to assure, among other things, economically efficient execution of securities transactions, and fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between exchange markets and markets other

than exchange markets.

The Commission believes that CBOE's proposal is reasonable because it prohibits a DPM from charging a customer a commission for an order executed without assistance or handling by the DPM or that is not executed at all. The Commission notes that Susquehanna suggested that Section 6(e)(1) of the Act 13 prohibits the Commission from approving a rule that limits the fees charged by DPMs with respect to orders for which DPMs have agency or order handling responsibilities. The Commission disagrees with this commenter and notes that the Commission has not viewed an SRO's limits on fees that its members may charge, even when the member is acting as agent, as inconsistent with Section 6(e) of the Act.14

Section 6(e) of the Act 15 was adopted by Congress in 1975 to statutorily prohibit the fixed minimum commission rate system. As noted in a report of the House of Representatives, one of the purposes of the legislation was to "reverse the industry practice of charging fixed rates of commissions for transactions on the securities exchanges." 16 The fixed minimum commission rate system allowed exchanges to set minimum commission rates that their members had to charge their customers, but allowed members to charge more. CBOE's proposal, by contrast, does not establish a minimum commission rate, but instead prohibits commissions in circumstances in which the DPM is not handling the order or in which the order is not executed. Accordingly, the Commission does not believe that the CBOE's proposal to limit the fees charged by DPMs constitutes fixing commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees for purposes of Section 6(e)(1) of the Act.17

In addition, CBOE's limits on fees that DPMs may charge applies only to members who choose to be DPMs on CBOE. Therefore, CBOE is not fixing fees generally; it is merely imposing a condition, which is consistent with the Act, on a member's appointment as a

DPM. Finally, the Commission does not agree with Susquehanna that the CBOE must expressly provide that DPMs never have any agency obligations towards orders for which they are prohibited from charging a commission.

#### V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national securities exchange, and, in particular, with Sections 6(b)(5) and 6(e)(1) of the Act. 18

It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,19 that the proposed rule change (SR-CBOE-2004-73) is approved.

For the Commission, by the Division of Market Regulation, pursuant to delegated authority.20

## Margaret H. McFarland,

Deputy Secretary.

[FR Doc. E5-786 Filed 2-25-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8010-01-P

## SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-51217; File No. SR-NYSE-2004-54]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Amendments to the NYSE Constitution and the Adoption of an Independence Policy of the NYSE **Board of Directors** 

February 16, 2005.

#### I. Introduction

On September 17, 2004, the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE" or "Exchange") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act") 1 and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,<sup>2</sup> a proposed rule change to implement certain amendments to its Constitution. The proposed rule was published for comment in the Federal Register on January 14, 2005.3 The Commission received no comment letters on the proposed rule change.

This order approves the proposed rule change.

## II. Description of the Proposed Rule Change

The Exchange has proposed amendments to its Constitution with respect to the new governance architecture that was approved by the Commission and implemented by the Exchange in December 2003.4 The Exchange also has proposed an Independence Policy for its Board of Directors ("Board"), which contains standards that NYSE directors must meet to be considered independent.

The proposed changes to the NYSE Constitution are summarized below:

- The Board would have the flexibility to move up its annual meeting of members to make it closer to the end of the Exchange's fiscal year, which coincides with the calendar year, and also to give the Board more flexibility with respect to the timing necessary to report its director nominations to the Exchange's membership, but without reducing the current time period for members to propose nominations by petition.
- The Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") would be recused from participating in any Board review of decisions made by Exchange staff, officers or committees.
- The CEO would be prohibited from requiring reviews of disciplinary decisions and would be recused from participating in Board reviews of any disciplinary decisions.
- In the event the Chairman of the Board is also not the CEO, the CEO would be permitted to serve as Chairman of the Board of Executives, to call meetings of the Board of Executives, and to determine when circumstances require shorter notice of meetings of the Board of Executives than otherwise provided for that group.
- Members of the Board of Executives would be barred from serving on the Hearing Board in light of their participation on the Regulation, **Enforcement & Listing Standards** Committee.
- The qualifications of the floor member representatives on the Board of Executives would be revised to include any individual, other than a specialist, who spends a substantial amount of time on the Exchange floor, in order to reflect the Exchange's entire nonspecialist floor member constituency as it currently exists.
- The current requirement that the Board and the Board of Executives have

<sup>13 15</sup> U.S.C. 78f(e)(1).

 $<sup>^{14}\,</sup>See$  Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49220 (February 11, 2004), 69 FR 7836 (February 19, 2004) (Order approving File No. SR-NASD-2003-128).

<sup>15 15</sup> U.S.C. 78f(e).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 94–123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42

<sup>17 15</sup> U.S.C. 78f(e)(1).

<sup>18 15</sup> U.S.C. 78f(b)(5) and 78f(e)(1).

<sup>19 15</sup> U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).

