

Compliance with the requirements contained in this special condition for aspects of the AP/SAS that can result in failure conditions classified as "Catastrophic" may be shown by analysis, and appropriate testing in combination with simulation to validate the analysis. Very limited flight tests in combination with simulation are typically used as a part of a showing of compliance for failures in this classification. Flight tests are performed only in circumstances that use operational variations, or extrapolations from other flight performance aspects to address flight safety.

This special condition requires that the AP/SAS system installed on a Robinson Model R44 helicopter, Type Certification Data Sheet Number H11NM, Revision 3, meet these requirements to adequately address the failure effects identified by the FHA, and subsequently verified by the SSA, within the defined design integrity requirements.

Applicability

This special condition is applicable to the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. AP/SAS installed as an STC approval, in a Robinson Model R44 helicopter, Type Certification Data Sheet Number H11NM, Revision 3.

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features for a Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. AP/SAS STC installed on one model series of helicopter. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the helicopter.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27

Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.

The authority citation for this special condition is as follows:

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572, 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.

Final Special Condition Information

The Special Condition

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special condition is issued as part of the Hoh Aeronautics, Inc. supplemental type certificate basis for an Autopilot/Stability Augmentation System to be installed on a Robinson Model R44 helicopter, Type Certification Data Sheet Number H11NM, Revision 3.

The Autopilot/Stability Augmentation System must be designed and installed

so that the failure conditions identified in the Functional Hazard Assessment and verified by the System Safety Assessment, after design completion, are adequately addressed in accordance with the "Definitions" and "Requirements" sections (including the design integrity, design environmental, and test and analysis requirements) of this special condition.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 21, 2006.

David A. Downey,

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 06–3013 Filed 3–28–06; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2005–19473; Directorate Identifier 2004–CE–35–AD; Amendment 39–14146; AD 2005–13–09]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; GROB–WERKE Model G120A Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

SUMMARY: This document makes a correction to Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2005–13–09, which published in the **Federal Register** on August 23, 2005 (70 FR 49184), and applies to certain GROB–WERKE Model G120A airplanes. AD 2005–13–09 requires replacement of the main landing gear (MLG) up-lock hook assembly. Current language in paragraph (e)(2) of AD 2005–13–09 incorrectly references the MLG up-lock hook assembly as "elevator and aileron hinge pins." This AD corrects that paragraph to reference the appropriate part number MLG up-lock hook assembly.

DATES: The effective date of this AD (2005–13–09) remains July 26, 2005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Schletzbaum, Aerospace Engineer, ACE–112, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone: 816–329–4146; facsimile: 816–329–4090.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

On August 15, 2005, the FAA issued AD 2005–13–09, Amendment 39–14146 (70 FR 49184, August 23, 2005), which applies to certain GROB–WERKE Model G120A airplanes.

AD 2005–13–09 requires replacement of the MLG up-lock hook assembly. Current language in paragraph (e)(2) of AD 2005–13–09 incorrectly references the MLG up-lock hook assembly as "elevator and aileron hinge pins." This AD corrects that paragraph to reference the appropriate part number MLG up-lock hook assembly.

Need for the Correction

This correction is needed to ensure that reference to the MLG up-lock hook assembly part number is correct for future reference. All airplanes currently on the U.S. Register have the actions of AD 2005–13–09 incorporated.

Correction of Publication

■ Accordingly, the publication of August 23, 2005 (70 FR 49184), of Amendment 39–14146; AD 2005–13–09, which was the subject of FR Doc. 05–16440, is corrected as follows:

§ 39.13 [Corrected]

■ On page 49184, in § 39.13 [Amended], in paragraph (e)(2), replace the *Current Text* in the Actions column with the *Replacement Text*.

Current Text: "(2) For all serial numbers: Do not install any elevator and aileron hinge pins that are not part number SY991A hinge pins."

Replacement Text: "(2) Do not install any MLG up-lock hook assembly that is not part number X03–0020–00–00.00/1 (or FAA-approved later part number that supersedes this part number)."

Action is taken herein to correct this reference in AD 2005–13–09 and to add this AD correction to § 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.13).

The effective date remains July 26, 2005.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on March 22, 2006.

William J. Timberlake,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 06–2983 Filed 3–28–06; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Food and Drug Administration

21 CFR Part 101

[Docket No. 2004P–0294]

Food Labeling: Health Claims; Dietary Noncariogenic Carbohydrate Sweeteners and Dental Caries

AGENCY: Food and Drug Administration, HHS.