA hydrogen release does not contribute to the conditional probability of a large release up to approximately 24 hours after the onset of core damage.

Category 3 hydrogen monitors are adequate to provide rapid assessment of current reactor core conditions and the direction of degradation while effectively responding to the event in order to mitigate the consequences of the accident. The intent of the requirements established as a result of the TMI, Unit 2 accident can be adequately met without reliance on safety-related hydrogen monitors.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. [The intent of the requirements established as a result of the TMI, Unit 2 accident can be

adequately met without reliance on safety-related oxygen monitors.] Removal of hydrogen [and oxygen] monitoring from TS will not result in a significant reduction in their functionality, reliability, and availability.

Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Attorney for licensee: James R. Curtiss, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006–3817.

NRC Branch Chief: David Terao.

Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing in connection with these actions was published in the **Federal Register** as indicated.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action, see (1) the applications for amendment, (2) the amendment, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management Systems (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the internet at the NRC Web site, *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.* If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397–4209, (301) 415–4737 or by e-mail to *pdr@nrc.gov.*

Southern California Edison Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, San Diego County, California

Date of application for amendments: December 27, 2004, as supplemented by letters dated October 27, 2005, March 10, and October 6, 2006.

Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, accident source term used in the design-basis radiological consequence analyses. The amendments were in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.67, which addresses the use of an alternative source term (AST) at operating reactors, and relevant guidance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183. The amendments represent full-scope implementation of the AST described in RG 1.183.

Date of issuance: December 29, 2006.

Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 180 days of issuance.

Amendment Nos.: Unit 2—210; Unit 3—202.

Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–10 and NPF–15: The amendments revised the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

Date of initial notice in ***Federal Register:*** February 1, 2005 (70 FR 5248). The supplemental letters dated October 27, 2005, March 10, and October 6, 2006, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 29, 2006.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

*Southern California Edison Company, et al.***,** *Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3, San Diego County, California*

Date of application for amendments: March 10, 2006, as supplemented by submittal dated May 16, 2006.

Brief description of amendments: The amendments conform the Facility Operating Licenses NPF–10 and NPF–15 for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 (SONGS 2 and 3) to reflect their transfer from the City of Anaheim (Anaheim) to Southern California Edison (SCE). The license transfers, which were approved by the Order dated September 27, 2006, permitted the transfer of the 3.16-percent undivided ownership interest in the facilities held by Anaheim to SCE, excluding Anaheim's interest in its spent fuel and in the SONGS 2 and 3 independent spent fuel storage installation. SCE retains exclusive responsibility and control over the operation of SONGS 2 and 3.

Date of issuance: December 29, 2006.

Effective date: At the time the transfer is completed.

Amendment Nos.: Unit 2—209; Unit 3—201.

Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–10 and NPF–15: The amendments revised the Facility Operating Licenses.

Date of initial notice in ***Federal Register:*** June 8, 2006 (71 FR 33321) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 27, 2006.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket No. 50–259 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Limestone County, Alabama

Date of application for amendment: January 6, 2006 (TS–443), as supplemented by letter dated October 2, 2006.

Brief description of amendment: Activation of thermal-hydraulic stability monitoring instrumentation. The Oscillation Power Range Monitor System is designed to provide the licensee's solution regarding reactor stability.

Date of issuance: December 29, 2006.

Effective date: Date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days.

Amendment No.: 266.

Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR–33: Amendment revised the TSs.

Date of initial notice in ***Federal Register:*** April 5, 2006 (71 FR 23962). The October 2, 2006, supplement, contained clarifying information and

did not change the NRC staff's initial proposed finding of no significant hazards consideration determination. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated December 29, 2006.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Final Determination of No Significant Hazards Consideration and Opportunity for a Hearing (Exigent Public Announcement or Emergency Circumstances)

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Because of exigent or emergency circumstances associated with the date the amendment was needed, there was not time for the Commission to publish, for public comment before issuance, its usual Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing.

For exigent circumstances, the Commission has either issued a **Federal Register** notice providing opportunity for public comment or has used local media to provide notice to the public in the area surrounding a licensee's facility of the licensee's application and of the Commission's proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. The Commission has provided a reasonable opportunity for the public to comment, using its best efforts to make available to the public means of communication for the public to respond quickly, and in the case of telephone comments, the comments have been recorded or transcribed as appropriate and the licensee has been informed of the public comments.