<sup>20 17</sup> CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> 17 CFR 240.19b-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51015 (January 11, 2005), 70 FR 2688.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 48946 (December 17, 2003), 68 FR 74678 (December 24,

two plenary sessions a year would be replaced by a requirement that each member of the Board attend at least three Board of Executives meetings annually and the Chairman would make an Annual Report on the Exchange's activities solely to the Board of Executives.

- A reference to "Nominating Committee" would be revised to reflect the change in name to "Nominating & Governance Committee."
- The Nominating & Governance Committee no longer would be required to conduct succession planning with respect to the Exchange's Chairman, because the Board now decides whether to separate the offices of Chairman and CEO and then selects the Chairman, if it determines to separate those offices.
- An erroneous reference to "Article VII, Section I" is corrected to refer to "Article VIII, Section 1."

In addition to the changes to the NYSE Constitution, the Exchange also has proposed an Independence Policy for the Board. The Independence Policy would apply to all members of the Board and would require the Board to make an independence determination with respect to each director upon his or her nomination or appointment to the Board and thereafter as the Board considers advisable, but no less frequently than annually. A director would be independent only if the Board determined that the director has no material relationship with the Exchange. In making a determination of independence, the Board would have to consider the special responsibilities of a director in light of the status of the NYSE as a New York non-profit corporation, as a self-regulatory organization, and as a national securities exchange subject to the Commission's supervision, as well as the specific independence qualification standards set forth in the proposed policy. The Independence Policy sets forth standards when a director would not be independent as a result of a relationship with the Exchange, Exchange members, member organizations, non-member brokerdealers, or listed companies. Each director would be responsible for informing the Exchange promptly of any relationships that might bear on the determination of his or her independence. Any director who is no longer independent as a result of the existence of a relationship that violates the independence standards in the NYSE Constitution, or whom the Board determines is no longer independence under the Independence Policy, would be deemed to have tendered his or her resignation. Under Article IV, Section 2

of the NYSE Constitution, the Board is required to adopt specific standards relating to the independence determination, which are to be comparable to standards required of issuers listed on the Exchange, by effecting a rule change within the meaning of Section 19(b)(1) of the Act.

# III. Discussion and Commission Findings

After careful consideration, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national securities exchange.<sup>5</sup> In particular, the Commission finds that, the proposed rule change is consistent with Section 6(b)(1) of the Act 6 which requires that the exchange be "so organized and [have] the capacity to carry out the purposes of [the Act]" and to "enforce compliance by its members and persons associated with its members with the provisions of [the Act]." The Commission also finds that, the proposed rule change is consistent with Section 6(b)(3) of the Act,7 which requires that the rules of a national securities exchange assure the fair representation of its members in the selection of its directors and administration of its affairs, and provide that one or more directors shall be representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with a member of the exchange, broker, or dealer. In addition, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act 8 in that it is designed, among other things, to facilitate transactions in securities; to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices; to promote just and equitable principles of trade; to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system; and in general, to protect investors and the public interest, and does not permit unfair discrimination among issuers. Further, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with Section 6(b)(7) of the Act,9 which, among other things, requires that the rules of a national securities exchange provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members and persons associated with members.

The Commission notes that the proposed changes to the NYSE Constitution would prohibit the CEO from participating in any Board review of decisions by Exchange staff, officers or committees; from requiring reviews of disciplinary decisions; and from participating in reviews by the Board of disciplinary decisions. The Commission also notes that the proposed NYSE Constitution changes would allow the CEO to preside over meetings of the Board of Executives; to call meetings of the Board of Executives; and to determine when circumstances require shorter notice of meetings of the Board of Executives than otherwise provided. The Commission believes that these changes are designed, in a manner consistent with the Exchange's governance architecture, to clarify the role of the CEO and to bolster the separation of the business and regulatory functions of the Exchange. The Commission finds that these NYSE Constitution revisions are consistent with the Act. Further, the proposed rule change would eliminate the Chairman as a subject of mandated succession planning for the Nominating & Governance Committee. In the Commission's view, this change is appropriate in light of the Board's authority to decide whether the offices of Chairman and CEO should be separated.

The Commission also notes that the proposed rule change would prohibit members of the Board of Executives from serving on the Exchange's Hearing Board in light of the fact that members of the Board of Executives currently serve on the Regulation, Enforcement & Listing Standards Committee, which has been delegated by the Board the responsibility to hear appeals of disciplinary matters considered by a Hearing Panel. The Commission notes that the Hearing Board would still consist of members and allied members of the Exchange who are not members of the Board or Board of Executives and registered employees and non-registered employees of members and member organizations. The Commission believes that prohibiting members of the Board of Executives from serving on the Hearing Board is consistent with the Act's requirements.

The Commission notes that the proposed rule change seeks to make several changes to the NYSE Constitution that would affect the administration of the Exchange. These changes include allowing the Board to schedule the annual meeting of members closer to the end of the Exchange's fiscal year; giving the Board more flexibility on the timing of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In approving this proposed rule change, the Commission notes that it has considered the proposed rule's impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. *See* 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).

<sup>6 15</sup> U.S.C. 78f(b)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(3). <sup>8</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(5).

<sup>9 15</sup> U.S.C. 78s(b)(7).

submission of director nominations to the membership; and requiring Board members to attend at least three meetings of the Board of Executives annually instead of requiring two plenary sessions between the Board and the Board of Executives. While these changes are designed to provide the Board with greater flexibility in administering the affairs of the Exchange, particularly with respect to the annual meeting process, they require that the Board provide sufficient advance notice to members of the annual meeting to take into account the number of days for the filing of nomination petitions, the determination by the Board of petition candidates' eligibility, and notice to members of the annual meeting. In the Commission's view, these proposed changes are consistent with the Act. In addition, the Commission notes that the proposed rule change would allow the Board to appoint to the Board of Executives as a floor member representative any member, other than a specialist, who spends a substantial amount of time on the floor. Because this change is intended to reflect more accurately the entire constituency of floor members, other than specialists, who are eligible to serve on the Board of Executives, the Commission believes that this proposal is consistent with the Act.

Finally, the Commission notes that the NYSE has submitted an Independence Policy pursuant to the requirement of Article IV, Section 2 of the NYSE Constitution. This provision of the NYSE Constitution requires the Exchange to adopt standards for determining the independence of its directors, which are to be comparable to the standards required of the Exchange's listed issuers, and to file such standards with the Commission as a proposed rule change under Section 19(b)(1) of the Act. 10 The Commission believes that generally the NYSE's Independence Policy comports with the independence standards required of the Exchange's listed issuers, but the Exchange has tailored its policy to address its role as a self-regulatory organization and as a listed market.<sup>11</sup> The Commission recently proposed governance standards for national securities exchanges and registered securities associations, which, among other things, would require that a majority of the directors of an exchange or association be

independent.<sup>12</sup> The SRO Governance Proposal also would set forth specific criteria for determining the independence of an exchange's or association's directors that are similar, but not identical, to the Exchange's Independence Policy. The Commission believes that, in the current context, the Exchange's proposed Independence Policy is consistent with the Act. The Commission notes, however, that the Exchange would have to conform its Independence Policy, as well as its Constitution and rules, to any rules the Commission may adopt with respect to the governance of exchanges and associations and the independence of their directors.

#### IV. Conclusion

It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,13 that the proposed rule change (SR-NYSE-2004-54) is hereby approved.

For the Commission, by the Division of Market Regulation, pursuant to delegated authority.14

## Margaret H. McFarland,

Deputy Secretary.

[FR Doc. E5–785 Filed 2–25–05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8010-01-P

## **SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION**

[Disaster Declaration # 10027 and # 10028]

#### California Disaster # CA-00003

**AGENCY: U.S. Small Business** Administration.

**ACTION:** Notice.

**SUMMARY:** This is a Notice of an Administrative declaration of a disaster for the State of California, dated February 18, 2005.

Incident: Severe Storms, Flooding, Debris Flows, and Mudslides.

Incident Period: December 27, 2004, through January 11, 2005.

**EFFECTIVE DATE:** February 18, 2005.

Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: April 19, 2005.

EIDL Loan Application Deadline Date: November 18, 2005.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Disaster Area Office 1, 360 Rainbow Blvd. South 3rd Floor, Niagara Falls, NY 14303.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster Assistance,

U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street, Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** Notice is hereby given that as a result of the Administrator's disaster declaration, applications for disaster loans may be filed at the address listed above or other locally announced locations.

The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster:

Primary Counties

San Bernardino.

Contiguous Counties

California

Inyo, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, and Riverside.

Arizona

La Paz and Mohave.

Nevada

Clark.

The Interest Rates are:

	Percent
Homeowners with credit available	
elsewhere	5.875
Homeowners without credit available elsewhere	2.937
Businesses with credit available	2.937
elsewhere	5.800
Businesses and Small Agricultural	
Cooperatives without credit available elsewhere	4.000
Other (Including Non-Profit Organi-	4.000
zations) with credit available	
elsewhere	4.750
Businesses and Non-Profit Organizations without credit available	
elsewhere	4.000

The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage is 10027B and for economic injury is 100280.

The States which received EIDL Decl# are California, Arizona and Nevada.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 59002 and 59008)

Dated: February 18, 2005.

Hector V. Barreto,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 05-3819 Filed 2-25-05; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8025-01-P

## **SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION**

[Disaster Declaration # 10032]

## Kansas Disaster # KS-00001 Disaster Declaration

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business

Administration. **ACTION:** Notice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The independence standards for NYSE listed issuers are found in Section 303A.00 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50699 (November 18, 2004), 69 FR 71126 (December 8, 2004) ("SRO Governance Proposal").

<sup>13</sup> Jd.

<sup>14 17</sup> CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).