In circumstances where failure to act in a timely way would have resulted, for example, in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant's licensed power level, the Commission may not have had an opportunity to provide for public comment on its no significant hazards consideration determination. In such case, the license amendment has been issued without opportunity for comment. If there has been some time for public comment but less than 30 days, the Commission may provide an opportunity for public comment. If comments have been requested, it is so stated. In either event, the State has been consulted by telephone whenever possible.

Under its regulations, the Commission may issue and make an amendment immediately effective, notwithstanding the pendency before it of a request for a hearing from any person, in advance of the holding and completion of any required hearing, where it has determined that no significant hazards consideration is involved.

The Commission has applied the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The basis for this determination is contained in the documents related to this action. Accordingly, the amendments have been issued and made effective as indicated.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the application for amendment, (2) the amendment to Facility Operating License, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment, as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.* If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397–4209, (301) 415–4737 or by e-mail to *pdr@nrc.gov.*

The Commission is also offering an opportunity for a hearing with respect to the issuance of the amendment. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ''Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland, and electronically on the Internet at the NRC Web site, *http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/.* If there are problems in accessing the document, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397–4209, (301) 415–4737, or by e-mail to *pdr@nrc.gov.* If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must also identify the specific contentions which the petitioner/

requestor seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.

Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact.[1] Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner/requestor who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Each contention shall be given a separate numeric or alpha designation within one of the following groups:

1. *Technical*—primarily concerns/issues relating to technical and/or health and safety matters discussed or referenced in the applications.

2. *Environmental*—primarily concerns/issues relating to matters discussed or referenced in the environmental analysis for the applications.

3. *Miscellaneous*—does not fall into one of the categories outlined above.

As specified in 10 CFR 2.309, if two or more petitioners/requestors seek to co-sponsor a contention, the petitioners/requestors shall jointly designate a representative who shall have the authority to act for the petitioners/requestors with respect to that contention. If a petitioner/requestor seeks to adopt the contention of another sponsoring petitioner/requestor, the petitioner/requestor who seeks to adopt the contention must either agree that the sponsoring petitioner/requestor shall act as the representative with respect to that contention, or jointly designate with the sponsoring petitioner/requestor a representative who shall have the authority to act for the petitioners/requestors with respect to that contention.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing. Since the Commission has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, if a hearing is requested, it will not stay the effectiveness of the amendment. Any hearing held would take place while the amendment is in effect.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed by: (1) First-class mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services: Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff; (3) E-mail addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, *HearingDocket@nrc.gov;* or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415–1101, verification number is (301) 415–1966. A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by means of facsimile transmission to (301) 415–3725 or by e-mail to *OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov.* A copy of the request for hearing and petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition, request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(a)(1)(i)–(viii).

STP Nuclear Operating Company, Docket No. 50–498, South Texas Project, Unit 1, Matagorda County, Texas

Date of amendment request: December 20, 2006, as supplemented by letter dated December 28, 2006.

Description of amendment request: The amendment, for a one-time change, revised Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2 for the loss of power (LOP) instrumentation (Functional Unit 8, ''loss of power'') in TS Table 3.3–3, ''Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation.'' A note is added to TS Table 3.3–3, Action 20, which is the TS-required action for inoperable LOP instrumentation, to allow a one-time provision for corrective maintenance on an inoperable Unit 1 LOP instrumentation channel when the number of operable channels are more than one less than the total number of channels. This provision for corrective maintenance expires 30 days after the amendment is approved.

Date of issuance: January 11, 2007.

Effective date: Effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented by January 15, 2007.

Amendment No.: 176.

Facility Operating License No. NPF–76: The amendment revised the Technical Specifications and Facility Operating License.

Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration (NSHC): No.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of emergency circumstances, state consultation, and final NSHC determination are contained in a safety evaluation dated January 11, 2007.

Attorney for licensee: A. H. Gutterman, Esq., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20004.

NRC Branch Chief: David Terao.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of January 2007.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

John W. Lubinski,

Deputy Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. E7–1259 Filed 1–29–07; 8:45 am]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release Number IC–27677; File No. 812–13321]

Integrity Life Insurance Company, et al.

January 24, 2007.

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission (the ''Commission'').

ACTION: Notice of application for an order of approval pursuant to Section 26(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the ''Act'').

APPLICANTS: Integrity Life Insurance Company (''Integrity''), Separate

[1] To the extent that the applications contain attachments and supporting documents that are not publicly available because they are asserted to contain safeguards or proprietary information, petitioners desiring access to this information should contact the applicant or applicant's counsel and discuss the need for a protective order.